Jenkins, In re
| Decision Date | 06 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 82356,82356 |
| Citation | 438 Mich. 364,475 N.W.2d 279 |
| Parties | In re Dana E. JENKINS. WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Plaintiff, v. RECORDER'S COURT JUDGE, Defendant. 438 Mich. 364, 475 N.W.2d 279 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, Don W. Atkins, Principal Atty., Appeals, Detroit, for plaintiff.
Gerald M. Lorence, Detroit, for Dana E. Jenkins.
State Appellate Defender Office by Anne Yantus, Assistant Defender, Special Unit, Pleas/Early Releases, Detroit, on brief, for amicus curiae.
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the trial court had the authority to resentence the defendant. We conclude that the trial court did not have such authority, because the defendant's original sentence was valid. We decline the invitation to overrule People v. Whalen, 412 Mich. 166, 312 N.W.2d 638 (1981), and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On March 12, 1985, defendant Jenkins and codefendant Orrin Cuthbertson each pled guilty of one count of armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, and one count of possession of a firearm during the attempt or commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). The convictions arose out of an incident that occurred on February 8, 1985. As two people left a store and walked toward their car, the defendants approached them. Defendant Jenkins pointed a gun at the complainant, demanding her purse, while codefendant Cuthbertson pointed a gun at the other victim. After a struggle between the complainant and defendant Jenkins, the purse was taken and the defendants ran away.
On April 4, 1985, defendant Jenkins was sentenced to four and one-half to fifteen years for the armed robbery conviction, plus two years for the felony-firearm conviction. The sentencing guidelines recommendation for the armed robbery offense was thirty-six to seventy-two months. Codefendant Cuthbertson was sentenced to two to ten years for the armed robbery conviction, plus two years for the felony-firearm conviction. The sentencing guidelines range for his robbery conviction was eighteen to twenty-four months.
On September 20, 1985, defendant Jenkins moved for resentencing, arguing that the disparity between the sentences was not justified. Unable to account for the difference, 1 the trial court resentenced Jenkins to two to ten years for the armed robbery conviction, the sentence imposed on codefendant Cuthbertson.
The prosecutor filed a complaint for superintending control in the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court did not have the authority to resentence the defendant. The Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that a trial court cannot resentence a defendant unless the original sentence is invalid. 164 Mich.App. 740, 743, 417 N.W.2d 594 (1987). Since the disparity between the sentences of two codefendants did not necessarily render Jenkins' sentence invalid, the trial court was without authority to resentence him. The panel further stated that People v. Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983), vests review of a sentence in the appellate courts, not the trial court. The Court of Appeals vacated the resentencing order and reinstated the defendant's original sentence for the armed robbery conviction.
We granted leave to appeal, limited to the question whether the trial court had the authority to resentence this defendant. 434 Mich. 899, 453 N.W.2d 254 (1990).
It is well-settled law in this state that a court's authority to resentence a defendant depends on whether the previously imposed sentence is valid. Beginning with our decision in In re Mason, 8 Mich. 70 (1860), in which we found that the trial court did not have the right to resentence the defendant even if the original sentence was imposed under a mistaken belief regarding the defendant's age, we have consistently held that trial courts do not have the power to resentence a defendant after a valid sentence has been imposed. Various rationales underlie these decisions.
In People v. Fox, 312 Mich. 577, 20 N.W.2d 732 (1945), we set aside an order amending a valid sentence, reasoning that, since the Governor's powers of commutation are exclusive, People v. Freleigh, 334 Mich. 306, 54 N.W.2d 599 (1952); Const. 1963, art. 5, Sec. 14, a trial court's amendment of a sentence infringes on the executive branch's powers of commutation and also violates the jurisdiction of the parole board. Fox, 312 Mich. at p. 582, 20 N.W.2d 732. Other decisions emphasize the fact that once the defendant begins serving the original sentence, even one day of it, the authority over the defendant passes out of the trial court's hands by its own order. See People v. Meservey, 76 Mich. 223, 226, 42 N.W. 1133 (1889); People v. Dotson, 417 Mich. 940, 331 N.W.2d 477 (1983) ().
