Jaynes v. Goepper

• Decision Date: 21 June 1888
• Citation: 147 Mass. 309,17 N.E. 831
• Parties: JAYNES v. GOEPPER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

147 Mass. 309

17 N.E. 831

JAYNES v. GOEPPER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1888

COUNSEL

S. Brancroft, for certain defendants.

Upon the allegations made in the plaintiff's bill, it cannot be maintained as a bill for discovery, inasmuch as it only seeks the disclosure of matters which, during a long course of dealings between the plaintiff and the deceased, James H Eames, were constantly open to the inspection of the plaintiff equally with the said Eames. Where one partner is intrusted with the management of the partnership concern, as in the case presented, was the fact with each as to the business of his location, even if the managing partner withdraws moneys for his separate use, which he duly and openly enters upon the partnership books, as is alleged in the plaintiff's bill in this suit, it has been constantly held there is no fraud which will give the joint estate any claim against the estate of the partner. See Ex parte Smith 6 Mad. 2, which lays down the principle which has been subsequently followed. The defendant Emory B. Eames, while asking the court to consider the various points suggested by the other defendants, so far as they may be applicable to the case presented against him, submits that he is not a devisee under the will of James H. Eames, and that the action cannot be maintained against him, but, if against any one, on account of any interest which may accrue to his benefit from said James' estate, it should be against the trustee to whom the property is devised. The defendants Osgood A Carter, Sarah A. Mason, Arthur Mason, Addie E. Carter, Harriet E. Sands, and John Sands submit to the court, while relying upon the several points raised by the other defendants so far as the same are applicable to the case stated against them, that, as devisees of real estate, they are entitled to all the rents and profits of the real estate devised to them, unless and until the said real estate shall be required to be dispossd of by the executors, under direction of the proper court, for the payment of liabilities of the estate of the deceased; and that, under the general and universally understood laws of this commonwealth relating to the settlement of estates, the plaintiff cannot maintain his bill for the purpose of obtaining the relief prayed for in the last clause of the sixth prayer of his bill.

Charles J. McIntire, for defendant Marks.

The plaintiff has stated no case which will entitle him to relief or discovery. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term.R. 51. If a person does not avail himself of the knowledge or means of knowledge, open to himself, he cannot be heard to say that he was deceived by representations made to him after the manner of traders' talk and representations of value. Attwood v. Small, 6 Clark & F. 233; Dillman v. Nadlehoffer, (Ill.) 7 N.E.Rep. 90; Stephens v. Orman, 10 Fla. 9; Hoitt v. Holcomb, 32 N.H. 185, 202, 205; Veasey v. Doton, 3 Allen, 380; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217, 220; Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 348; Dickinson v. Lee, 106 Mass. 557; Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138; 2 Kent, Comm. 484, 485; Wissler v. Craig, 80 Va. 22; Burwell v. Fauber, 21 Grat. 446; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, 8; Hencken v. Insurance Co., 11 Daly, 282. His remedy is not in equity. Story, Partn. (7th Ed.) §§ 269, 284, 275; 3 Kent, Comm. 53; Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 49, 56; Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 536; Marston v. Gould, 69 N.Y. 220; Heath v. Sansom, 4 Barn. & Adol. 172; Miles v. Thomas, 9 Sim. 606; Nerot v. Burnand, 4 Russ. 247, 260; Carlton v. Cummins 51 Ind. 478. It is only when the partnership is for a definite period that partners are obliged to seek a court of equity for a dissolution. Smith v. Everett, 126 Mass. 304. "It would be a dangerous precedent; it would endanger the estates of the dead; it would render the rights of the living uncertain and insecure; it would open the door for the introduction of stale claims, which it has well been said have often more of cruelty than justice in them,"--to favor this bill. Wright v. Paine, 34 Amer.Rep. 30, 62 Ala. 340; McGivney v. McGivney, 142 Mass. 156, 7 N.E. 721; Nudd v. Powers, 136 Mass. 273; Bank v. Railroad Co., 125 Mass. 490, 494, 495; Harrison v. Gibson, 23 Grat. 213; Mooers v. White, 6 Johns.Ch. 360, 368. A decree for an account should be denied in every case where it appears that plaintiff's laches has rendered impossible for the court to do full justice to all parties, whether the infirmity consists of the death of a party, loss of evidence, or other cause. Stout v. Seabrook, 30 N.J.Eq. 190; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen, 52; Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 222; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. 252; Fuller v Melrose, 1 Allen, 166. The bill is multifarious and uncertain. A bill embracing distinct matters, affecting distinct parties, who have no common interest in the distinct matters, is multifarious. Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Pope v. Leonard, 115 Mass. 288; Water-Works v. Bleaching Co., 14 Gray, 193. The several defendants ought not to be subjected to disadvantage and expense of meeting and answering charges of fraud against the others, with whom they have no connection. Sanborn v. Dwinell, 135 Mass. 236.

