Jemison v. State Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1892
• Citation: 52 N.W. 185,85 Iowa 229
• Parties: JEMISON ET AL. v. STATE INS. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

85 Iowa 229

52 N.W. 185

JEMISON ET AL.

v.STATE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 17, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Allamakee county; L. O. HATCH, Judge.

Action in equity to reform a policy of insurance, and to recover the value of property insured which was destroyed by fire. There was a hearing on the merits, and a decree in favor of plaintiffs. The defendant appeals.Cummins & Wright, for appellant.

Stilwell & Stewart, for appellees.

ROBINSON, C. J.

The policy upon which this action is brought purports to insure “Mrs. Sarah Jemison, administratrix of David Jemison's estate, against loss by fire on a certain barn, to the amount of $2,600, besides other property, for the term of five years from the 23d day of May, 1888. On the 15th day of the next August the barn was destroyed by fire. On the 7th day of December, 1888, Mrs. Jemison filed a petition in this case to recover the value of the barn, in which she alleged that she was the widow and one of the legatees of David Jemison, and owned a life interest in the barn, which was of greater value than the amount for which it was insured. Defendant demurred to that petition on the 15th day of January, 1889. Six days later Mrs. Jemison filed an amended and substituted petition, in which she alleged that she had been the administratrix of the estate of David Jemison, deceased, and was then his widow, and one of his legatees, and guardian of the estate of David Jemison, Jr., a minor, who was a reversionary devisee of decedent; that when the policy was executed she was the absolute owner of a life estate in the barn, and the premises upon which it was situated, entitled to the use and possession of it during her lifetime, or so long as she remained the widow of decedent; that her ward was the absolute owner of the property, subject to her rights, and that together they are the absolute and unqualified owners of the property; and that her interest in the barn when it was destroyed was of the value of $4,000. On the 15th day of April, 1889, a second amended and substituted petition was filed, in which David Jemison, Jr., was joined with Sarah Jemison, his mother, as party plaintiff. In this petition the averments of the preceding petitions to which we have referred were set out in substance, excepting that in regard to the value of Mrs. Jemison's interests. The petition alleged, further, that in making the contract of insurance it was expressly agreed between Mrs. Jemison and defendant and intended that the policy should cover the interest of both plaintiffs in the property insured, and that the policy should be made to Sarah Jemison to insure her interest in said property, and also to her as guardian or trustee of said David Jemison, Jr., to insure his interest in the property; that the soliciting agent of defendant, who took the application for insurance, was fully informed of the respective interests of the plaintiffs, and directed to have the policy so made as to insure those interests; that he was informed that Mrs. Jemison was entirely ignorant of the way in which the business should be done, and relied upon him to have the policy made as agreed; that any failure of the policy to insure the interests of plaintiffs was the result of a mutual mistake between Mrs. Jemison and defendant. The plaintiffs ask that the policy be so reformed as to conform to the intent of the parties, and that they have judgment for $2,600, with interest at 6 per cent. from the 29th day of October, 1888, and costs. The cause was transferred to the equity docket for trial. The district court changed the policy to read: “Said State Insurance Company does insure Mrs. Sarah Jemison, as administratrix of D. Jemison's estate, for herself and the heirs of said D. Jemison, deceased, as their interests may appear,” etc.; and: “The said company does hereby promise and agree to make good unto the said Sarah Jemison, administratrix, and the said heirs of D. Jemison, deceased,” etc., as further provided in the policy. Judgment was also rendered in favor of plaintiffs for $2,667.05 and costs.

1. Some of the testimony introduced for plaintiffs was given in response to leading questions, and some was of a secondary character for which no foundation had been laid. As due objection was made by defendant, such evidence should not have been introduced, and cannot be given any weight. But the interests of plaintiffs are shown to be as claimed, and we are of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence of an unobjectionable character to sustain the averments of the petition made for the purpose of obtaining a reformation of the policy. The application for insurance was taken by a soliciting agent of defendant named Robbins. It appears with reasonable certainty that he knew when he filled the blanks in the application from information then given him, or which having been given him previously was then in his mind, just what interest each of the plaintiffs had in the property insured. Having that knowledge, he failed to express it properly in the application, but made it appear that the insurance was for the benefit of Mrs. Jemison, as administratrix. It is true the application was read to her after it was prepared, but she is an illiterate woman, not accustomed to doing business of that kind, and did not understand the nature and effect of some of the answers which she appeared to have given in the application. No doubt the agent acted in good faith, and according to his understanding of his duties, but notice to him was notice to defendant, and it must be charged with having the knowledge he possessed when the application was taken. Key v. Insurance Co., 77 Iowa, 175, 41 N. W. Rep. 614;Donnelly v. Insurance Co., 70 Iowa, 693, 28 N. W. Rep. 607;Stone v. Insurance Co., 68 Iowa, 740, 28 N. W. Rep. 47;Jordan v. Insurance Co., 64 Iowa, 219, 19 N. W. Rep. 917;Boetcher v. Insurance Co., 47 Iowa, 255; Rogers v. Insurance Co., (Ind. Sup.) 23 N. E. Rep. 502.

Mrs. Jemison also acted in good faith, and according to her best understanding of the facts, in what she said and did in regard to the application for insurance. No suppression of facts nor intent to deceive can be charged to her. Robbins, in procuring her application, acted as the agent of defendant. Section 1, c. 211, Acts 18th Gen. Assem. He was selected by defendant, and furnished blanks with which to do that work. He knew all material facts when he prepared the application, and, having undertaken to prepare it, his duty required him to state them correctly. Mrs. Jemison gave the required consideration for the insurance, and relied upon the agent, as she had a right to do, to discharge his duty in a proper manner. His failure in that respect was the fault of defendant, and...