Jefferson County Sav. Bank v. Miller

• Decision Date: 03 April 1906
• Citation: 145 Ala. 237,40 So. 513
• Parties: JEFFERSON COUNTY SAVINGS BANK v. MILLER.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

40 So. 513

145 Ala. 237

JEFFERSON COUNTY SAVINGS BANK v. MILLER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 3, 1906

Appeal from Chancery Court, Jefferson County; Alfred H. Benners Chancellor.

"To be officially reported."

Bill by Nathan L. Miller against the Jefferson County Savings Bank. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

John H Miller and E. K. Campbell, for appellant.

H. A Sharpe, for appellee.

SIMPSON J.

This was a bill filed by the appellee (complainant) against the appellant (defendant) under the statute to quiet title to the land in controversy, and the agreed statement of facts shows that complainant obtained judgment January 29, 1898, and the judgment was registered the same day, but failed to state who was owner of the judgment, which, under section 1920 of the Code of 1896, and the decisions of this court thereon, was invalid. His judgment was filed again for registration September 18, 1899, under Act Feb. 23, 1899. Acts 1898-99, p. 34. The defendant then obtained judgment against the same party November 7, 1901, and filed his judgment the same day, and had execution issued and levied March 24, 1904. Complainant had an execution issued and levied April 21, 1904, and the property was sold under both executions May 23, 1904; each party purchasing under his own execution. The decree of the chancellor was in favor of the complainant.

The contention of appellant (defendant) is: That the first registration by complainant was invalid, which is correct; (2) that the second registration was invalid, in so far as it could authorize an execution to be issued, because it was more than a year after the judgment was rendered; (3) that the act of September 26, 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 273), could not authorize the issuance of the execution of April 21, 1904, because that would be giving to the act retrospective operation, and depriving said defendant of a vested right, to wit, the right to have execution on its judgment and levy on the property. The only material change of the sections of the Code, made by the act of 1899, was in dispensing with the necessity of stating who is owner of the judgment, and making the filing of the judgment notice, in place of the registration. It will be noticed that there is no limit of time for the filing or registration of the judgment, but whenever it is filed it becomes a lien on the property and operates as notice. It is provided only by section 1922 of the Code, and continued by act of 1899, that if the judgment is filed or registered within one year execution may be issued. So it is clear that at the time of the enactment of the statute of 1903 the complainant had a lien on the land which was prior and superior to that of the defendant. The only change made by the act of 1903, which is material to this case, is to provide that "upon any judgment or decree which has been filed or registered as provided by section one hereof within ten years" execution may issue. So the effect of that act was not to change the rights or interests of the parties in or to the property, but merely to give the complainant a remedy by execution to enforce the lien, which appellant admits he had.

"Statutes designed to change the mode of judicial procedure, where such change relates to the method of enforcing a right and does not affect the right itself, are construed to apply to causes of action which accrued before the enactment, as well as those to accrue thereafter." 26 Am. & Eng....