Manley v. Hallbauer

• Decision Date: 10 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 115,531,115,531
• Citation: 423 P.3d 480
• Parties: Lori Leann MANLEY, Individually and as Special Administrator for the Estate of Darren R. Manley, Deceased, Amanda Tubbs, and Derrick Manley, Appellants, v. Steven B. HALLBAUER and Kathie M. Hallbauer, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

423 P.3d 480

Lori Leann MANLEY, Individually and as Special Administrator for the Estate of Darren R. Manley, Deceased, Amanda Tubbs, and Derrick Manley, Appellants,

v.Steven B. HALLBAUER and Kathie M. Hallbauer, Appellees.

No. 115,531

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed August 10, 2018.

Angela L. Spigarelli, of The Spigarelli Law Firm, of Pittsburg, argued the cause, and Fred Spigarelli, of the same firm, was on the briefs for appellants.

Vince P. Wheeler, of Hite, Fanning & Honeyman L.L.P., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Luckert, J.:

After a deadly two-car accident at a rural intersection, the estate and heirs of a deceased driver sued the owners of property located at one corner of the intersection. The estate alleged an overgrowth of trees and vegetation obstructed the view at the intersection and contributed to the accident. The estate's ability to recover depends on whether the landowners owed a common-law duty to passing drivers to correct a natural condition on their property that affected road visibility at the rural intersection. We hold the landowners owed no common-law duty to the drivers under those circumstances.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Darren Manley died after his truck collided with John Patton's truck at the intersection of two gravel roads: Anderson Road and 20000 Road in Labette County. The intersection of the two roads had no traffic signs.

Officers investigating the accident found no evidence suggesting that either driver tried to brake or to avoid the collision. The officers testified trees located on land abutting the southeast corner created a blind spot. One of the investigating officers testified the trees made it impossible for northbound traffic to see approaching westbound traffic and for westbound traffic to see approaching northbound traffic. Patton testified he did not have a clear view of Anderson Road south of the intersection because of the tree row and underbrush and did not see Manley before entering the intersection. In the opinion of Manley's engineering expert, "The lack of proper signage and site distance caused the accident which resulted in the death of Darren Manley."

About five years before the accident, Steven and Kathie Hallbauer purchased the property abutting the southeast corner of the intersection—the property with the trees that created the blind spot. The tree growth remained largely unchanged from the time the Hallbauers purchased the property until the accident, although the Hallbauers had cleared some trees. Steven testified that the view of the intersection was obstructed from around 50 to 60 feet away when traveling north or west. Kathie agreed with Steven's testimony. Both Hallbauers agreed that the intersection would be safer with a stop sign.

Manley's estate and heirs (Manley) filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Labette County, Patton, and the Hallbauers. Manley settled with Patton and Labette County. The Hallbauers moved for summary judgment, arguing they could not be held liable under Kansas law for the failure to remove trees or other vegetation. The district court granted summary judgment and certified the judgment as final under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-254(b).

A Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The panel focused on the existence of a common-law duty, which it tied to whether "a reasonable landowner [would] have foreseen a probability of harm to motorists from the obstructed view?" Manley v. Hallbauer , 53 Kan. App. 2d 297, 299-302, 387 P.3d 185 (2016). The panel considered two Kansas Supreme Court cases the Hallbauers relied on but ultimately held they did not control. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 303, 387 P.3d 185. Finding no binding Kansas authority on whether the landowners owed a duty to passing drivers, the panel turned to the American Law Institute's Restatements of Torts, which restate the law in a manner useful to courts, lawyers, scholars, and others. But these Restatements are not state-specific and do not necessarily reflect the law of Kansas.

