Jeffords v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc.
| Citation | 963 F.3d 658 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1533,19-1533 |
| Parties | Victoria JEFFORDS, as Administrator of the Estate of Donald Jeffords, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Jeffrey S. Wrage, Attorney, Blachly, Tabor, Bozik & Hartman, Valparaiso, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jeffrey D. Naffziger, Mark Englund Christensen, Attorneys, Christensen Hsu Sipes, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees BP Products North America Inc., and MC Industrial, Inc.
Thomas S. Ehrhardt, Attorney, Bokota Ehrhardt McCloskey Wilson & Conover, Merrillville, IN, Robert Dennis Hawk, Jr., Esq., Attorney, Kopka Pinkus Dolin PC, Crown Point, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Fluor Constructors International, Inc.
Before Flaum, Ripple, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.
Donald Jeffords was a crane operator on a construction project at an oil refinery. One day at work he fell seven feet from the catwalk on the body of a crane and injured his feet and back. He sued the project owner and several of its contractors for negligence. While this lawsuit was pending, Jeffords died, apparently of unrelated causes, so the suit is now being prosecuted by his widow, Victoria Jeffords, as his estate's administrator. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding that none of the defendants whom Jeffords sued owed him a duty of care. We affirm.
The material facts are undisputed. Defendant BP Products North America owns and operates an oil refinery in Whiting, Indiana. As part of a large-scale modernization project at the refinery, BP contracted with defendant Fluor Constructors International to provide engineering, procurement, and construction management services. BP and Fluor each entered into separate contracts with defendant MC Industrial (MCI) to provide construction services. BP also contracted with Central Rent-a-Crane, Donald Jeffords's employer, to provide crane operation services. Central had no contractual relationship with Fluor or MCI, and Central is not a defendant because the workers’ compensation system would apply to Jeffords's injuries on the job.
On May 4, 2013, Jeffords was walking on the catwalk of the crane he operated for Central and inspecting the crane's fluid levels. The catwalk was seven feet above the ground. It was only thirteen inches wide and lacked a guardrail. Jeffords lost his balance and fell onto the asphalt below. He fractured both feet, requiring surgery, and he injured his back.
Jeffords filed this lawsuit in state court, and defendants removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship. Jeffords alleged negligence against BP, Fluor, and MCI. Jeffords died in 2015, survived by Victoria Jeffords and two daughters. In August 2018, the district court granted BP and MCI's motions for summary judgment, 2018 WL 3819251 (Aug. 10, 2018) ; in February 2019, it granted Fluor's separate motion. 2019 WL 954818 (Feb. 27, 2019). Both orders held in relevant part that none of these defendants owed Jeffords a duty of care. The district court entered a final judgment for the defendants, and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo the district court's grants of summary judgment. Lewitton v. ITA Software, Inc. , 585 F.3d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Questions of interpretation of written contracts, on which this case hinges, are often well-suited for summary judgment. Lewitton , 585 F.3d at 379.
We apply Indiana substantive law to this suit, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), because neither side disputes that it applies. Wood v. Mid-Valley Inc. , 942 F.2d 425, 426–27 (7th Cir. 1991). Under Indiana law, a plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must prove that the defendant owed him a duty and breached that duty in a way that caused injury to the plaintiff. Peters v. Forster , 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind. 2004). "The duty, when found to exist, is the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances." Stump v. Indiana Equipment Co. , 601 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind. App. 1992). "Absent a duty, there can be no breach of duty and thus no negligence or liability based upon the breach." Peters , 804 N.E.2d at 738. As a matter of federal procedure, see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. , 356 U.S. 525, 537, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958), whether a duty exists is a question of law determined by the court. Dunn v. Menard, Inc. , 880 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2018).
