Jefferson v. State

• Decision Date: 12 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. PD-0363-05.,PD-0363-05.
• Citation: 189 S.W.3d 305
• Parties: Raymond JEFFERSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 305

189 S.W.3d 305

Raymond JEFFERSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-0363-05.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 12, 2006.

Keith A. Gross, Pearland, for Appellant.

Alan Curry, Asst. District Atty., Houston, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which MEYERS, KEASLER, HOLCOMB and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

A jury unanimously found appellant guilty of the offense of injury to a child.¹ The issue in this case is whether a jury instruction was required informing the jury that it also had to unanimously agree on at least one of these three theories in order to convict: (1) that appellant injured the child by commission (striking the child with his foot or with an unknown object), or (2) that appellant injured the child by omission by failing to prevent the child's mother from injuring the child, or (3) that appellant injured the child by omission by failing to provide proper medical care for the child. We hold that the jury in this case was not required to unanimously agree on any of these theories.

Appellant, the child and the child's mother lived together. The evidence shows that appellant and the child's mother severely abused the child for approximately two years. This pattern of abuse culminated in a September 7, 2001, incident (or transaction) during which the child was severely injured. The child was struck by some object, causing her to fall and hit her head. Neither appellant nor the child's mother sought medical attention for the child even though the child was obviously in great distress. The child died very soon after being struck. The mother initially told the police that she struck the fatal blow to the child during the September 7, 2001, episode. She testified at trial, however, that appellant struck the fatal blow to the child during this incident.

On this record, it is not clear that the State sought to convict appellant based solely on the September 7, 2001, incident. However, several things in the trial record and the parties' briefs lead us to conclude that the State was relying on this incident. In a reply brief, appellant does not dispute the State's assertion in its original brief that it was not "relying upon multiple acts of serious bodily injury in order to support the appellant's conviction."

Also, during its closing jury arguments, the prosecution referred to the prior acts of abuse, not as a basis to convict, but to explain why appellant and the mother did not seek medical attention for the child during the September 7, 2001, incident.

[PROSECUTION]: I don't expect you to like [the mother]. I can't stand the woman. I don't expect you to have one ounce of sympathy for her because she lied. The whole family lied. Why? To cover up their little scapegoat of a child who was a disgrace to the family, who was battered and bruised with 56 different injuries. They couldn't take that child to the doctor. They knew they'd both be getting arrested immediately. They couldn't — that's why they intentionally and knowingly did not call 9-1-1...

The prosecution's closing jury arguments focused almost entirely on the September 7, 2001, incident as the basis to convict. For example,

[THE PROSECUTION]: You do not have to agree on whether or not [appellant] did it by co-mission [sic] or omission and that's what we talked about in voir dire. And the reason that's so is because [the mother] gave conflicting statements.

Now the greater weight of the evidence clearly supports that [appellant] is the one who physically kicked [the child] with such force it caused her head to strike something which caused her to be shaking, foaming at the mouth, go unconscious and she eventually died. That's the greater weight of the evidence. But if some of you believe that I'm not so sure about that but I believe that he had care, custody and control of that child, he believed he was the father, at the very least he was the stepfather living in that house as a family and he did not pick up the phone to call 9-1-1 to get medical treatment for that child it doesn't matter if you agree six of one half dozen of the other it's still a guilty verdict for injury to a child.

* * *

When a grown man, whatever it is, he weighs somewhere between 250 and 280, kicks a weak, malnourished 47 pound six year old with the kind of force that it's going to take to cause that kind of head trauma that's knowingly. When an adult kicks a small, weak, defenseless child that is knowingly. You know you're going to hurt her and you know you're going to hurt her bad because you're an adult and that is a small, defenseless child. You know you're going to hurt that child when that child is laying on the floor, foaming at the mouth and shaking and unconscious and her body is twitching because she's convulsing. You know if you don't pick up the telephone you know that child is probably going to die. You know that.

* * *

When you look at the facts of this case and the evidence that you heard you may not have every detail answered in your mind but you don't have to. When you look at it and you step back and you look at the big picture what do you see? You see two parents who really didn't ever deserve to have a child and those parents let that child die. They killed that child. [The mother] and [appellant] killed that child and the reason that he is here is because of his action and his in-action and the reason that [the mother] is also here is because of her action and her in-action.

* * *

[Appellant] tells you that finally he admits to being home that day off sick and says well yeah, [the child] was there. Finally admits yeah [the child] was in the house September 7, 2001, then he says but I wasn't. Now mind you he was sick, that he called in sick, off work. He had diarrhea that day. I had to go to the store for diarrhea medicine. He tells you that he's gone for six hours. He walks to Walgreens and he's gone for six hours and goes and sits at a bus stop for six hours. And I don't mean to be crude but when you got diarrhea where do you want to be? At home by your own private bathroom not walking on the streets of Houston, Texas for six hours sitting in a bus stop when you've got diarrhea. He's a liar.

The facts make sense when you put the picture together and [the mother] and [appellant] are equally responsible for the death of [the child] and I'm going to ask you to find him guilty of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to this child. We will never know if this child could have lived. We will never know and we don't have to prove to you that she could have survived if they called 9-1-1.

Dr. Wolf says sometimes they do and sometimes they don't but my God folks you at least try.

During its closing jury arguments, the defense emphasized several times that this case was "about the events that happened on September 7, 2001," even though the "prosecution would have [the jury] rule on the events as they occurred over two years." For example,

[THE DEFENSE]: That's what he did. What happened that day? This trial is about the events that happened on September 7, 2001. The events you're asked to rule on, to rule on to determine guilt or innocence are the events that occurred on September 7, 2001, when [the child] was killed.

The prosecution would have you rule on the events as they occurred over two years. They would just assume that you find him guilty for what happened in August, July or May or any of those prior events. If you're going to look and you're going to say well we don't care so much about September 7 we're just going to rule guilty because the child was there, he must have known, let's just hang him right now.

The prosecution's response to this during its final closing jury arguments was somewhat ambiguous. The prosecution did not expressly and unequivocally argue that the jury should "rule on the events as they occurred over two years" as a basis to convict. For example,

[THE PROSECUTION]: We don't care whether or not you believe that on the night of September 7 [appellant] kicked that child so hard-there are no holes in the wall by the way, but so hard that some object impacted her head and she died at the hands of [appellant]. I don't care. I don't care. That child's death was inevitable. This was going to be the result. It culminated, in a moment on September 7, 2001 but there was no other outcome. It would have happened whether it was the next day or the day before or two, three or four days later or a week later. That child was dead and we all know it. And I can't for the life of me see how another human being wouldn't stop it. Thank you.

The jury was instructed that it could convict appellant if it found that appellant caused serious bodily injury to the child on or about September 7, 2001, under multiple theories submitted disjunctively.

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Raymond Jefferson, in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 7th day of September 2001, did then and there unlawfully intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to Raysate Knight, a child younger than fifteen years of age, by striking Raysate Knight with his foot; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 7th day of September 2001, did then and there unlawfully intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to Raysate Knight, a child younger than fifteen years of age, by causing Raysate Knight's head to strike an unknown object; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 7th day of September 2001, did then and there unlawfully while having assumed care, custody or control of Raysate Knight, intentionally or knowingly by omission cause serious bodily injury to Raysate Knight, a child younger than fifteen years of age, by failing to...