Jefferson v. State, 30815

Decision Date24 March 1961
Docket NumberNo. 30815,30815
Citation128 So.2d 132
PartiesRobert Lee JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Marvin A. Urquhart, Jr., Panama City, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Joe L. McClung, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HOBSON, Justice.

This case is before the court on a direct appeal from a judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree and a sentence of death imposed by the Circuit Court of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Bay County, Florida. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder in the first degree.

Because of the issues involved, it is more appropriate to enucleate the facts of the case as they were related by each witness at the trial than to attempt to narrate them in chronological fashion.

J. D. Nolin, a police lieutenant of the Panama City police department, testified that at approximately 10:00 P.M. on January 10, 1960 he drove his patrol car into the Kayo Oil Station on Fifteenth Street in Panama City, Florida. As he pulled into the station, he noticed that a dark blue 1950 Buick automobile was parked at the station. He saw the defendant, with whom he was acquainted, walk around the car from the driver's side to the passenger's side and enter. The car then drove out of the station with a driver whom the witness was unable to identify. Nolin, for no apparent reason, made a mental note of the license number of the Buick as it pulled out of the station. Immediately thereafter the witness discovered that there was no one in attendance at the station. He became suspicious and radioed a 'pick-up' request to police headquarters.

A police officer, Roy Womble, of the City of Lynn Haven, Florida, a town near Panama City, testified for the State that at approximately 10:00 o'clock on the night of January 10, he spotted the Buick automobile on which the 'pick-up' had been broadcast by the Panama City police and followed the car to a highway intersection a short distance from Lynn Haven where he turned on his red light and siren. As soon as the car stopped, the defendant, who was then driving, got out of the car quickly and rushed back to the police car. Womble requested to see the defendant's driver's license, and while the defendant was fumbling for it, the witness observed the deceased slide out of the front seat of the automobile onto the highway and heard him say, 'Help me, Mister, he has shot me.' After helping the deceased into the police car, the witness asked the defendant if he had shot the deceased and he replied, 'Yes, sir.' The deceased then stated that he had given him all his money and he had begged him not to shoot him. Womble then asked Jefferson why he had shot him, and the defendant replied that he had told the deceased that if he didn't quit begging to go home to his wife and kids he was going to shoot him, and he wouldn't hush. The witness called for an ambulance and for assistance from the Bay County Sheriff's office. Shortly thereafter a deputy sheriff, Leonard Finch, arrived on the scene. Finch asked the defendant where the gun was. The defendant first said he had no gun but later told him it was under the front seat of the car. Womble went to the car and found the gun. At the trial, Womble identified the gun which he had removed from under the front seat of the car which the defendant had been driving. Womble also testified that he had seen the defendant hand some money to Deputy Finch in response to a question as to where the money was. The defendant also stated that there was some change in the glove compartment. Womble went to the car, got the change and turned it over to Finch.

Deputy Sheriff Finch testified for the State that at about 11:00 o'clock he received a call from the Lynn Haven policeman requesting assistance. On arriving at the scene he asked the deceased who had shot him and he replied, 'That Nigger standing out there.' Jefferson then admitted shooting the decedent. After finding the gun and money in the manner described by the witness Womble, Finch inquired of the defendant whether he had shot the deceased before or after the robbery, and the defendant replied, 'After.' Finch then asked why he had shot him and the defendant replied, 'He kept begging and wanted to go home to his wife and kids and I taken all I could and I put the barrel of the gun to his neck and pulled the trigger.'

Thereafter the ambulance took the deceased to the hospital and the defendant was taken to the Bay County jail.

Lowell Spooner, an ambulance driver, testified for the State, in effect, that he had picked the deceased up at the site where the Buick automobile had stopped, took him to a local hospital and later transported the deceased to a hospital in Mobile, Alabama, and that he brought the deceased's body back to Panama City after he had died on the way to Mobile.

A nephew and a brother of the deceased testified as to the identity of the deceased. The nephew additionally testified that he had accompanied the deceased to Mobile in the ambulance, and that he was with him when he died.

Two doctors testified that they had examined the deceased's wound. The wound was identified as being caused by a bullet which entered deceased's neck behind his left ear close to the hair line. It was the opinion of both doctors that this was the cause of death.

