Jeffers v. Hardeman

• Decision Date: 25 July 1957
• Docket Number: No. 17333,17333
• Citation: 99 S.E.2d 402,231 S.C. 578
• Parties: H. L. JEFFERS, Respondent, v. C. E. HARDEMAN, Appellant. Ozela MATTHEWS, by her Guardian ad litem, Ozela Matthews, Respondent, v. C. E. HARDEMAN, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 402

99 S.E.2d 402

231 S.C. 578

H. L. JEFFERS, Respondent, v. C. E. HARDEMAN, Appellant.

Ozela MATTHEWS, by her Guardian ad litem, Ozela Matthews, Respondent, v. C. E. HARDEMAN, Appellant.

No. 17333.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 25, 1957.

Hubert E. Long, Leesville, and Nelson, Mullins & Grier, Columbia, for appellant.

R. Milo Smith, Lexington and McEachin, Townsend & Zeigler, Florence, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

These two actions stem from an automobile accident which occurred about 4:00 p. m. on March 22, 1955 on Highway No. 321 near Gaston, South Carolina, when a Ford truck owned and operated by H. L. Jeffers collided with the rear of a Pontiac automobile owned and operated by C. E. Hardeman which had been stopped on the highway in Jeffers' lane of traffic. Jeffers brought an action against Hardeman to recover for personal injuries received and damage to his automobile as a result of the collision. Ozela Matthews, a minor who was a passenger in Jeffers' truck, brought an action against Hardeman to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her.

By agreement of counsel, the two cases were tried together. Timely motions by defendant for a directed verdict were refused. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jeffers for $750 actual damages and $750 punitive damages and a verdict in favor of Ozela Matthews for $100 actual damages and $2,000 punitive damages. Defendant's motion in each case for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was refused but in the Ozela Matthews case, the Court granted a new trial unless she remitted on the record $1,250 of the verdict for punitive damages.

Defendant has appealed in both cases. He contends (1) that the Court erred in refusing his motion for a directed verdict as to punitive damages made upon the ground that there was no evidence of wilfulness or recklessness to support such damages, and (2) in refusing a motion for directed verdict in the Jeffers case on the ground that he was guilty of contributory recklessness as a matter of law. Ozela Matthews has also appealed upon the ground that the trial Judge erred in holding that the verdict awarded her for punitive damages was excessive and in granting a new trial unless she remitted a portion of same.

We shall first determine whether there was any evidence reasonably warranting an inference of wilfulness or recklessness on the part of Hardeman. It is conceded that there is some evidence that he was negligent but it is vigorously contended that there is no basis for the award of punitive damages.

Both Hardeman and Jeffers were driving in a northerly direction on a windy afternoon. There were some freshly plowed fields along the highway. Automobile drivers were intermittently confronted with sudden gusts of dust which became more frequent and severe just before the accident.

Hardeman testified that he had his dimmers on and the tail lights burning, and was driving about 40 miles an hour following a Buick car; that it gradually slowed down and stopped; and that he stopped 'because the Buick stopped in front of me' and in 'a second or two' a truck ran into the rear of his car. He said that he had not noticed the truck following him. He admitted stopping his car in the right lane of the paved portion of the highway and that there was ample room to have parked on the shoulder, but claimed that he did not do so because he did not have time. He made no contention that he was unable to drive off on the shoulder because his vision was obscured by the dust. It is conceded that he was thoroughly familiar with this highway.

Most of the foregoing testimony by Hardeman is sharply contradicted by that offered by the plaintiffs. Mrs. Jeffers testified that immediately after the accident Hardeman stated to her that it was his and not her husband's fault 'because I parked in the highway in front of him.' According to the plaintiffs' testimony, the lights on the Hardeman car were not burning. Several witnesses for plaintiffs said that there was no Buick car in front of Hardeman's car after the accident and that they saw no Buick elsewhere at the scene. The jury could infer from this testimony that no car stopped in front of Hardeman and that he voluntarily stopped on the highway. These witnesses further testified that immediately after the accident they saw Hardeman standing in the highway by his car. There is other testimony to the effect that he was directing traffic. But whether he was merely standing in the highway or directing traffic, the testimony of plaintiffs reasonably warrants an inference that Hardeman had ample opportunity to have driven onto the shoulder and not blocked the traffic in Jeffers' lane of travel. If the jury so found, this would constitute a violation of Section 46-481 of the 1952 Code which, except under certain conditions not material here, prohibits the stopping, parking or leaving standing of any vehicle 'upon a paved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practicable to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of such highway.'

Counsel for defendant apparently concede that there is some evidence showing a violation of the foregoing statute and that such violation, if found to exist, would constitute negligence per se. It is argued, however, that the violation of a statute does not compel an inference of recklessness or wilfulness justifying an award of punitive damages. It is said that Hardeman was faced with an emergency and that while he may have used poor judgment, there is nothing in the testimony warranting an inference that he intentionally violated the statute or that his conduct was reckless or wilful in any other respect.

It is well settled 'that negligence may be so gross as to amount to recklessness, and when it does, it ceases to be mere negligence and assumes very much the nature of wilfulness. So much so that it has been more than once held in this state that a charge of reckless misconduct will justify the jury, if the same be proved, in awarding punitive damages.' Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 70 S.E.2d 629, 631. In Fisher v. J. H. Sheridan Co., Inc., 182 S.C. 316, 189 S.E. 356, 359, 108 A.L.R. 981, the Court said: 'The violation of a statute is sufficient to carry the issue as to punitive damages to the jury under proper instructions by the court and may warrant the inference of reckless, willful, or wanton conduct, but it is not obligatory as a matter of law to demand such a finding in every case where the question arises.'

We think the testimony in the instant case warrants an inference of recklessness and that the issue of punitive damages was properly submitted to the jury. The danger of leaving a vehicle standing on the traveled portion of a highway is well known. Several cases have been before this Court involving a collision with the rear end of such vehicle. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S.C. 267, 37 S.E.2d 737; Howey v. Jordan's, Inc., 223 S.C. 71, 74 S.E.2d 216. The danger was increased here by poor visibility. Added to this is the fact that the jury could infer from the testimony that there were no rear lights on Hardeman's car.

In reaching the foregoing conclusion we did not overlook Cubbage v. Roos, 181 S.C. 188, 186 S.E. 794, 799, strongly relied on by counsel for Hardeman. The defendant there, while driving through a sparsely settled residential section of a small unincorporated village, at a speed of 35 miles an hour, in violation of a 20 mile speed limit, struck and fatally injured...