JBS Carriers v. Utah Labor Comm'n
| Decision Date | 30 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20210321 |
| Citation | 2022 UT 31 |
| Parties | JBS Carriers and American Zurich Insurance Company, Respondents, v. Utah Labor Commission and David Hickey, Petitioners. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Heard November 10, 2021.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Brad J. Miller, Rachel Konishi, Greenwood Village, CO, for respondents
Chris Hill, Salt Lake City, for petitioner Utah Labor Commission
Gary E. Atkin, Kenneth E. Atkin, Salt Lake City, for petitioner David Hickey.
Due to his retirement, Justice Himonas did not participate herein District Judge Teresa L. Welch sat.
Justice Hagen became a member of the Court on May 18, 2022, after oral argument in this matter, and accordingly did not participate.
¶1 David Hickey worked as a long-haul truck driver for JBS Carriers (JBS). At the end of a three-day drive from Utah to California, which included a stretch in which he drove for approximately nine hours with only one break and little movement of his left leg, he began experiencing swelling in that leg and shortness of breath. After finishing his route, he went to a hospital in California. He was diagnosed with a blood clot in his left leg (deep vein thrombosis or DVT), which caused blood clots in his lungs (pulmonary emboli).
¶2 After his hospitalization, Hickey could not return to work as a truck driver and sought workers' compensation. He asserted that the DVT and pulmonary emboli arose from his drive to California for JBS. JBS disputed Hickey's workers' compensation claim. It argued that his injuries were actually caused by his "super obesity," a term used in medical literature "to describe a person with a BMI over 50." And JBS asserted that super obesity should be considered a preexisting condition under these circumstances.
¶3 Whether workers' compensation claimants have a relevant preexisting condition is significant because, if they do, to obtain compensation they must show not only medical causation-in other words, that the injury is "medically the result" of the employment activity, Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986)-but also legal causation. To show legal causation, claimants must show that the employment activity "contributed something substantial to increase the risk [they] already faced in everyday life" due to their preexisting condition. Id. at 25. We have said that to make such a showing, a workers' compensation claimant must demonstrate that the employment activity that precipitated the injury was "unusual or extraordinary" when compared to normal life activities. Murray v. Utah Lab. Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 48, 308 P.3d 461.
¶4 Here, we are asked to determine whether Hickey's long drive in a commercial truck is an unusual or extraordinary activity in comparison to the ordinary activities people perform in their everyday, nonwork lives. We conclude that it is unusual. And because Hickey has therefore shown that his employment activity was the legal cause of his DVT and pulmonary emboli, we need not address whether super obesity is a preexisting condition, since he is able to show legal causation even if it was.
¶5 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that Hickey's long-haul truck drive was similar to typical, everyday activities. Further, we vacate the court's conclusion that there was substantial evidence in support of the administrative law judge's (ALJ's) finding that Hickey's "super obesity" was a preexisting condition because it is unnecessary to the resolution of Hickey's claim. And we reinstate the decision of the Labor Commission Appeals Board.
¶6 Hickey worked for JBS as a long-haul truck driver. Over the course of three days, Hickey drove a route for JBS that began in Tremonton, Utah, and ended in Madera, California. Starting late on the second day, Hickey drove for six hours and twenty-five minutes straight, followed by another two hours and twenty-five minutes without stopping. He drove an automatic transmission truck that did not require the use of his left leg, so he rarely moved that leg while driving the truck. And it was his general practice to remain in the driver's seat when he stopped for loading and unloading so he likely spent more time in the truck than his driving logs indicated.
¶7 After arriving at Madera on the third and final day of the trip, Hickey began experiencing swelling in his left leg and shortness of breath. He went to a local hospital where he was admitted for treatment. He was released after three days, but was admitted to another hospital ten days later. Hickey was diagnosed with DVT and pulmonary emboli. He was hospitalized for a total of sixteen days. And when he was finally released, he was unable to return to work and applied for workers' compensation.
