Jeffries v. Kansas, Dept. of Social & Rehab. Serv.
| Decision Date | 25 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-4047-SAC.,95-4047-SAC. |
| Citation | 946 F.Supp. 1556 |
| Parties | Leslie Ann JEFFRIES, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF KANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, and The Reverend Dr. Ed Outlaw, Jr., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Alan V. Johnson, R. Scott Seifert, Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, Topeka, KS, for Leslie Ann Jeffries.
Jane Kelly Coates, Social & Rehabilitation Services, Office of the General Counsel, Topeka, KS, Betsy B. Patrick, Kansas Department of SRS, Osawatomie, KS, Gregory A. Lee, Gehrt & Roberts, Chartered, Topeka, KS, for State of Kansas, Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services.
Betsy B. Patrick, Kansas Department of SRS, Osawatomie, KS, Gregory A. Lee, Gehrt & Roberts, Chartered, Topeka, KS, for Ed Outlaw.
This sexual harassment case comes before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dk. 42). The plaintiff, Leslie Ann Jeffries ("Jeffries"), was hired by the defendant State of Kansas, Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services ("SRS"), as a resident chaplain and student of the clinical pastoral education program ("CPE program") at Osawatomie State Hospital ("Hospital"). The plaintiff claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment marked by a single incident where a fellow student in the CPE program hugged and kissed her. She alleges the incident "occurred because the defendants failed to take reasonable remedial action to prevent it." (Dk. 53 at 3). The plaintiff further alleges that her supervisor and instructor retaliated against her when she took her complaint of sexual harassment to the superintendent of the Hospital. The plaintiff's final claim is "that her resignation constituted a constructive discharge caused by" her supervisor's retaliatory acts. (Dk. 53 at 4). The defendants seeks summary judgment on all claims.
A court grants a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]here are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).
The initial burden is with the movant to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the nonmovant must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to" the nonmovant's claim or position. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The nonmovant's burden is more than a simple showing of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; it requires "`present[ing] sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to return a verdict in that party's favor.'"1 Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991)). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. A party relying on only conclusory allegations cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir.1995).
More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion does not empower a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
Summary judgments are "used sparingly in employment discrimination cases." Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 264 (8th Cir.1995). This is because discrimination claims often turn on the employer's intent, McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370-71 (7th Cir.1992), and courts ordinarily consider summary judgment inappropriate to settle an issue like intent, Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (10th Cir.1994). Even so, summary judgment is not "per se improper," Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.1993), and may be useful in weeding out claims and cases obviously lacking merit, Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 709 (10th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court finds the following facts for purposes of this summary judgment ruling.
1. The State of Kansas through the SRS provides and administers inpatient psychiatric treatment. Osawatomie State Hospital ("Hospital") is one of the state's inpatient psychiatric treatment facilities.
2. During the relevant time periods, the Hospital has sponsored a clinical pastoral education ("CPE") program which offers specialized pastoral training to seminary students and others and which provides spiritual care to those patients requesting it.
3. The plaintiff Jeffries was a "resident" student in the Hospital's CPE program. Because of her services to the Hospital's wards she was considered a state employee and received a salary. The plaintiff's participation in the CPE program and her employment were governed by a one-year contract running from August 30, 1991, through August 29, 1992, with the Department of Pastoral Care and Education at the Hospital. The contract provided that it could "be extended by mutual consent of both parties" and be terminated upon written notice to the other party thirty days before the proposed termination. Resident students generally stayed a second year if both parties and the hospital were satisfied with the arrangement and performance during the first year.
4. When Jeffries started the CPE program in September of 1991, she and two men — Glenn Hoyt and Jerry Muncey — were the resident students. The Director of the CPE program for all relevant periods was the Reverend Dr. Ed Outlaw. He not only supervised and assigned the student's clinical duties at the hospital, but he also provided their pastoral education during the same period.
5. Dr. Outlaw assigned Jeffries to the Hospital's substance abuse program. Immediately prior to Jeffries, Hoyt had served as the chaplain to the substance abuse program for sixteen months. Dr. Outlaw directed Hoyt to work with Jeffries for the month of September and to orient her on the policies, procedures and schedules of the program as well as the nature of the pastoral care involved.
6. On October 4, 1991, Hoyt entered the open door to Jeffries' office, which she shared with a nurse, to pick up his briefcase and coat. As he entered, Hoyt started to close the door when Jeffries told him to leave the door open. Hoyt responded that he wanted to hug Jeffries and he did not want others to see. According to Jeffries, Hoyt swiftly approached and hugged her, placed his legs so that she couldn't retreat, and kissed her on the neck and mouth. In her deposition, Jeffries described the event in these terms: (Jeffries Dep. at 181).
7. Hoyt's hug and kiss lasted about three seconds or less.
8. Jeffries did not tell Hoyt at that time that his actions were unwelcome. Hoyt had hugged Jeffries once before in private, and Jeffries did not consider that hug inappropriate. Jeffries testified that she did not consider either hug to have had a "sexual connotation." (Jeffries Dep. at 199). She found the second hug offensive because there was kissing and body contact in which she felt his penis against her.
9. In late October of 1991, Jeffries underwent back surgery at a hospital in Overland Park, Kansas. Hoyt visited her at the hospital. During Hoyt's visit, Jeffries asked him to rub her neck while she rested in bed and was dressed in a hospital gown.2
10. Following her surgery and recuperation, Jeffries resumed her participation in the CPE program and her pastoral duties in the substance abuse program on November 9, 1991.
11. Over two months after Hoyt's hug, Jeffries mentioned inappropriate hugs to Dr. Outlaw during a weekly individual supervisory conference meeting. Jeffries, however, did not mention any names. In a subsequent session, Jeffries began offering details about the incident and Dr....
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