Floyd Nixon, Chief investigator of Bay County Sheriff's office, testified for the State in effect that he had interviewed the defendant on two occasions after his arrest. The defendant made both an oral and a written statement in which he admitted in substance that on the date in question he needed some money and decided he would 'go out and try to get some'. He borrowed a car from a friend and drove it to the service station in question. He stated that he selected this station because there was only one man in attendance. He pulled into the station and at gun point forced the attendant to get in the automobile and drive. After driving some distance he ordered the deceased to stop the car, and he took the money from him. Part of the money was change which was removed from a coin changer which the deceased had attached to his belt. They then rode around some more, during which time the deceased, at the order of the defendant, threw the money changer out of the car. The defendant then stated that after he had changed places with the deceased and had started driving the car, he had shot the deceased accidentally when the deceased made a lunge for him. He denied that he ever had any intention of harming or threatening the deceased and stated that the shooting itself was an accident. Nixon testified that the defendant conducted him to the place where the money changer had been thrown from the car. The changer was recovered and received in evidence at the trial. In addition, the oral and the written statements were received in evidence.

The above constituted the case of the State, and at the close thereof counsel for the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the corpus delicti had not sufficiently been established by evidence aliunde the confessions and admissions of the accused. The motion for directed verdict was denied. The defendant himself was the only witness for the defense. He admitted robbing the deceased and told how the shooting occurred, stating again that it was accidental. He denied any intention on his part to harm the deceased and denied ever having made any statements to anyone to the effect that he had intentionally killed him. He also denied hearing the deceased tell anyone that he had shot him although he had begged him not to do so.

On appeal, counsel for the defense concedes that in this case a conviction of murder in the first degree may be had upon proof of either actual premeditated design on the part of the defendant, or by proof that the killing was committed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery. Section 782.04, F.S.A. It is contended, however, that the only evidence introduced by the State as to either actual premeditation or as to the perpetration of a robbery was contained in the confessions or admissions of the defendant. It is the position of the defense, therefore, that the corpus delicti was not sufficiently established.

In order to establish the corpus delicti in a homicide case, it is necessary to prove three elements: first, the fact of death; second, the criminal agency of another person as the cause thereof; and third, the identity of the deceased person. Lee v. State, 96 Fla. 59, 117 So. 699; Deiterle v. State, 101 Fla. 79, 134 So. 42; Hulst v. State, 123 Fla. 315, 166 So. 828; Spanish v. State, fla., 45 So.2d 753; and Freeman v. State, Fla.App., 101 So.2d 887.

In dealing with cases of homicide involving an issue of corpus delicti, it is necessary to remember that the term corpus delicti encompasses a dual aspect. On the one hand, there is the requirement that there be sufficient evidence introduced by the State tending to prove the three essential elements of corpus delicti before the jury will be permitted to consider any admission or confession of the defendant. When the term is used in this sense tnere is no requirement for proof of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. It is enough if the evidence tends to show that the crime was committed, the only question being whether the evidence of corpus delicti is prima facie sufficient to authorize the admission or the confession. Frazier v. State, Fla., 107 So.2d 16. See...

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49 cases
  • Stephens v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 15 Marzo 2001
    ...and ending with the killing, the felony, although technically complete, is said to continue to the time of the killing. Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla.1961). Neither the passage of time nor separation in space from the felonious act to the killing precludes a felony murder convictio......
  • McArthur v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 21 Septiembre 2001
    ...to a nonexisting murder. Id. at 1202. The Supreme Court of Florida plainly adopted the majority view of this issue in Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla.1961). In Jefferson, the court considered the proof necessary to establish the corpus delicti of the offense of first-degree murder, a......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 21 Junio 2007
    ...of another victim "were part of the same criminal episode." Roberts v. State, 510 So.2d 885, 888 (Fla.1987) (citing Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132, 137 (Fla.1961) ("It is a homicide committed during the perpetration of a felony, if the homicide is part of the res gestae of the felony."))......
  • State v. Franklin, 446A82
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 7 Julio 1983
    ...upheld). Florida, on the other extreme, requires independent proof of the accused's identity as the doer of the crime. Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla.1961).5 Our traditional definition of corpus delicti in a homicide case is (1) the death of a human being (2) by criminal means. As s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The anatomy of Florida's corpus delicti doctrine.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 74 No. 9, October 2000
    • 1 Octubre 2000
    ...Fridovich v. State, 489 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986). [23] Schwab v. State, 636 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1994). [24] Jefferson v. State, 128 So. 2d 132,135 (Fla. [25] Franqui, 699 So. 2d at 1317 (emphasis added). [26] Spanish v. State, 45 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1950) (citing Anderson v. State, 3 ......

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