Jenkins, In re
| Decision Date | 15 September 1967 |
| Citation | 234 A.2d 49,210 Pa.Super. 501 |
| Parties | In the Matter of John JENKINS, a minor, by his friend, Bessie Peele. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Lois G. Forer, Philadelphia, Atty. in Charge, Ronald M. McCaskill, Philadelphia, Staff Atty., Community Legal Services, Almanina Barbour, Senior Atty., Philadelphia, for appellant.
Edwin D. Wolf, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Alan J. Davis, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Before ERVIN, P.J., and WRIGHT, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, and SPAULDING, JJ.
On February 6, 1967, appellant, John Jenkins, age seventeen, was arrested at his place of employment and charged with the offenses of assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery and assault with intent to kill. A hearing was held on February 10, 1967, before the Honorable John R. MEADE in Juvenile Court. After much testimony had been taken, the court made no order but, on its own motion, continued the hearing so that appellant might be represented by counsel. At a second hearing, held on March 2, 1967, appellant was represented by the Community Legal Services Inc. Following this hearing, appellant was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill.
Appellant filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to § 15 of the Juvenile Court Law, Act of June 2, 1933, P.L. 143, § 15, 11 P.S. § 257, on March 7, 1967. This petition alleged, in substance, that the adjudication was not sustained by the weight of the evidence and was based upon evidence which was not credible. On March 23, 1967, the lower court dismissed the petition, thus denying a rehearing.
We agree with appellant's argument that the court erred in denying his petition for rehearing. Such a rehearing is mandated by § 15 of the Juvenile Court Law, 11 P.S. § 257 which provides in pertinent part: 'Within twenty-one (21) days after the final order of any judge of the juvenile court, committing or placing any dependent, neglected or delinquent child, such child shall, as a matter of right, by his or her parent or parents or next friend, have the right to present to the court a petition to have his or her case or cases reviewed and reheard, if, in the opinion of such parent, parents, or next friend, an error of fact or of law, or of both, has been made in such proceedings or final order, or if the said order has been improvidently or inadvertently made.
The Commonwealth argues, in opposition to this petition, that the statute does not require the granting of a rehearing. This argument, however, ignores the specific language of the statute which provides that 'the court shall grant such review and rehearing as a matter of right.' As our holding in Rinker Appeal, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955), indicates the lower court Must grant review and rehearing when requested within twenty-one days of the final order. 1
The Commonwealth's second contention is that appellant has already had two hearings, one on February 10, 1967, and a second on March 2, 1967. This argument, however, again ignores the specific provision of § 15 which provides that an accused has a right to petition for a rehearing 'Within twenty-one (21) days after the final order * * *.' In this case, no order was entered until after the March 2 hearing. Consequently, appellant's right to a rehearing under the statute arose only at that time. The Commonwealth's position, if adopted, would have required that the defendant seek review and rehearing of the order, before such order had even been entered.
In our opinion, the Commonwealth's difficulty with this case arises from a misconception of the purposes of § 15 of the Juvenile Court Law. This provision was not designed simply to afford the appellate courts an adequate record for review. 2 It was also designed to assure that the utmost care and consideration would be given by the Courts in any proceeding affecting a juvenile. The Court's special responsibility in dealing with juveniles demands careful consideration to assure that harm will not result from an unwise adjudication. It is this fundamental, moral obligation which underlies and supplies the true basis for the rehearing provisions contained in § 15 of the Juvenile Court Law.
Thus, at rehearing the defendant is not restricted to the narrow issues of whether there were technical errors of law or fact. He may, in addition, argue that 'the said order has been improvidently made.' It clearly appears from the language of the statute that the legislature intended that great latitude be afforded the petitioning party so that the court might ultimately make a decision which serves the best interests of both the child and society. We cannot agree, therefore, with the...
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