Jefferies v. Lee

• Decision Date: 30 March 2023
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-02258-SHM-tmp
• Parties: MARCELLUS JEFFERIES, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM B. LEE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

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MARCELLUS JEFFERIES, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM B. LEE, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-02258-SHM-tmp

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

March 30, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE (ECF NO. 1); DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND; DENYING PENDING MOTION (ECF NO. 10); CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH; DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL NOTIFYING JEFFERIES OF THE APPELLATE FILING FEE; NOTIFYING JEFFERIES OF THE COURT'S STRIKE RECOMMENDATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G); AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS ENTIRETY

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On April 25, 2022, Plaintiff Marcellus Jefferies filed a pro se civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and paid the civil filing fee (ECF No. 2). On April 25, 2022, summons was issued to Jefferies to serve the complaint. (ECF No. 4.) On May 6, 2022, Jefferies filed a document showing a handwritten note that says “Proof of Service.” (ECF No. 7 (United States Postal Service Product (“USPS”) Tracking receipt showing delivery to Lisa Puckett at “State” on April 17 2022).) On May 20, 2022, Jefferies filed a USPS Form 3811 addressed to Governor Bill Lee. (ECF No. 8 (signed by D Mosley on April 28, 2022).) On May 20, 2022, counsel for Governor Lee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(4)-(6). (ECF No. 10 (the “Motion”).)

The complaint alleges that Tennessee's Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration Verification and Tracking Act (the “Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201, et seq., violates Jefferies right not to be subject to ex post facto laws, his right to exercise free speech, and his right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3. Jefferies sues “William B. Lee, et al.” (Id. at PageID 1-2.) Jefferies seeks: (1) removal from the Act's sex offender registry (the “Registry”); (2) appointment of counsel; and (3) “any other relief deemed appropriate.” (Id. at PageID 4.)

The Motion seeks dismissal of the complaint pursuant to: (1) Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(4)-(5) for insufficient service and insufficient service of process (ECF No. 10-1 at PageID 22); and (2) Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (Id. at PageID 22-23 (contending that the complaint fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)'s requirement of a “short and plain statement” showing entitlement to relief).)

The complaint and the Motion are before the Court.

For the reasons explained below: (1) the complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (2) leave to amend in DENIED; and (3) the Motion is DENIED as moot.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint -

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In screening the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court applies the standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67779 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts a plaintiff's “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “‘plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). However, pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

Jefferies filed his complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jefferies's Claims Under § 1983 Are Barred By The Statute Of Limitations

The sole allegation in the complaint is:

[T]he retroactive application of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (hereinafter “SORA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-218 (2018), (1) is an unconstitutional violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, (2) violates the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, and (3) imposes oppressive restrictions in violation of the rights to parent, work, and travel under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 3 (the “SORA Claim”).) Jefferies alleges that the events giving rise to the SORA Claim occurred “[u]pon the Plaintiff's release from the Tennessee Department of Correction, May 12, 2013. The occurrence of said constitutional violation rendered upon the Pro Se Plaintiff occurred before the calendar year of 2004.” (Id.) As explained below, the SORA Claim is time-barred.

Tennessee first adopted a sex offender registration law in 1994, creating a sex offender registry and establishing a ten-year registration period for persons convicted of certain offenses. See 1994 Tenn. Laws Pub. Ch. 976. The Tennessee General Assembly has amended the 1994 version of the registration law several times, including: amendment in 2000 to provide for lifetime registration for violent sexual offenders; repeal and replacement in 2004 (see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201, et seq.); expansion of the scope of the registration law's restrictions; and extension of the law's reporting requirements. In its present form, the Act requires sex offenders to provide detailed personal information to Tennessee's database of sex offenders, some of which is included in the publicly-accessible Registry. See Doe v. Rausch, 382 F.Supp.3d 783, 789 (E.D. Tenn. 2019). Offenders must report in person annually to verify and update their registration information. Id. The Act imposes geographic restrictions on where registered offenders may live, work, “be upon or remain,” or “stand [or] sit idly.” Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-211(a), (d)). Registered offenders must provide advance notification of travel outside of the State or country. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-204(h)). Failure to comply with the Act's requirements may subject an offender to fines or felony criminal charges. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-208, 40-39-211)).

The Act was amended in 2014 to state:

(g)(1) An offender required to register under this part shall continue to comply with the registration, verification and tracking requirements for the life of that offender, if that offender: ...

(C) Has been convicted of an offense in which the victim was a child of twelve years of age or less.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-207(g)(1)(C).

Actions pursuant to § 1983, such as Jefferies's SORA Claim, are governed by state statutes of limitations. See Thomas v. Bivens, No. 3:09-CV-62, 2011 WL 32207, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011) (referencing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985)). The limitations period for § 1983 actions in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B). Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). In Tennessee, civil actions for compensatory damages or injunctive relief brought under the federal civil rights statutes must be commenced within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Irick v. Ray, 628 F.3d 787, 798 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

However “the accrual date of a § 1983 claim is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). “Under federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of the claim.” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007). The discovery rule provides that “the statute of limitations commences to run when the injury occurs or is discovered, or when in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it should have been discovered.” Gilmore v. Davis, 185 Fed.Appx....