Jay v. Dollarhide
| Decision Date | 28 January 1970 |
| Citation | 3 Cal.App.3d 1001,84 Cal.Rptr. 538 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Robert C. JAY, Administrator etc., Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. C. M. DOLLARHIDE et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants. Civ. 1067. |
Robert C. Jay, duly appointed administrator of the estate of Charles H. Maginnis, deceased, brought this action on April 18, 1963, to quiet title to 80 acres of land in Madera County, generally described as the North one-half of the Northeast one-quarter of Section 18, Township 5 South, Range 24 East, M.D.B. & M., as the representative of the estate of Charles H. Maginnis and the heirs thereof. Named as defendants were appellants, Madera Timber Company, a Nevada corporation, C. M. Dollarhide, Roy Maggart, Joseph C. Donnerberg, Jr., and Mrs. Ray Karp.
The plaintiff administrator by an authorized supplementary complaint sought treble damages for trespass against C. M. Dollarhide, Madera Timber Company and Turnbar Timber Company, for cutting and taking timber from the realty in question.
The appellants Charles Dollarhide and Madera Timber Company cross-complained against the estate of Charles H. Maginnis and certain of his heirs, namely, Florence M. Maginnis (his second wife), Charles H. Maginnis (his son), and Margaret Szenes-Dugo (a daughter). As against these heirs, appellants purported to secure a default judgment.
Judgment was for plaintiff on the cause of action for quiet title, and treble damages in the sum of $150,000 were awarded plaintiff for trespass and cutting of lumber. The effect of the default judgment undetermined. This appeal followed.
The Pretrial Conference Order, filed April 1, 1966, stated:
'The issues remaining in dispute are as follows:
'1. Whether or not MADERA TIMBER COMPANY, a Nevada corporation and/or C. M. DOLLARHIDE own said property and are entitled to have a decree quieting title.
'2. Whether or not Plaintiff is the owner of said real property and entitled to have a decree quieting title thereto.
'3. Whether or not Defendants committed trespass upon said real property, and, if so, the amount of compensatory and/or punitive damages, if any, Plaintiff is entitled to recover therefor.
first (Code Civ.Proc. §§ 318, 319, 320) second (Dollarhide an innocent purchaser for value, plaintiff's claim is in bad faith and is estopped), third (plaintiff has not come into court with clean hands), fourth (Marguerite Maginnis is an indispensable party), fifth (Florence M. Maginnis is an indispensable party), or sixth (deed to Maginnis, heirs and assigns is void, since he and Marguerite Maginnis were dead on date of deed of reconveyance from the United States) affirmative defenses, as contained in Defendants' Amendment to Answer.
'5. The effect of the entry of default as against Cross-Defendants FLORENCE M. MAGINNIS, CHARLES H. MAGINNIS and MARGARET SZENES-DUGO, and any judgment by default which may hereafter be entered thereon.
'6. Whether or not the corporate veil of MADERA TIMBER COMPANY should be pierced to subject Defendant C. M. DOLLARHIDE to personal liability for the acts of said corporation.
'* * *
'The case is ordered set for Court Trial on July 5, 6, and 7, 1966 at 10:00 A.M., in the Madera County Superior Court.'
Notice of time and place of trial was waived. The order was signed by the Honorable Howard C. Green, Judge assigned.
The pretrial order superseded the pleadings and controlled the case. (Cal.Rules of Court, rule 216; Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Smith, 262 Cal.App.2d 772, 69 Cal.Rptr. 50; Lauder v. Jobe, 261 Cal.App.2d 539, 68 Cal.Rptr. 63; K. King & G. Shuler Corp. v. King, 259 Cal.App.2d 383, 66 Cal.Rptr. 330; California Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Transport Indemnity Co., 242 Cal.App.2d 749, 51 Cal.Rptr. 797; Mellone v. Lewis, 233 Cal.App.2d 4, 12, 43 Cal.Rptr. 412.)
Such order is as much a part of the law as any other procedural rule. (Thompson v. Guyer-Hays, 207 Cal.App.2d 366, 372, 24 Cal.Rptr. 461.)
