Jefferies v. United Rotary Brush Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2022
• Docket Number: 124,140
• Citation: 515 P.3d 743
• Parties: Jason L. JEFFERIES, Appellant, v. UNITED ROTARY BRUSH CORPORATION, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

515 P.3d 743

Jason L. JEFFERIES, Appellant,

v.UNITED ROTARY BRUSH CORPORATION, et al., Appellees.

No. 124,140

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed July 1, 2022.

Michael W. Blanton, of Gerash Steiner P.C., of Evergreen, Colorado, John M. Parisi, of Parisi Law Firm, of Overland Park, and Jim Lemonds, of Brown & Crouppen, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.

Lee M. Baty and Morgan L. Simpson, of Baty Otto Coronado PC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellees.

Before Bruns, P.J., Cline, J., and James L. Burgess, S.J.

Cline, J.:

Jason L. Jefferies received workers compensation benefits from his employer, United Rotary Brush Corporation (URBC), after he was injured at work while operating a convoluted press machine. He then filed a civil suit against URBC (and several related entities) alleging negligent design and manufacture of the press machine. Jefferies claimed URBC was civilly liable under the dual capacity doctrine, a judicially recognized exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensation Act. See Kimzey v. Interpace Corp. , 10 Kan. App. 2d 165, 166-67, 694 P.2d 907 (1985). Under this exception, an employer may be liable to its employee as a third-party tortfeasor if the employer has obligations to the employee independent of those imposed on it as an employer. 10 Kan. App. 2d at 167, 694 P.2d 907.

The district court dismissed Jefferies’ case on summary judgment after finding URBC manufactured the press machine. The dual capacity doctrine does not apply when a machine manufactured by the employer injures the employee since the employer has a duty to its employees to maintain a safe work environment. 10 Kan. App. 2d at 167-68, 694 P.2d 907. As a result, Jefferies was barred from another recovery out of URBC. It also denied Jefferies’ untimely motion to amend his petition to add another party, which he filed while the summary judgment motion was pending. Jefferies appeals both decisions. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

Jefferies’ Civil Suit

On March 7, 2019, Jefferies filed a civil suit against URBC and five related entities (Defendants). He alleged that on March 8, 2017, while operating a press machine on the job for URBC in Lenexa, Kansas, a brush wafer became lodged. As he tried to dislodge it, the machine activated and crushed his left arm and hand. He sued for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability based on the design and manufacture of the machine. He claimed Defendants were subject to civil tort liability for his injury under K.S.A. 44-504(a) and the dual capacity doctrine because he alleged URBC had acquired the entity that manufactured the machine "through an asset purchase, stock purchase and/or merger with a predecessor corporation or business entity that designed, manufactured, built, or assembled the machine."

Summary Judgment Motion

In August 2020, Defendants moved for summary judgment, on the basis that the claims against URBC were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensation Act.

URBC merged with another company in 2008 (URB Sub., Inc.). Defendants claimed the press machine was manufactured after the merger and Jefferies claimed it was manufactured before the merger. The district court found this dispute immaterial since it found URBC survived the 2008 merger, meaning it was the same company before and after the merger. Thus, no matter when the press machine was manufactured, URBC (Jefferies’ employer) was the manufacturer, so the dual capacity doctrine did not apply.

The district court relied on Section 2.1 of the 2008 merger agreement to support this finding:

" ‘The Merger . On the terms and subject to the conditions contained in this Agreement, at the Effective Time, in accordance with this Agreement and the KGCC, Merger Sub shall merge with and into the Company, the Company shall continue as the Surviving Corporation and the separate corporate existence of Merger Sub shall cease.’ "

The merger agreement defined URBC as the "Company."

Motion to Amend to Add URB of Canada

At the December 2, 2020 hearing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Jefferies’ attorney mentioned he had learned during depositions taken in August 2020, that the individual who designed the press machine (Harry Vegter) was an employee of URB of Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of the holding company that also owns URBC. The attorney mentioned he intended to file a motion to amend the complaint to bring in URB of Canada. And, on December 23, 2020 (while the court's summary judgment decision was still pending), Jefferies moved for leave to file his first amended petition to add URB of Canada as a defendant under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-215(a)(2) and (c)(3). Defendants opposed the motion.

The district court heard Jefferies’ motion on February 3, 2021, and took the matter under advisement. Jefferies then filed a new motion on February 4, 2021, titled "Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Petition to Add United Rotary Brush of Canada as a Party Out of Time." Defendants opposed this motion as well.

The district court denied Jefferies’ motions to amend on the same day it issued its summary judgment order. The court determined that Jefferies’ proposed amendment would not relate back to the original pleading date because it did not find Jefferies mistakenly named the wrong defendant when he filed his petition. And if he was mistaken, the court found he should have moved to amend sooner. The case management order deadline for amendments to pleadings was November 2, 2020, and Jefferies never sought to extend it. The court pointed out that Jefferies received documents through discovery referencing URB of Canada's existence and potential involvement long before this deadline ran. Without relation back, the court found it would be futile to name URB of Canada now as a defendant since the claims were barred by the statutes of limitations.

It also held that allowing the belated amendment would be prejudicial to URB of Canada and the other defendants, since it would require more discovery regarding URB of Canada's potential involvement in manufacturing the press machine years after the injury occurred, when memories had faded. And, last, it denied Jefferies’ claim that the Kansas Supreme Court administrative orders suspending statutes of limitations and statutory deadlines during the COVID-19 pandemic extended Jefferies’ deadline to name additional parties.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants.

Jefferies argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment because he claims URBC emerged from the 2008 merger a new company, so the dual capacity doctrine applies. He claims the court misconstrued the 2008 merger documents when it found URBC remained intact through the merger. He also contends Defendants admitted in their summary judgment briefing that URBC emerged as a new company from the merger.

To begin, URBC correctly notes that Jefferies did not object to the entry of summary judgment as to the remaining defendants in his brief, and so he has abandoned any such arguments. See Russell v. May , 306 Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017) ("Issues not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned."). We will thus only address the arguments against URBC.

Standard of Review

We consider appeals from a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards the district court applied:

" ‘Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.’ [Citations omitted.]" Hammond v. San Lo Leyte VFW Post #7515 , 311 Kan. 723, 727, 466 P.3d 886 (2020).

In a negligence action, summary judgment is proper if the only question presented is a question of law. Manley v. Hallbauer , 308 Kan. 723, 726, 423 P.3d 480 (2018) ("Generally, granting summary judgment in negligence cases must be done with caution. But ‘[a]n exception ... applies when the only question presented is one of law.’ "). The overall question here is a question of law—whether the dual capacity doctrine applies. And this court exercises de novo review over questions of law. 308 Kan. at 726, 423 P.3d 480. We must also interpret the 2008 merger agreement, which is another matter of law over which we have unlimited review. See First Security Bank v. Buehne , 314 Kan. 507, 510, 501 P.3d 362 (2021) (" ‘Our review over the interpretation and legal effect of written instruments is unlimited, and we are not bound by the lower courts’ interpretations of those instruments.’ ").

The Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Workers Compensation Act

The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 44-501b(d), provides:

"Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury, whether by accident, repetitive trauma, or occupational disease, for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act ...." (Emphasis added.)

Kansas courts interpret this provision to mean that an injured employee cannot maintain a civil action against his or her employer or another employee for damages based on common-law negligence if...