Jeanice D., In re

• Decision Date: 20 October 1980
• Docket Number: Cr. 21313
• Citation: 168 Cal.Rptr. 455,617 P.2d 1087,28 Cal.3d 210
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 617 P.2d 1087 In re JEANICE D., a Minor, on Habeas Corpus.

Page 455

168 Cal.Rptr. 455

28 Cal.3d 210, 617 P.2d 1087

In re JEANICE D., a Minor, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 21313.

Supreme Court of California.

Oct. 20, 1980.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Mark E. Cutler, Deputy State Public Defender, for petitioner.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., James T. McNally, Roger E. Venturi, Anthony L. Dicce, Willard F. Jones and Ramon M. de la Guardia, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

In this proceeding, petitioner Jeanice D., a minor, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing her to state prison without first remanding her to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for evaluation pursuant to section 707.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ¹ In defense of the trial court's action, the Attorney General argues that because of her conviction of first degree murder without special circumstances, Jeanice is statutorily ineligible for commitment to the CYA under section 1731.5. The Attorney General maintains that in view of such alleged ineligibility, the trial court was under no obligation to remand her for an evaluation report under section 707.2. For the reasons discussed below, we have concluded that Jeanice is entitled to the relief she seeks. Contrary to the main premise of the Attorney General's argument, we find that Jeanice's conviction does not render her automatically ineligible for CYA commitment. As we shall explain, pursuant to the current provisions of Penal Code section 190, Jeanice's conviction of first degree murder without special circumstances carries a "25 years to life" sentence; moreover, for more than 35 years, we have followed this court's decision in People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d 575, 150 P.2d 401 that a minor facing such an indeterminate sentence is not ineligible for CYA commitment under section 1731.5.

The Attorney General attempts to avoid the force of the Ralph decision by arguing that the 25 years to life sentence of Penal Code section 190 should not be read as establishing an indeterminate sentence but should instead be construed as a determinate life sentence with a minimum parole eligibility date of 25 years. As we shall explain, however, the Attorney General's construction conflicts with the explicit language of the statute and finds no support in any relevant legislative history. Accordingly, we conclude that the requested writ should issue.

1. Procedural background

In May 1979, Jeanice, who was then 17 years of age, was tried as an adult in Merced County Superior Court and was convicted of (1) first degree murder without special circumstances and (2) use of a firearm in the commission of the murder. Prior to sentencing, defense counsel requested that the trial court remand Jeanice to CYA for a diagnostic evaluation and report pursuant to section 707.2. ² The trial court, although indicating that in its view the 25 years to life sentence of Penal Code section 190 represented "an indeterminate sentence, not one of the determinate sentences that was enacted by the Legislature in 1977," nevertheless denied defense counsel's request, stating that "(m)y version of the law as it exists is I am not permitted nor do I care to commit you to the Youth Authority for their observation and diagnostic workup." Thereafter, the court directly committed Jeanice to state prison for 25 years to life, with a consecutive term of two years for use of a firearm.

In addition to appealing from the judgment of conviction, Jeanice filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, asserting that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing her to state prison without first obtaining a diagnostic report from the CYA and that her remedy by appeal did not afford an adequate, prompt remedy. ³ The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, and, after briefing and oral argument, ruled in favor of Jeanice. Thereafter, in light of the general importance of the question of statutory interpretation presented, we granted the Attorney General's petition for hearing.

In challenging the trial court's action, Jeanice contends (1) that the trial court was in error in considering her ineligible for CYA commitment, and (2) that, even if she is ineligible for such commitment, the court was nonetheless obligated under section 707.2 to remand her for a diagnostic evaluation and report. As we shall explain, we have concluded that Jeanice's conviction does not render her ineligible for CYA commitment and that for this reason alone the trial court's action cannot be sustained. In light of this conclusion, we have no occasion in the instant case to determine whether section 707.2 additionally requires a trial court to remand for a diagnostic evaluation those minors who come within section 707.2's literal terms but who are statutorily ineligible for CYA commitment. (See People v. Eaker (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1015-1016, 161 P.2d 417; People v. Grisso (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 380, 385-386, 163 P.2d 547.)