¶8 In his workers' compensation claim, Hickey argued that the DVT and pulmonary emboli arose from his employment with JBS as a long-haul truck driver. Specifically, he claimed that the blood clots were caused by the second day of his trip, when he drove for almost nine hours with only one break and without moving his left leg.
¶9 JBS disputed Hickey's workers' compensation claim, arguing that his injuries were merely the result of a preexisting condition-super obesity-and not his employment. The dispute went before an ALJ, who appointed a medical panel and ultimately determined that Hickey had failed to show legal causation-in other words, that his employment contributed something substantial to increase his risk of injury.
¶10 The ALJ found that Hickey's super obesity was a preexisting condition, so he applied the test we adopted in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), to determine whether Hickey's employment was the legal cause of his injuries. The Allen test is used to distinguish between injuries resulting from a preexisting condition that only coincidentally occur while an individual is working and injuries that were precipitated by an employment activity that increased the risk of injury normally faced by the worker in nonwork life. Id. at 25. To make this distinction, we have instructed the agency or court to: (1) consider the totality of the circumstances to determine what workplace activity precipitated the injury; and (2) determine whether that activity was objectively unusual or extraordinary when compared to normal life activities. Murray v. Utah Lab. Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 48, 308 P.3d 461.
¶11 After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Hickey's drive to California, the ALJ concluded that it was not an unusual or extraordinary activity under part two of the Allen test. Because the ALJ denied Hickey's claim based on lack of legal causation, he never reached the question of medical causation and did not calculate Hickey's medical expenses or disability compensation.
¶12 Hickey appealed the decision to the Labor Commission Appeals Board (Board), arguing that the medical panel had not been qualified to assess his injuries, that the ALJ erred in his causation analysis by looking for the greatest risk factor leading to Hickey's injuries rather than whether Hickey's employment activity increased the risk of his injuries, and that super obesity was not a preexisting condition.
¶13 The Board resolved Hickey's claim by determining that he had satisfied the Allen test. It concluded that Hickey's long-haul truck drive was an unusual activity when compared to nonwork life. And for this reason, the Board did not reach the question of whether Hickey's super obesity was a preexisting condition, because even assuming it was, he was able to show that the employment activity was the legal cause of his injury.
¶14 The Board remanded the case back to the ALJ "to complete the adjudication of Mr. Hickey's claim." The ALJ restated his previous conclusion that Hickey's super obesity was a preexisting condition and adopted the Board's holding that Hickey had satisfied the Allen test for legal causation. The ALJ also determined that Hickey's injuries were medically caused by his work as a commercial truck driver and accordingly awarded Hickey workers' compensation benefits.
¶15 JBS then appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board, arguing among other things that the ALJ had misapplied the Allen standard of "unusual or extraordinary" activity. The Board affirmed the ALJ, and again found it unnecessary to determine whether Hickey had a preexisting condition because even if he did, he had shown legal causation. JBS then appealed to the court of appeals.
¶16 The court of appeals reversed the Board, agreeing with JBS that Hickey's work activities were not unusual or extraordinary under Allen. JBS Carriers v. Lab. Comm'n, 2021 UT App 44, ¶ 25, 489 P.3d 221. The court of appeals discounted some of the employment circumstances considered by the Board because they had not been "required" by the employment, noting that the Board had not found that Hickey was prevented from taking breaks and that "no requirement of the job prevented Hickey from stretching his inactive left leg while operating the truck with his other limbs." Id. ¶ 23. And the court "perceive[d] no meaningful distinction between sitting for a long time in a truck cab and sitting for a long time in a passenger car, or sitting for a long time in an airplane seat, or even sitting for a long time on a couch in front of a television screen"-activities the court considered neither "unusual [n]or extraordinary." Id. ¶ 24.
¶17 Because the court of appeals determined Hickey could not show his "required" employment activities were the...
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