Jefferson v. Asplund
| Decision Date | 01 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 1036,1036 |
| Citation | 458 P.2d 995 |
| Parties | Will Key JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. John M. ASPLUND, Eric E. Wohlforth, Herbert Land, Larry H. Ely, and Greater Anchorage Area Borough, Appellees. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Will Key Jefferson, in pro. per.
Victor Carlson, Borough Atty., Eric E. Wohlforth, Anchorage, for appellees.
Before NESBETT, C. J., DIMOND, RABINOWITZ, and CONNOR, JJ., and LEWIS, Superior Court Judge.
In his complaint below appellant primarily sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. On motion of appellees the superior court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We have concluded that the lower court's ruling was in part erroneous.
In 1959, our legislature implemented the judiciary article of the Alaska constitution by defining the jurisdiction of the superior court. 1 In so doing the legislature vested the superior court with authority to render declaratory judgments. This grnat flowed from the following statutory provision:
In case of an actual controversy within the state, the superior court, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and legal relations of an interested party seeking the declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. The declaration has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and is reviewable as such. Further necessary or proper relief based on a delcaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against an adverse party whose rights have been determined by the judgment. 2
It is apparent that our legislature intended to parallel the text of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in its formulation of the declaratory judgment provisions just quoted. 3 Complementing Alaska's statutory provisions relating to declaratory judgments are the provisions of Civil Rule 57(a). By virtue of this rule of civil procedure, it is provided that:
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to statute shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in case where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar. 4
It is essentially against this framework of Alaska's statutory and procedural provisions relating to declaratory judgments that the superior court's dismissal of the amended complaint must be judged. Before explaining the basis of our conclusion that the superior court erred in its dismissal of appellant's amended complaint, a brief examination of the historical antecedents of Alaska's declaratory judgment act and the jurisprudence of declaratory judgments in general is appropriate.
Although the earliest form of a declaratory judgment procedure is found in ancient Roman law, it was the late mineteenth century developments of declaratory relief in England which supplied the model for American legislation. In 1915, the first effective declaratory judgment statute in this country was enacted by the legislature of New Jersey. 5 Seven years later the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was approved by the commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Since its approval, over 30 states have adopted (or have enacted statutes substantially similar to) the Uniform Act. 6
In regard to the federal prototype of Alaska's Declaratory Judgments Act, judicial precedent has established the the federal Declaratory Judgment Act is both remedial and procedural in nature, creating no substantive rights or duties. 7 In short, the procedure provided by the federal Declaratory Judgment Act added another remedy to existing legal and equitable remedies. As Professor Moore puts it:
Courts had from time immemorial rendered declaratory judgments, i. e., had declared or adjudicated rights in cases that could be fitted within any traditional common law form of action or equitable remedy. But these traditional legal and equitable remedies did not always afford an adequate judicial remedy. The declaratory judgment remedy is an all-purpose remedy designed to permit an adjudication whenever the court has jurisdiction, there is an actual case or controversy, and an adjudication would serve a useful purpose. 8
Under both the federal act and the Alaska's Declaratory Judgment Act, AS 22.10.020(b), it is provided that the court 'may declare the rights and legal relations' of an interested party seeking the declaration. 9 Thus, it is clear that judicial discretion was intended to play a significant role in the administration of both acts. 10
According to Professor Borchard, an eminent authority in the field of declaratory judgment,
(t)he two principal criteria guiding the policy in favor of rendering declaratory judgments are (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. It follows that when neither of these results can be accomplished, the court should decline to render the declaration prayed. 11
In regard to the federal act, it has been said that:
The discretion to grant or refuse declaratory relief should be liberally exercised to effectuate the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act and thereby afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations. * * * 12
This exercise of judicial discretion, under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, is subject to appellate review. 13 Although we choose to make no comment upon the merits of his thesis, we note that in Professor Moore's view.
in reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion to grant or refuse declaratory relief, a sound position is that the appellate court may substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. The determination of the trial court may, therefore, be reversed where, though not arbitrary or capricious, it was nevertheless erroneous. This view of the appellate court's power to review and reverse the action of the trial court in respect to its discretionary power to grant or refuse declaratory relief permits greater uniformity than would otherwise be possible. 14
Judicial precedent had delineated criteria for the guidance of trial courts in the exercise of discretion under the federal act. Thus, it is settled that the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude declaratory relief where appropriate; 15 that courts should guard against the use of the declaratory judgment action as a means of procedural fencing; 16 and that declaratory relief may be withheld when the grant of such relief would not terminate the controversy or the uncertainty which gave rise to the declaratory proceeding. 17
Both Alaska's Declaratory Judgment Act and the federal act require 'a case of * * * actual controversy' as a prerequisite to the grant of declaratory relief. In analyzing the meaning of 'justiciability,' Chief Justice Hughes, in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth, 18 said:
A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination. * * * A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. * * * The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. * * * It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. * * * And as as it is not essential to the exercise of the judicial power that an injunction be sought, allegations that irreparable injury is threatened are not required. 19
It follows that declaratory relief will be withheld when declarations are sought concerning hypothetical or advisory questions 20 or moot questions. 21 On the other hand, declaratory relief may be sought to determine the validity and construction of statutes and public acts. 22 An appropriate summary of these principles is provided by Professor Moore in the following passage from his treatise:
(I)t may be stated that the declaratory action is limited to no particular class of cases, and is confined to no special type of litigation. Its scope is pervasive. If a is presented, and the requisite elements of jurisdiction are present, then in the absence of statutory prohibition, the court is competent to provide declaratory relief. Whether or not such relief will in fact be granted is a matter of judicial discretion. But the exercise of this discretion is to be in accordance with established principles, and is to be liberally exercised in achieving the Act's remedial objectives. 23
Resolution of the narrow issues presented by this appeal requires consideration of more particularized criteria than the general declaratory judgment principles previously discussed.
As indicated earlier, Civil Rule 57(a) provides in part that '(t)he procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment (under AS 22.10.020(b)) shall be in accordance' with our Rules of Civil Procedure. The intent of this rule of procedure was to establish that general rules of pleading and of civil procedure were to be made applicable to actions for declaratory relief. 24 Thus, all that is required of a complaint seeking declaratory relief is a simple statement of facts demonstrating that the superior court has jurisdiction and that an actual justiciable case or controversy is presented. 25 In short, the requirements of pleadings in actions seeking declaratory relief do not differ from those standards of pleadings governing other types of civil actions. These principles received...
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...Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937))); Jefferson v. Asplund, 458 P.2d 995, 997 (Alaska 1969) (“In regard to the federal prototype of Alaska's Declaratory Judgments Act, judicial precedent has established the federal De......
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