Jean-Baptiste v. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-01499 (TNM) |
| Parties | HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, Plaintiff, v. BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, sues his former employer, Booz Allen Hamilton for employment discrimination under Title VII and violations of federal and state statutes. Booz Allen moves to dismiss Jean-Baptiste's Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). The Court will grant in part Booz Allen's motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because Jean-Baptiste's claims are either time-barred or do not meet minimum pleading standards, and will deny the motion in part insofar as the dismissal is without prejudice.[1]
I.
Jean-Baptiste worked for Booz Allen as a data scientist. See Am Compl. (Compl.) ¶ 6, ECF No. 3. Soon after Booz Allen hired him, Jean-Baptiste submitted a racial discrimination claim to Booz Allen and the EEOC. See id. He asserted that he was the “only black male and Haitian exclusion [sic] from [sic] training conference essential for [his] role.” Id. ¶ 7. He also claimed that his co-worker stated she “hated black people” and exhibited hostility toward him. Id. ¶ 8. And he complained that armed FBI agents accosted him and searched his office. See Id. ¶ 15. Booz Allen investigated Jean-Baptiste's claims and found them meritless. See id. ¶ 21; see also Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (Def.'s MTD) at 6 ECF 7-1. Booz Allen then asked Jean-Baptiste to undergo a fitness for duty exam, but he did not report for the exam. See Def.'s MTD at 6. So Booz Allen fired Jean-Baptiste in February 2020, about seven months after hiring him. See id.
Jean-Baptiste first sued Booz Allen and other federal Defendants in April 2020 alleging violations of Title VII and his constitutional rights, illegal invasion of privacy under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and more. See Jean-Baptiste v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., et al., No 1:20-cv-02178, ECF No. 1 (D.D.C. April 30, 2020).[2] After amending his Complaint several times, Jean-Baptiste sought voluntary dismissal, which this Court granted. See id., ECF No. 37; see also Minute Order (Sept. 28, 2020).
Jean-Baptiste filed this case nearly two years later, suing Booz Allen under many of the same theories. See Compl. at 2. He alleges that Booz Allen violated Title VII, ECPA, §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 of the Civil Rights Act, and other federal and state statutes between March 10, 2019 and February 24, 2020. See, e.g., Id. ¶ 1. Jean-Baptiste seeks a declaratory judgment, damages, reinstatement of his employment, and more. Id. at 15-16. Booz Allen argues that Jean-Baptiste's claims must be dismissed because they are either time-barred or do not meet minimum pleading standards. The Court agrees with Booz Allen and will grant its motion in full, except for the request that the dismissal be with prejudice. Jean-Baptiste's Motion to Take Judicial Notice is also pending. See Mot. to Take Judicial Notice (MJN), ECF No. 13. Because Jean-Baptiste is pro se, the Court considers the allegations in, and attachments to, his motion in this Opinion. This Court has jurisdiction over Jean-Baptiste's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
II.
A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Mere “labels and conclusions,” “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” do not suffice. Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court treats the complaint's factual allegations as true and grants the plaintiff the benefit of inferences drawn from the facts alleged. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But the Court need not accept inferences unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint. See Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Because Jean-Baptiste is pro se, the Court “liberally construe[s]” his filings. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court may also consider Jean-Baptiste's supplemental filings “to clarify the precise claims being urged.” Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But these relaxed standards do not relieve Jean-Baptiste of his obligation to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Slovinec v. Am. Univ., 520 F.Supp.2d 107, 111 (D.D.C. 2007).
Rule 8(a) requires a Complaint to contain short and plain statements of “the grounds for the court's jurisdiction” and “the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. And Rule 8(d) requires that each allegation “be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d). Rule 8's standards ensure that defendants receive fair notice of the claims against them so they can prepare defenses. See Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
III.
Jean-Baptiste alleges that Booz Allen violated Title VII by fostering a hostile work environment and by discriminating against him based on race. See Compl. ¶¶ 24, 30, 37, 39. Booz Allen argues that his claims must be dismissed because they are time-barred. See Def.'s MTD at 9-10.
Booz Allen terminated Jean-Baptiste's employment on February 24, 2020. See Compl. ¶ 6; Def.'s MTD at 6. Jean-Baptiste claims he received a Right to Sue Letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on February 5, 2020, a prerequisite to bringing an employment discrimination suit. See Compl. ¶ 4. And he submits a copy of the letter, though it is dated February 14, 2020. See MJN, Ex.1. Regardless of when in February 2020 JeanBaptiste received the letter, Booz Allen is correct that his claim is time-barred.
“A person aggrieved under Title VII who seeks to file a civil action must do so within ninety days from receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue notice.” Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 151 F.Supp.2d 78, 80 (D.D.C. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). And courts strictly construe the 90-day deadline for Title VII claims, even in pro se cases. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Vilsack, 763 F.Supp.2d 168, 173 (D.D.C. 2011). Jean-Baptiste sued Booz Allen in May 2022-far outside the 90-day period which began in February 2020. Even if the 90-day time limit were equitably tolled during Jean-Baptiste's first lawsuit, his suit here remains untimely because he filed it nearly twenty months after he voluntarily dismissed his prior action.[3]
Jean-Baptiste next alleges that Booz Allen violated his rights under ECPA by monitoring his computer. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 24, 35. Booz Allen argues that this claim must also be dismissed because it is time-barred. See Def.'s MTD at 10-12.
ECPA provides that a civil action “may not be commenced later than two years after the date upon which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e). To the extent comprehensible, Jean-Baptiste's Complaint alleges that Booz Allen most recently illegally intercepted his communications on September 27, 2019. See Compl. ¶ 15; Def.'s MTD at 11. So Jean-Baptiste had until September 27, 2021 to sue under ECPA. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e). Because he did not sue until May 2022, this claim is also time-barred. Jean-Baptiste has no meaningful rebuttal to Booz Allen's arguments. See, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss (Opp'n) at 4, ECF No. 9. Though Jean-Baptiste states that he had two years to refile his original Complaint against Booz Allen, see, e.g., Id. at 5, he cites no authority for this proposition, nor does this Court know of any. Thus, the Court will dismiss his ECPA claim.
Jean-Baptiste also alleges that Booz Allen violated §§ 1985(3) and 1986 of the Civil Rights Act. See Compl. ¶¶ 33-34. Once again, Booz Allen argues that these claims are time-barred. See Def.'s MTD at 13-14.
Section 1985(3) permits suit if two or more people “conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). And § 1986 allows a derivative suit against a person who knew of violations under § 1985 but neglected to prevent them. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Typically, the viability of a § 1986 claim depends on a meritorious § 1985 claim. See, e.g., Philogene v. District of Columbia, 864 F.Supp.2d 127, 132 (D.D.C. 2012) ().
Jean-Baptiste alleges that Booz Allen conspired to interfere with his civil rights in violation of § 1985(3). See Compl. ¶ 34. Because § 1985 does not include a statute of limitations, courts apply the “most appropriate or analogous” state law to determine the statute of limitations. Cf. Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (); see also Philogene, 864 F.Supp.2d at 132-33 (applying this rule to a § 1985 claim). And when two state laws could apply, District of Columbia choice-of-law rules require this Court to apply the “tort law of the jurisdiction that has the ‘most significant relationship' to the dispute.” Wu v. Stomber, 750 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C. 2006)). To assess which state's relationship is more significant, ...
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