Charles H. Maginnis died in 1937, his wife, Marguerite, having predeceased him. A second wife, Florence Maginnis, and other heirs survived him. It is undisputed that the decedent, Charles H. Maginnis, acquired clear title to the base land in question by patent and deed dated November 10, 1899, recorded in Madera County on February 12, 1900. On January 31, 1900, he and his wife, Marguerite Maginnis, executed a deed, recorded February 12, 1900, which recited, in part,
'* * * That Whereas, It is provided by an Act of Congress of June 4, 1897, as follows: 'That in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected bona fide claim or by a patent is included within the limits of a public forest reservation, the settler or owner thereof may, if he desires to do so, relinquish the tract to the Government, and may select in lieu thereof a tract of vacant land open to settlement not exceeding in area the tract covered by his claim or patent'; AND WHEREAS, I, the undersigned am the owner of a certain tract of land (hereinafter described) included within the limits of the Sierra Forest Reservation in the State of California, which land I desire to relinquish to the United States and select in lieu thereof an equal quantity of vacant land open to settlement; NOW, THEREFORE, I, Charles H. Maginnis and I, Marguerite Maginnis, his wife of St. Louis County, State of Minnesota do hereby release, remise, grant and relinquish to the United States of America; the said land, which is more particularly described as follows: The north half of the northeast quarter of section eighteen (18) in Township five (5) south of range twenty four (24) east Mount Diablo Base and Meridian situated in the County of Madera, State of California and containing 80 acres, and I agree to accept in lieu thereof other lands to be hereafter selected by me or my assigns, equal in area to the tract so relinquished.'
On March 3, 1958, the director of the Bureau of Land Management 1 on behalf of the United States by his deed remised, relinquished and quitclaimed to Charles H. and Marguerite Maginnis, their heirs or assigns, 'all right, title or interest in or to' the 80-acre tract in question, inuring to the United States on January 31, 1900, by their conveyance recorded in the official records of Madera County on February 12, 1900, and on May 11, 1903. The reconveyance was duly recorded on April 7, 1958. This extinguished all In lieu selection rights and reunited the legal and equitable titles. (Udall v. Battle Mountain Company, 9 Cir., 385 F.2d 90, 93, cert. den. 390 U.S. 957, 88 S.Ct. 1041, 19 L.Ed.2d 1151.)
The trial court found that Charles H. Maginnis owned the land in question as his separate property on the date of his death, and accordingly it awarded the plaintiff administrator a decree quieting title thereto against the appellants. Apart from asserting that there was no trespass because of their alleged ownership, no issue is taken on this appeal by appellants relative to the treble damages awarded for trespass and cutting of timber.
The reconveyance to Maginnis, his heirs and assigns, was pursuant to federal statutes which we will hereinafter consider, including the act of September 22, 1922 (ch. 404, § 1, 42 Stat. 1017, 16 U.S.C.A. § 483, repealed in 1960). This act presupposed that for some reason, not the fault of the grantor, no selection of the In lieu lands sought in exchange had been accomplished, making it proper for the United States to reunite the legal and equitable titles, and to clear the record title from the conveyance to the United States.
By the act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1264, congress repealed the act of 1897, under which Maginnis had sought to exchange his land for the In lieu land. The right to make such exchanges was cut off, saving the rights of those whose selection of In lieu land had been rejected or cancelled through no fault of their own. 2
Through attorneys-in-fact, one of whom was Andrew Christiansen, Maginnis applied for in lieu land in 1900, but 40 of the 80 acres sought were unavailable. Nor having made a reselection, his application was cancelled in 1906.
Again in 1918, he applied to select In lieu acreage in Wyoming and Colorado. These applications were rejected, since the lands lay in different areas, and also because of the former application, which still was assumed in some manner to affect the choice. Nothing having been done in the interim, the federal land office cancelled such application in 1922.
In 1922, congress again granted the right to exchange certain relinquished base lands for national forest land, which was unoccupied, surveyed and nonmineral in character. (42 Stat. 1017; 16 U.S.C.A. § 483, repealed in 1960.) If no exchange could be agreed upon, the Secretary of the Interior or an officer he might designate could quitclaim to such persons, their heirs or assigns, all title to the base lands which they had relinquished to the United States.
Terminating all right to make such exchanges for in lieu selections, the congress by act of April 28, 1930 (ch. 219, § 6, 46 Stat. 257; 43 U.S.C.A. § 872), provided that:
'Where a conveyance of land has been made or may hereafter be made to the United States in connection with an application for amendment of a patented entry to entries, for an exchange of lands, or for any other purpose, and the application in connection with which the conveyance was made is thereafter withdrawn or rejected, the Secretary of the Interior or such officer as he may designate is authorized and directed, if the deed of conveyance has been recorded, to execute a quitclaim deed of the...
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