It is a "general common law notion" that control equals responsibility. Stropes ex rel. Taylor v. Heritage House Children's Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc. , 547 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ind. 1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An employer, who controls working conditions, see GKN Co. v. Magness , 744 N.E.2d 397, 402–03 (Ind. 2001), must take reasonable care to provide its employees with a safe place to work, including safe equipment. City of South Bend v. Estate of Rozwarski , 404 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ind. App. 1980), citing Evansville & Terre Haute R.R. Co. v. Duel , 134 Ind. 156, 33 N.E. 355 (1892), among others. The principal of an independent contractor, who does not control the contractor's working conditions, see Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel , 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.E. 365, 367 (1914), ordinarily owes the contractor's employees no similar duty. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc. , 72 N.E.3d 908, 913 (Ind. 2017), citing Prest-O-Lite , 106 N.E. at 367, and Stumpf v. Hagerman Construction Corp. , 863 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. App. 2007), among others.
The principal may, however, assume by contract a "specific" nondelegable duty of care toward its contractor's employees. Ryan , 72 N.E.3d at 913, quoting Bagley v. Insight Commc'ns Co. , 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. 1995). Similarly, the construction manager of a construction project, even if it is not itself the principal of any contractor, may assume an otherwise nonexistent duty to provide a reasonably safe jobsite either by contract or "gratuitously or voluntarily" by its conduct. Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. Garrett , 964 N.E.2d 222, 226–27, 229 (Ind. 2012) ; see generally id. at 224–25 (describing construction management).
In this case, the estate maintains that each defendant assumed a duty of care toward Jeffords on one or more of the theories above. Each of the estate's arguments is defeated by the undisputed material facts and contractual provisions in the record, and by the limits of the relevant Indiana Supreme Court cases.
First, the estate argues that BP, MCI, and Fluor all may be characterized as general contractors or construction managers and that all therefore assumed duties of care toward Jeffords. Even assuming the dubious premise, the conclusion is incorrect. As the district court explained, in Ryan and Hunt the Indiana Supreme Court held respectively that general contractors and construction managers "can owe duties to the employees of their independent contractors," not that they "always owe duties to the employees of their independent contractors." Whether a duty exists depends "solely" on the language of the relevant contracts. Ryan , 72 N.E.3d at 914.
Second, the estate argues that, because MCI was contractually charged by Fluor with responsibility for the safety of its subcontractors’ employees, MCI owed Jeffords a duty of care. See Fluor-MCI contract § 6.02 (). But Central, Jeffords's employer, was not MCI's subcontractor; its only contractual relationship—at least the only one appearing in the record—was with BP. MCI therefore owed no duty of care to Jeffords under this provision of its contract with Fluor.
Third, the estate argues that, because BP, Fluor, and MCI were each contractually required to comply with certain public and private safety standards and to monitor others’ compliance with them as well, the contracts imposed on each of them duties of care toward Jeffords. We disagree.
Ryan held that a general contractor on a construction project had assumed a duty of care toward all onsite workers based on four features of its contract with the project owner. First, there was an "explicit assumption of responsibility for safety" by the general contractor. 72 N.E.3d at 915. Second, there was a "demonstrate[d] ... intent to control" the subcontractors’ work. Id. Third and fourth, playing supporting roles, there was a "general recognition" of the importance of workplace safety by the general contractor and a requirement that the general contractor designate a safety representative "to prevent accidents." Id.
By contrast, Hunt held that a construction manager had not assumed a duty of care toward all onsite workers by its contract with the project owner. First, the contract contained no language imposing on the construction manager "any specific legal duty to or responsibility for the safety of all employees at the construction site," though it did assume a duty to "review and monitor contractors’ safety programs." 964 N.E.2d at 227. Second, the contract provided that the construction manager's performance under the contract was for the benefit of the project owner and no one else. Id. Third, the contract provided that the construction manager would not have "direct control over or charge of the acts or omissions" of any contractor. Id.
As in Hunt , the contracts in this case do not contain language imposing on any defendant a specific legal duty toward, or expressly assigning responsibility for the...
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