Jefferson v. Mo. Baptist Med. Ctr.
| Citation | 447 S.W.3d 701 |
| Decision Date | 19 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 99895.,ED 99895. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | Collin and Courtney JEFFERSON, by and through their natural father and next friend, Eric JEFFERSON and The Estate of Gloria Mitchell Moss, by and through its Personal Representative, Walter Moss, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MISSOURI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER and Amy Mosher, M.D. and Midwest Radiological Associates, P.C., Defendants/Respondents. |
Collin and Courtney JEFFERSON, by and through their natural father and next friend, Eric JEFFERSON and The Estate of Gloria Mitchell Moss, by and through its Personal Representative, Walter Moss, Plaintiff/Appellant
v.
MISSOURI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER and Amy Mosher, M.D. and Midwest Radiological Associates, P.C., Defendants/Respondents.
No. ED 99895.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.
Aug. 19, 2014.
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Sept. 22, 2014.
Application for Transfer Denied Nov. 25, 2014.
Amy Gunn, Anne–Marie Brockland, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Steven Wasserman, John Mahon, Jr., Lisa Larkin, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants/Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
LISA S. VAN AMBURG, Presiding Judge.
Plaintiffs Collin and Courtney Jefferson, by and through their natural father and next friend, Eric Jefferson, (“the Jeffersons”) appeal the Circuit Court of St. Louis County's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Missouri Baptist Medical Center (“MBMC”). On appeal, the Jeffersons argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of MBMC on the basis of section 538.210.2(3), R.S.Mo. (Cum Supp 2007). Specifically, they argue that the trial court incorrectly defined the term “employee” within the meaning of that section. We agree. We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. FACTS
Viewed in a light most favorable to the Jeffersons, the following facts led to the instant suit. Decedent Crystal Jefferson delivered her first child at age 31 on October 27, 2005, via caesarian section at MBMC. During her time in the hospital, she experienced abdominal pain and underwent a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis. The CT scan showed a soft tissue mass in the abdomen as well as fluid collection in the pelvis. The attending radiologist recommended a follow-up study.
Ms. Jefferson underwent a follow-up CT scan at MBMC on December 9, 2005. This second scan also showed a soft tissue mass in the abdomen and fluid collection in the pelvis. Again, the attending radiologist recommended a follow-up study to address both the tissue mass and the fluid.
On January 19, 2006, Ms. Jefferson underwent a third CT scan at MBMC. Dr. Mosher, a radiologist, read and interpreted the results of the study and posted remarks to Ms. Jefferson's medical chart. Dr. Mosher informed Ms. Jefferson that the fluid collection had resolved, but failed to mention in her post-study report or to Ms. Jefferson that the soft tissue mass was still present. Accordingly, Ms. Jefferson believed her medical problem had been resolved.
In the spring of 2008, however, Ms. Jefferson began to notice an abnormal pressure in her abdomen. Testing soon revealed that the soft tissue mass was not only still present, but was in fact stage-IV colon cancer. By this point, the tissue mass was inoperable. As a result, Ms. Jefferson died of cancer in 2011.
The Jeffersons filed the instant suit on December 15, 2011, alleging that Ms. Jefferson's cancer would have been treated two years earlier if Dr. Mosher had not negligently overlooked the soft tissue mass during the 2006 CT scan.1 In response, MBMC filed a motion for summary judgment citing section 538.210.2(3), which bars the Jeffersons from recovering against MBMC for the tortious actions of Dr. Mosher if Dr. Mosher is not MBMC's “employee.” MBMC asserted that Dr. Mosher was actually an employee of Midwest Radiological Associates,2 which directly contracted with and paid Dr. Mosher, rather than its own employee. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of MBMC. This appeal follows.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d 58, 61–62 (Mo. banc 2013). “The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially.” ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). We “review[ ] the record in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, without deference to the trial court's findings, and accord[ ] the non-movant ‘the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.’ ” Manner, 393 S.W.3d at 61–62 (quoting ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 376 ). “Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law.” Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. banc 2007). “As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment.”3 ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 376. Additionally, “[s]tatutory interpretation is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Finnegan v. Old Republic Title Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Mo. banc 2008).
IV. DISCUSSION
Section 538.210(3) bars the Jeffersons from recovering against MBMC for the tortious actions of Dr. Mosher, if Dr. Mosher is not MBMC's “employee.”4
The Jeffersons argue that the trial court's determination that Dr. Mosher was not MBMC's employee was based on an erroneous interpretation of the term “employee.” Specifically, the Jeffersons contend that the term “employee,” within the meaning of section 538.210.2(3), should be defined according to its dictionary definition and common-law principles of agency, which focus primarily on the level of control the employer exercises over the purported employee's work performance. Because MBMC exercised a significant degree of control over Dr. Mosher's work performance, the Jeffersons argue that the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Dr. Mosher was not MBMC's employee, and that section 538.210.2(3) therefore barred their claim.
In response, MBMC argues that the trial court correctly defined the term “employee” in section 538.210.2(3) in accordance with the definition of “physician employee” provided in the definitions section of Chapter 538. Specifically, the legislature in section 538.205(9), R.S.Mo. (Cum.Supp.2007), defines a “physician employee” as “any person or entity who works for hospitals for a salary or under contract and who is covered by a policy of insurance or self-insurance by a hospital for acts performed at the direction or under control of the hospital.” Because the undisputed facts show that Dr. Mosher does not meet this definition, MBMC contends that section 538.210.2(3) bars the Jeffersons' claim as a matter of law.
To resolve the foregoing dispute, we first address the reasons that the legislature's definition in section 538.205(9) of “physician employee” does not apply to section 538.210.2(3). Second, we define the term “employee” in section 538.210.2(3). Lastly, we remand to the trial court to apply the correct definition of the term “employee” in the context of section 538.210.2(3)
A. Section 538.210.2(3)'s Statutory Bar and 538.205(9)'s Definition of “Physician Employee”
In 2005, the legislature amended Chapter 538, entitled “Tort Actions Based on Improper Healthcare,” by enacting the current section 538.210, entitled “Limitation on noneconomic damages—jury not to be informed of limit—limit—punitive damages, requirements.” The basic purpose of section 538.210 is to limit wrongful-death claims against healthcare providers and their employees.5 Section 538.210 accomplishes this purpose by two primary means. First, section 538.210.1 provides in pertinent part that in claims “arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render health care services, no plaintiff shall recover more than three hundred fifty thousand
dollars for noneconomic damages.” Second, section 538.210.2(3), the provision at issue here, instructs that “[n]o individual or entity whose liability is limited by the provisions of [Chapter 538] shall be liable to any plaintiff based on the actions or omissions of any other entity or person who is not an employee of such individual or entity.” (emphasis added).
The legislature did not provide a specific definition for the term “employee” for the purposes of section 538.210.2(3). Therefore, MBMC directs our attention to Chapter 538's definitions section, which contains a definition for a different term: “physician employee.” Section 538.205(9). Although section 538.205 is prefaced with, “[a]s used in sections 538.205 to 538.230, the following terms shall mean,” the term “physician employee” appears nowhere in Chapter 538 besides the definitions section. But see section 538.210.1(1), R.S.Mo. (2000) (providing, prior to legislature's 2005 amendment of Chapter 538, that one category of defendant protected by the cap on non-economic damages is “[a] hospital ... and...
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