The panel noted the answer to the question of a landowner's duties to passing motorists differed depending on whether it consulted the Restatement (Second) or the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Under the Restatement (Second), a rural landowner generally is not liable to someone who, while off the property, is injured by a natural condition of the land, like trees. But under the Restatement (Third), a landowner could be held liable if the landowner knew of the risk or the risk was obvious. The panel adopted the Restatement (Second) view, noting the Restatement (Second) had been applied by the Kansas Supreme Court many times and the Restatement (Third) differs from Kansas law in its analytical approach to negligence. The caselaw of other jurisdictions also persuaded the panel; these cases found no duty under similar circumstances. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 304-06, 387 P.3d 185. The panel summarized its conclusion:

"[A]lthough there is a potential argument for the plaintiff based on the Third Restatement, we have concluded that the Second Restatement's position that there is no duty on a rural landowner in this situation is the most consistent with Kansas law. Our foreseeability analysis, the holdings of [the two Kansas Supreme Court cases cited by the Hallbauers], the rulings from other states, and the traditional common-law rule all suggest that the Hallbauers did not owe a duty to Manley to trim the naturally occurring trees and vegetation on their land that obstructed visibility at the intersection." 53 Kan. App. 2d at 307, 387 P.3d 185.

We granted Manley's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

This case arises from the district court's grant of summary judgment. We apply our well-established standard of review:

" ‘Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and when we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.’ Bank v. Parish , 298 Kan. 755, Syl. ¶ 1, 317 P.3d 750 (2014)." Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist , 301 Kan. 618, 622, 345 P.3d 281 (2015).

Generally, granting summary judgment in negligence cases must be done with caution. But "[a]n exception ... applies when the only question presented is one of law." Apodaca v. Willmore , 306 Kan. 103, 106, 392 P.3d 529 (2017). And, here, the issue—whether Kansas law imposes a duty on a land possessor or property owner for natural conditions growing on the land that impede visibility of passing traffic at a rural intersection—is a question of law. See Berry v. National Medical Services, Inc. , 292 Kan. 917, 920, 257 P.3d 287 (2011). Questions of law are subject to de novo review. Apodaca , 306 Kan. at 106, 392 P.3d 529.

A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must prove: "(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation between the breach of duty and the injury to plaintiff, and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff." Patterson v. Cowley County , Kansas , 307 Kan. 616, 622, 413 P.3d 432 (2018). We are concerned here with the first element, the duty owed to a plaintiff. And, as the Court of Appeals panel correctly noted: "Where a duty exists, a person generally has the duty to act as a reasonably prudent person would act in similar circumstances. See Fieser v. Kansas Bd. of Healing Arts , 281 Kan. 268, 272, 130 P.3d 555 (2006) ; Wozniak v. Lipoff , 242 Kan. 583, 607, 750 P.2d 971 (1988)." Manley , 53 Kan. App. 2d at 300, 387 P.3d 185.

Kansas law limits the person or persons to whom a duty extends, however. "To find a legal duty to support a negligence claim, (1) the plaintiff must be a foreseeable plaintiff and (2) the probability of harm must be foreseeable." Berry v. National Medical Services, Inc. , 292 Kan. 917, Syl. ¶ 1, 257 P.3d 287 (2011). But foreseeability does not end the analysis: "This court may choose not to recognize a duty if the duty is contrary to public policy." Berry , 292 Kan. at 922, 257 P.3d 287. As a corollary to that principle, we recognize a new duty only when the duty is consistent with public policy.

Under the traditional rule applying to the circumstances of this case, "the owner of land is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely natural origin upon his land[;] ... the duty is upon the motoring public to observe obstructions to view and to exercise reasonable care for their own safety and protection." Annot. 69 A.L.R.4th 1092, § 3; see also § 2[a]. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(1) (1965) also recognizes the traditional rule: "[N]either a possessor of land, nor a vendor, lessor, or other transferor, is liable for physical harm caused to others outside of the land by a natural condition of the land." See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 (1965), comment b (" ‘Natural condition of the land’ is ... used to include the natural growth of trees, weeds, and other vegetation upon land not artificially made receptive to them."). But § 363(2) recognizes an exception that imposes liability on a possessor of land in urban areas "for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the condition of trees on the land near the highway." The Restatement's...