Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l
Decision Date | 25 October 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 99-8032,99-8032 |
Citation | 195 F.3d 894 |
Parties | (7th Cir. 1999) Missey Jefferson, et al., on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Ingersoll International Inc., et al., Defendants-Petitioners |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
On Petition for Leave to Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 98 C 50042--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Coffey, Easterbrook, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs contend in this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that Ingersoll International and affiliated companies discriminated on account of race in considering applications for employment. It is a pattern-or-practice suit, and like most similar claims of persistent discrimination affecting large numbers of persons was filed as a class action. The district court certified a class limited to persons who actually applied for employment but were turned down; the court rejected plaintiffs' effort to include in the class persons discouraged from applying. It also declined to certify classes of employees who were not promoted, or whose compensation allegedly was depressed because of their race; these groups of employees were not sufficiently numerous to justify class handling, the court explained. The opinion, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13126 (N.D. Ill. 1999), is a careful and measured treatment of the class-certification issue. But one part of the disposition is problematic and is the focus of defendants' petition for leave to take an interlocutory appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). See Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs seek an injunction that would require Ingersoll to change its hiring practices. That relief, if granted, would affect applicants as a group, and plaintiffs therefore sought certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), which applies when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole". For many years Rule 23(b)(2) was the normal basis of certification in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) ( ). When this tradition took hold, however, Title VII allowed only equitable relief and therefore nicely fit the language of Rule 23(b)(2). True enough, class members could receive money, because back pay is a form of equitable relief, but this relief was treated as incidental to the injunction--and, because it was deemed equitable, neither side had a right to jury trial, so that handling the suit as a consolidated proceeding in equity did not threaten anyone's rights.
After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, prevailing plaintiffs in a Title VII suit are entitled not only to equitable relief but also to compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. sec.1981a(a)(1), (b). Either side may demand a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks damages. 42 U.S.C. sec.1981a(c). Because the representative plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive damages, Ingersoll contended that any class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) rather than Rule 23(b)(2). If the action proceeds under Rule 23(b)(3), then each member of the class must receive notice and an opportunity to opt out and litigate (or not) on his own behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). If it proceeds under Rule 23(b)(2), by contrast, then no notice will be given, and no one will be allowed to opt out. Because of this difference, Rule 23(b)(2) gives the class representatives and their lawyers a much freer hand than does Rule 23(b)(3). Although class members who want control of their own litigation are vitally concerned about the choice, so too are defendants--for the final resolution of a suit that proceeds to judgment (or settlement) under Rule 23(b)(2) may be collaterally attacked by class members who contend that they should have been notified and allowed to proceed independently. Defendants who want the outcome of a damages action (no matter which side wins) to be conclusive favor Rule 23(b)(3), because it alone insulates the disposition from collateral attack by dissatisfied class members.
In the district court the parties joined issue on the question when, if at all, a suit may proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) if the plaintiffs seek not only equitable relief but also substantial money damages. All the district judge said on this subject, however, is that Rule 23(b)(2) is well suited to pattern-or-practice suits, which no one doubts. The judge wrapped up: "Because the court has determined that the hiring class is properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2), it need not address the applicability of subsection (b)(3)." It is this decision that Ingersoll wants us to review by interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f). This issue fits the third category of appropriate appeals discussed in Blair, 181 F.3d at 835--situations in which the legal question is important, unresolved, and has managed to escape resolution by appeals from final judgments. Both sides cite a welter of district court decisions (many in this circuit) addressing the subject, but none has reached this court since the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and only one has reached another court of appeals. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus we grant the petition for leave to appeal. Moreover, because the petition and the response lay out the legal arguments, further briefing is unnecessary. We have seen enough to know that the district court must confront rather than dodge the fundamental legal question.
Earlier this year the Supreme Court stressed that proper interpretation of Rule 23, principles of sound judicial management, and constitutional considerations (due process and jury trial), all lead to the conclusion that in actions for money damages class members are entitled to personal notice and an opportunity to opt out. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2314-15 (1999). This entitlement may be overcome only when individual suits would confound the interest of other plaintiffs--when, for example, there is a limited fund that must be distributed ratably, the domain of Rule 23(b)(1), or when an injunction affects everyone alike, the domain of Rule 23(b)(2). Ortiz disapproved a creative use of Rule 23(b)(1) that employed the "limited fund" rationale to eliminate notice and opt-out rights; the Court's analysis applies equally when a request for an injunction is being used to override the rights of class members to notice and an opportunity to control their own litigation.
Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a no-notice and no-opt- out class for "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief [that operates] with respect to the class as a whole". In such a situation class certification protects the missing class members by obliging the representatives (and their counsel) to act as fiduciaries of the other affected persons. Money damages under sec.1981a(b) are neither injunctive nor declaratory, and they do not affect a class as a whole. It is possible for one applicant for employment to recover substantial damages while another recovers nothing (for example, because the second person would have been rejected under nondiscriminatory conditions, or found a better job elsewhere). Class members sensibly may decide that direct rather than vicarious representation is preferable, and they may reject the aid of self-appointed fiduciaries. Rule 23(c)(2) gives them that right.
It is an open question in this circuit--and in the Supreme Court, see Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994)--whether Rule 23(b)(2) ever may be used to certify a no-notice, no-opt-out class when compensatory or punitive damages are in issue. See also Blair, 181 F.3d at 839 (). Rule 23(b)(2) is designed for all-or-none cases in which "final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate." Advisory Committee's Note explaining Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b) begins by saying that an action "may" be maintained as a class action when the prerequisites of subdivision (a) and a part of subdivision (b) have been satisfied; it does not say that the class must be certified under the first matching subsection. A court should endeavor to select the most appropriate subsection, not just the first linguistically applicable one in the list. When substantial damages have been sought, the most appropriate approach is that of Rule 23(b)(3), because it allows notice and an opportunity to opt out.
Divided certification also is worth consideration. It is possible to certify the injunctive aspects of the suit under Rule 23(b)(2) and the damages aspects under Rule 23(b)(3), achieving both consistent treatment of class-wide equitable relief and an opportunity for each affected person to exercise control over the damages aspects. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), would require the district judge to try the damages claims first, to preserve the right to jury trial, a step that would complicate the management of separate classes--and mean, as a practical matter, that the damages claims and the Rule 23(b)(3) class would dominate the litigation--but the damages-first principle holds even when there is a single class under a...
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