2. Because petitioner was convicted of an offense carrying an indeterminate sentence, she is eligible for CYA commitment pursuant to section 1731.5

Section 1731.5 currently provides, as it has since 1941, that a person under 21 years of age who is convicted of a crime is generally eligible for commitment and treatment in the CYA unless, inter alia, he or she has been sentenced to "imprisonment for life." ⁴ Shortly after the enactment of section 1731.5, this court unanimously concluded in People v. Ralph, supra, 24 Cal.2d 575, 150 P.2d 401, that a youth who is convicted of an offense carrying an indeterminate sentence with a possible life imprisonment maximum (e. g., a sentence of "five years to life") does not fall within the "imprisonment for life" exclusion embodied in the statute, and thus, if amenable to treatment as a juvenile offender, may be committed to the CYA. In the more than 35 years since the decision in Ralph, the Legislature has amended section 1731.5 on many occasions but has never questioned the validity of the interpretation of the statute in Ralph.

In the present case, Jeanice has been convicted of first degree murder without special circumstances. Under Penal Code section 190, as amended by the voters of this state in November 1978, her offense carries a sentence of "twenty five years to life." ⁵ Noting that the statutory language prescribing this sentence cannot be distinguished from the statutory terminology that has uniformly been utilized in this state to signify an indeterminate sentence with a minimum possible term of 25 years and a maximum potential term of life imprisonment (see, e. g., In re Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958), Jeanice argues that under People v. Ralph, supra, the trial court erred in finding her ineligible for CYA commitment pursuant to section 1731.5.

Although the trial court, in concluding that Jeanice was ineligible for CYA commitment, apparently was under the impression that the nature of Jeanice's offense (i. e., first degree murder) was itself controlling, the Attorney General properly recognizes that under section 1731.5 it is the nature of the sentence, rather than the offense, which governs a juvenile's eligibility for commitment to CYA. In light of the applicable statutory framework, the Attorney General implicitly acknowledges that if, as the trial court thought, the current provisions of Penal Code section 190 provide for an indeterminate 25 years to life sentence, it necessarily follows under the Ralph decision that Jeanice is eligible for CYA commitment. In seeking to forestall that result, however, the Attorney General argues that contrary to the trial court's reading, the "25 years to life" sentence currently provided by Penal Code section 190 should not be interpreted as establishing an indeterminate sentence in which the actual term of an individual's sentence may be set between 25 years and life, but rather should be read as prescribing a determinate life sentence in every case with a minimum parole release date of 25 years. A careful review of the explicit language of Penal Code section 190 (quoted in full at fn. 5, ante ), however, demonstrates the fallacy of the Attorney General's proposed construction.

To begin with, the initial, and most obvious, indication of the nature of the sentence established by the statute flows from the "25 years to life" language utilized in the provision. As already noted, this statutory terminology is precisely the language that has been commonly and uniformly utilized in this state to denote an indeterminate sentence. As this court observed nearly a half-century ago: "It is a well-recognized rule of construction that after the courts have construed the meaning of any particular word, or expression, and the legislature subsequently undertakes to use these exact words in the same connection, the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts." (City of Long Beach v. Payne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 184, 191, 44 P.2d 305.)

This prime principle, moreover, applies equally to subsequent legislation adopted through the initiative process as to enactments passed by the Legislature itself. (See, e. g., Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 93, 207 P.2d 47.) If the drafters of the current version of Penal Code section 190 had intended to establish a determinate life sentence, with some minimum parole fixing date, they surely would not have specifically utilized language that unequivocally connotes an indeterminate sentence.

Furthermore, even if the "25 years to life" language left any question as to the nature of the sentence established by the section, any such doubt dissolves in the concluding sentence of Penal Code section 190. That sentence...