Jefferson v. Bates

• Decision Date: 12 November 1928
• Docket Number: 27395
• Citation: 152 Miss. 128,118 So. 717
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: JEFFERSON v. BATES. [*]

118 So. 717

152 Miss. 128

JEFFERSON v. BATES. ^[*]

No. 27395

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 12, 1928

Division A

1. LIBEL AND SLANDER. Truth of words uttered is no defense to action for saying words actionable under statute (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1).

Truth of words uttered is no defense to action for slander for saying words which are actionable under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1 (Code 1906, section 10).

2. LIBEL AND SLANDER. Truth of words which are actionable under statute may be offered in evidence in mitigation of damagics (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1).

Truth of words which are actionable under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1 (Code 1906, section 10), may be offered in evidence in mitigation and diminution of amount of damages.

3. LIBEL AND SLANDER. Words to effect that plaintiff set fire to and burned his house held to be actionable per se (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 1, 805).

Words to effect that plaintiff set fire to and burned his house charged arson under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 805 (Code 1906, section 1041), and were insults and calculated to lead to breach of peace and were actionable per se under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1 (Code 1906, section 10.)

4. LIBEL AND SLANDER. Law imputes intention to damage the other party by speaking of words that are slanderous per se.

Law imputes intention to injure and damage the other party by speaking of words that are slanderous per se.

5. LIBEL AND SLANDER. Where words were actionable per se plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages and it was unnecessary to show special damages (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1).

Where defendant stated in effect that plaintiff had set fire to his house and words were actionable per se under Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1 (Code 1906, section 10) plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages and it was unnecessary to show special damages.

HON. S F. DAVIS, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Sunflower county, HON. S. F. DAVIS Judge.

Action of slander by M. Bates against John Jefferson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

S. D. Neill and Forrest G. Cooper, for appellant.

Everett & Forman, for appellee.

OPINION

MCGOWEN, J.

The appellee, M. Bates, filed a declaration in the circuit court of Sunflower county in an action of slander in the oral use of words against the appellant, and the declaration embraced four counts.

In the first count it was charged that the appellant, defendant in the court below, spoke of the plaintiff, M. Bates, saying that he (meaning Bates) "set fire to and burned his house," and that such words were considered an insult and were calculated to lead to a breach of the peace.

No effort was made to introduce proof as to count two of the declaration.

Count three likewise alleged that the appellant said of Bates:

"If he (meaning Bates) does not quit prosecuting me, I will ruin him; he (meaning Bates) burned his house because he told me so."

Count four alleged that the words spoken were:

"If he (meaning the plaintiff, M. Bates) does not compromise, I am going to ruin him, for he burned his house because he tried to borrow one hundred and fifty dollars from me to burn it."

Defendant pleaded the general issue to each of these counts, and gave notice thereunder to the effect that the words uttered by the defendant (appellant here) were justified, because the appellee (Bates) had told him that he (Bates) was going to burn his own home. The defendant further set out the conversations with two neighbors, which were confidential in their nature, and one of the conversations in which the language was repeated was with an officer of the law.

The court gave a peremptory instruction for the appellant on the second count, there being no evidence to sustain it, and submitted the three counts, the tenor of which is quoted above, to the jury on a peremptory instruction that the words uttered were actionable per se, charging the appellee with an infamous crime, arson, and instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff in each of said counts such sum as the jury deemed proper, not to exceed the amount sued for in the declaration.

The appellant (defendant) sought, by his instructions, to have the court say to the jury that the truth of the words uttered was a defense to this cause, together with the theory that the appellee (Bates) would only be entitled to nominal damages. There was a judgment on the three counts for two hundred and fifty dollars, being eighty-three dollars and thirty-three and one-third cents each, and an appeal is prosecuted here from that judgment.

The evidence disclosed that the appellant (defendant) admitted having made the statements to witnesses as charged in the declaration in the three counts, but asserted that Bates (the appellee) had made the statement to him that he was going to burn his (meaning Bates') own house; that, subsequent to this statement, the appellee and appellant had a church row, the appellee being a preacher and the appellant a deacon, and that they had disagreed about where the church should be located. They had two difficulties, in the latter of which the appellant slapped the Reverend Bates, remarking at the time, "I is gwine to treat you right, Brother Bates," for which he was arrested. The statement made to an officer of the law was made after the appellant was arrested and was being prosecuted for assault and battery, which statement was, in effect, an effort to secure a compromise for the assault and battery. The record does not disclose any privileged relation, but does disclose a bad state of feeling between the parties.

We think the grounds urged here for reversal may be crystallized into two propositions: (1) Was the truth of the words, admittedly uttered, a bar to the suit? and (2) Was the plaintiff (appellee here) entitled to only nominal damages?

We answer both propositions in the negative.

Section 1, Hemingway's 1927 Code, section 10, Code of 1906, has been one of our statutes since 1822, and is as follows:

"All words, which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are considered as insults, and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, shall be actionable; and a plea, exception or demurrer shall not be sustained to preclude a jury from passing thereon, who are the sole judges of the damages sustained; but this shall not deprive the courts of the power to grant new trials, as in other...