The rule announced in these cases is also stated in the recently enacted MCR 6.429, which although not yet effective at the time of defendant's resentencing is plainly premised on the cited cases and is thus nonetheless instructive. The rule states that a court "may correct an invalid sentence, but the court may not modify a valid sentence after it has been imposed except as provided by law." 2 Thus, while sentence review is generally a province of the appellate courts, trial courts do have the authority to review and correct a sentence. 3
Although the notion that sentences should be subject to later modification by the trial court has some surface appeal, we conclude that countervailing considerations counsel against recognizing the principle contended for. In the current legal culture, the trial judge must bring to bear at the moment of sentencing all of the knowledge, experience, and ability available, because the decision made at that moment will be that judge's ultimate ruling. The sentencing process is carefully designed to ensure conscientious and informed decision making as of that moment. Every effort is made to ensure that the judge has adequate and accurate information upon which to base the sentencing decision. Sentencing occurs only after the defendant, the defendant's attorney, the prosecutor, and the victims have all had the opportunity to present their views to the court. MCR 6.425. In addition, the presentence report is prepared to provide the court with as much information as possible so that the sentence can be tailored to fit the circumstances. The parties have the opportunity to review the presentence report and to challenge the accuracy 4 of any information it contains in advance of sentencing. MCR 6.425. The current system encourages the judge to thoughtfully consider every factor before sentencing the defendant.
We are persuaded that permitting the trial judge to revisit the sentencing decision may erode judicial accountability. Undermining the finality of the decision might foster carelessness or intrude upon the degree of conviction that ought to attend such a solemn pronouncement. In addition, when the judge who originally imposed the sentence is no longer on the bench or is unavailable, a new judge, unfamiliar with the record and without the benefit of observing live testimony, will be permitted to review the sentence, without the ability to closely tailor sentences to the unique facts of the particular case.
A new procedure allowing sentences to be reconsidered at the trial court level also opens the door to possible abuse. Requiring a trial judge to revisit sentencing in a high profile case opens a window to extraneous considerations. Even if inappropriate concerns actually have no bearing on a trial judge's decision to alter the sentence, the public may perceive that the change in sentence resulted from the publicity. Public respect and confidence in the criminal justice system's ability to sentence may be compromised.
We are also concerned with the administrative burden imposed by recognizing the authority to reimpose a valid sentence. Requiring the sentencing judge to review valid sentences will inevitably lead to increased challenges, further burdening a court system that is already having difficulty handling the increased number of criminal cases. Providing for an additional review of the sentence may result in a battle of attrition. A prisoner, having nothing to lose, may seek a reduced sentence again and again at an unacceptable cost to the criminal justice system. Additionally, since the Supreme Court has held that a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal, United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979), recognition of such a right at the behest of the defendant would doubtless lead to claims for recognition of the prosecutor's right to petition the sentencing court for an increase of sentence. 5 Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court's Sentence Review Committee considered, but declined to recommend the adoption of, a court rule allowing the trial judge to reconsider the sentence within 120 days of its imposition. 6 The committee forecasted "an unacceptable burden on the criminal justice system by attracting an excessive number of motions to reconsider." Report and Recommendation of Sentence Review Committee, July 19, 1982, p 17.
While considerations of finality and of administrative consequences might alone not persuade us to adhere to our holding in Whalen if we were convinced that such a process was necessary, we believe it is not. The system of sentence review in Michigan already guarantees adequate opportunity to correct errors. If the sentence is invalid a trial judge is entitled to resentence the defendant pursuant to MCR 6.429. The trial court is also empowered to...
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... ... 36 ... [454 Mich. 176] We have long recognized and recently reaffirmed that a sentence may be set aside only when it is invalid. People v. Whalen, 412 Mich. 166, 169-170, 312 N.W.2d 638 (1981); In re Dana Jenkins, 438 Mich. 364, 373, 475 N.W.2d 279 (1991). In Jenkins, we observed in dicta that the defendant may challenge the scoring of the sentencing guidelines under MCR 6.429; and in People v. Hernandez, 443 Mich. 1, 503 N.W.2d 629 (1993), and People v. Walker, 428 Mich. 261, 407 N.W.2d 367 (1987), we ... ...
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