Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Myers

• Decision Date: 09 November 1934
• Citation: 256 Ky. 174
• Parties: Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Myers.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

256 Ky. 174

Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Myers.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided November 9, 1934.

1. Insurance. — Courts recognize and give effect to provision of life insurance policy exempting insurer from liability if insured's death results directly from bodily injury inflicted intentionally by another.

2. Insurance. — Insured's injury or death is sustained by "accidental means" within double indemnity clause of life insurance policy, though intentionally inflicted by another, if not result of insured's misconduct or participation.

3. Insurance. — Provision of life insurance policy, exempting insurer from liability if insured's injury or death is intentionally inflicted by another, bars recovery for injury or death directly and immediately resulting from another's intentional act, done with intent to injure insured, if nature of injury could reasonably have been foreseen as direct result of act.

4. Insurance. — Clause in life insurance policy, exempting insurer from liability for insured's injury or death intentionally inflicted by another, is no defense to action on policy, if person injuring insured intended to injure third party.

5. Insurance. — Provision in life insurance policy, exempting insurer from liability if insured's injury or death is intentionally inflicted by another, bars recovery thereon for insured's death or injury caused by another's intentional act aimed at insured.

6. Insurance. — To exempt insurer from liability under life insurance policy excepting liability for insured's death or injury caused by intentional act of another, latter's intention must have been to cause injury or death, as well as to do act, and directed toward insured.

7. Insurance. — It was exclusively jury's province, in action for double indemnity under life insurance policy excepting injury intentionally inflicted on insured by another, to apply circumstantial evidence to solution of question whether person who shot insured intended to injure and kill him, evaluate such evidence, reconcile apparent conflicts therein, and find facts in accordance with court's instructions.

8. Insurance. — Instructions requiring jury to believe from evidence in action for double indemnity under life insurance policy, excepting injury intentionally inflicted on insured by another, that shot which caused insured's death was aimed directly at him, in order to find for defendant, held proper.

9. Insurance. — Evidence held sufficient to sustain jury's verdict for plaintiff in action for double indemnity under life insurance policy for death of insured shot by another.

10. Appeal and Error. — Court of Appeals cannot substitute its judgment on facts for jury's verdict nor disturb verdict sustained by sufficient evidence.

Appeal from Christian Circuit Court.

BREATHITT & BREATHITT for appellant.

WHITE & CLARK for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE RICHARDSON.

Affirming.

This appeal requires the interpretation, in the light of the developed facts, of a "double indemnity" clause of a $1,000 life insurance policy issued by the Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company on September 21, 1925, to Wallace Myers, designating Dixie Lee Myers beneficiary.

The double indemnity clause obligates the company to pay the beneficiary, in full settlement of all claims thereunder, "double the face amount of this policy, if, during the premium-paying period, and before default in the payment of any premium, and before waiver of any premium on account of disability, and before any non-conformity provisions other than automatic premium loan is in effect, if the death of the insured results from bodily injury within ninety (90) days after the occurrence of such injury, provided death results directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury, effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, while the insured is sane and sober; except these provisions do not apply * * * from bodily injury inflicted * * * intentionally by another."

On a trial before a jury a verdict was returned on the evidence under the instructions of the court for the beneficiary.

The court, on his own motion, in substance, instructed the jury that unless it believed from the evidence "the insured, Wallace Myers came to his death as the result of an injury intentionally inflicted on him by other parties," to find for the beneficiary under the double indemnity clause and that the words "intentionally inflicted" mean "an injury from a shot aimed directly and individually at the insured, Wallace Myers."

The insurance company offered an instruction which reads: "The court says to the jury that you shall find for the plaintiff in this case under the `double indemnity' provision of this policy, unless you believe from the evidence that the insured, Wallace Myers, came to his death as the result of an injury intentionally inflicted upon him by other parties, in which latter event you shall find for the plaintiff only the sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars." It will be observed that the material distinction between these instructions, is, the first quoted defines the words "intentionally inflicted."

A review of the situation involved at the time and the occasion of Myers' death is required to determine the propriety of the action of the court overruling the company's motion for a directed verdict as well as the criticism to the given instruction.

A serious condition existed in the mining industry near the line between Christian and Hopkins counties. On account of it, it became necessary for the owners, to employ guards to escort "strike-breaking" miners to and from their work.

The sheriff of Christian county gave the owners support with the force of his office, to the prevention of disorder.

Wallace Myers was a deputy sheriff of Christian county, and in obedience to the direction of his superior in office (the sheriff), he accompanied, as a guard, the nonstriking miners (on May 5th, 6th, and 7th, about two or three weeks before Myers was shot and killed at the mine), while being transported in automobiles and trucks to and from the mines. On more than one occasion, the automobiles and trucks occupied by the nonstriking miners accompanied by the guards, including Myers, were stopped on the public highway by the show of force and the brandishment of arms by the striking miners. On June 7th, about 4:30 o'clock p.m., Myers was a guard on duty at the mine known as "Empire No. 6." Near this hour the miners who were engaged in work therein emerged from the mine and went to the bathhouse. About the same time, from a point some 100 or more yards from the mouth of the mine came a fusillade of shots directed at the miners on their way to the bathhouse. Close to the same time, Myers went into the office from whence he returned and went over to his car to go home, when another volley of shots was fired from behind a tree located on a hill about 150 yards from the mouth of the mine. At this time, about one hundred or more shots were fired by the persons on the hill in the direction of the mouth of the mine and the bathhouse. Myers, Johnson, and Devers were not very far from each other. Johnson, armed with a pistol, went toward the tipple. Myers stopped and began to look over the hill, like he was looking to see where the shooting was coming from; then he went across the bottom, Devers twenty or thirty steps behind him. At that time Myers was going toward the tree from which the shooting seemed to come; he was unarmed; Devers was armed with a...