A.E. Pillsbury, for defendants Elizabeth B. Eames and Ida L. Nelson.

It does not appear that any specific thing which was ever the property of the partnership has ever passed into or is in the hands or possession of any of the defendants. The plaintiff has therefore no claim to possession of it, in specie, as surviving partner or otherwise. Johnson v. Ames, 11 Pick. 173, 180; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 cited and approved in Andrews v. Bank, 3 Allen, 314; Attorney General v. Brigham, 142 Mass. 248, 7 N.E. 851, and cases cited. The plaintiff does not appear to claim the specific property in the hands of the various defendants in the capacity of surviving partner, and such a claim could not be maintained, even if the property appeared to have been partnership property. The reason of the rule which allows a surviving partner to take and administer the partnership assets is wanting. The partnership was dissolved by Eames' act, independently of Jaynes' assent. Pars. Partn. 401, 405. This leaves no foundation for the prayer that the dissolution be decreed void. The allegation that the purchases were made "through the fraud of said Eames" does not cure the difficulty. It is too indefinite. And this may be said of the allegations of fraud generally throughout the bill. Nichols v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 146, 150; 1 Daniell, Ch.Pl. 324; Story, Eq.Pl. 251. It is at most a conclusion. The facts disclosed, not only fail to support it, but they are consistent with the honesty and propriety of the whole transaction. General allegations will be taken to refer to the particular facts disclosed. Munday v. Knight, 3 Hare, 497; Evan v. Avon, 29 Beav. 144. The means of knowledge is equivalent to the knowledge itself. Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 244; Nudd v. Hamblin, 8 Allen, 130; Cole v. McGlathry, 9 Greenl. 131. The plaintiff cannot, in any view, reach the property said to have been conveyed by Eames to the defendants in his lifetime. See Locke v. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1, and cases cited. A merely voluntary conveyance is good as against subsequent creditors. Thacher v. Phinney, 7 Allen, 146; Winchester v. Charter, 12 Allen, 606. It is well settled in Massachusetts that no trust resulted to Eames from the conveyances alleged. Gould v. Lynde, 114 Mass. 366; Keyes v. Carleton, 141 Mass. 45, 6 N.E. 524. Nor even if it is assumed that the money with which Eames purchased the property in question belonged in part to Jaynes, which is assuming more than the bill shows, is there any trust resulting to Jaynes from the transaction. McGowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray, 119; Buck v. Warren, Id. 122; Fickett v. Durham, 109 Mass. 419; Peirce v. Colcord, 113 Mass. 372; Snow v. Paine, 114 Mass. 520, 526; Bresnihan v. Sheehan, 125 Mass. 11, 13. The transaction, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, was no more than a misappropriation of firm money by Eames to his own uses. It does not come within the doctrine of the leading case of Dyer v. Clark, 5 Metc. 562, as to partnership trusts. The bill cannot be maintained as under Pub.St. c. 151, § 3. The claim even against the executors is not a "debt" in the sense of the statute; the property in the hands of the executors was never "fraudulently conveyed" by Eames; and there is no allegation that the property said to have been conveyed by him in his life-time to other defendants was so conveyed "with intent to defeat, delay, or defraud creditors." If the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought, he cannot maintain the bill for discovery. Walker v. Brooks, 125 Mass. 241, 243, and cases cited; Emery v. Bidwell, 140 Mass. 271, 275, 3 N.E. 24. The plaintiff's delay in asserting his pretended claims is, under the circumstances, inexcusable, and ought to defeat his bill. Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212, 245. The means of discovering a fraud are equivalent to discovery and knowledge. Farnam v. Brooks, ubi supra; Nudd v. Hamblin, 8 Allen, 130, and cases cited; Learned v. Foster, 117 Mass. 365. The doctrine of laches is in principle analogous to that of estoppel in pais. If the plaintiff has lain by until the situation is changed, or until, by lapse of time or the operation of natural causes or otherwise, the means of defending are lost or materially impaired, equity will refuse relief, and remit him to his legal rights, such as they may be. Codman v. Rogers, 10 Pick. 112; Bank v. Railroad Co., 125 Mass. 490, and cases cited; Brown v. County of Buena Vista, 95 U.S. 157, 161. Laches is not measured by the period of statutory limitation. A claim may be bad for laches, though not barred by any statute. Codman v. Rogers, ubi supra; Phillips v....