Jenkins, Matter of

• Decision Date: 15 March 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 84205
• Citation: 437 Mich. 15,465 N.W.2d 317
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of Honorable Leon JENKINS, Judge, 36th District Court, Detroit, Michigan. 437 Mich. 15, 465 N.W.2d 317

Page 317

465 N.W.2d 317

In the Matter of Honorable Leon JENKINS, Judge, 36th District Court, Detroit, Michigan.

Docket No. 84205.

437 Mich. 15, 465 N.W.2d 317

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 9, 1990.

Decided Jan. 23, 1991.

Rehearing Denied March 15, 1991.

[437 MICH 16] Leon Jenkins, Detroit, in pro-per.

Thomas L. Prowse, Staff Atty., Detroit, for Judicial Tenure Com'n of State of Mich.

Before the entire Bench (except MALLETT, J.).

OPINION

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from the Judicial Tenure Commission's filing of Formal Complaint No. 41 against respondent 36th District Judge Leon Jenkins. The complaint charged respondent with:

(1) engaging in routine solicitation and acceptance of bribes in return for the improper disposition of matters before him as a judge (principally traffic citations),

(2) engaging in routine improper ex parte communications with litigants and their representatives involved in matters before him as a judge,

(3) engaging in routine improper acceptance of, and failure to report, gifts, favors, loans, and other items of value from litigants and their representatives involved in matters before him as a judge,

(4) signing a writ of habeas corpus authorizing the release of a person respondent believed to be the friend of a close friend, without being fully informed of the facts and circumstances of the individual's incarceration, and following respondent's personal retention of another close friend as the incarcerated individual's attorney, who prepared the writ signed by respondent,

(5) intentionally misrepresenting his residential address on an automobile insurance application to the Farmers Insurance Company, in order to defraud Farmers, and

(6) soliciting an individual for whom respondent had agreed to fix certain traffic citations to commit perjury in connection with a federal investigation into respondent's activities.

In connection with the foregoing allegations, the complaint charged respondent with committing acts which would, if proven in a criminal trial, constitute violations of, inter alia, M.C.L. Sec. 750.118; M.S.A. Sec. 28.313 (acceptance of bribes by public official), M.C.L. Sec. 750.218; M.S.A. Sec. 28.415 (false pretenses with intent to defraud), M.C.L. Sec. 750.425; M.S.A. Sec. 28.667 (solicitation of perjury), and with violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2A (impropriety and appearance of impropriety), 2C (permitting friends or family to influence judicial conduct), 3A(4) (improper ex parte communications), 5C(4) (improper acceptance of gifts), and 6C (failure to properly report income).

We appointed a master in this case who, following a hearing, issued his report finding respondent guilty of the charged misconduct. ¹ The commission adopted the master's findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that respondent had engaged in misconduct in office and conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice within the meaning of Const. 1963, art. 6, Sec. 30, and MCR 9.205(C). For reasons stated below, we adopt the findings of the master and the commission, and we hereby remove respondent from his judicial office.

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent petitions this Court to reject the commission's recommendation, contesting the factual findings made below and raising a number of procedural challenges. We address these contentions in parts II(A) and (B). In part II(C), we discuss the commission's recommended action in this case.

A. Factual Issues

We review de novo the factual findings of the master and the commission. In re Somers, 384 Mich. 320, 323, 182 N.W.2d 341 (1971). The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. In re Loyd, 424 Mich. 514, 521-522, 384 N.W.2d 9 (1986). On the basis of our de novo review of the record, we find overwhelming evidence that during the period from 1984 to 1987 respondent systematically and routinely sold his office and his public trust, committed acts which would, if proven in a criminal trial, constitute violations of three criminal statutes, committed wholesale violations of the most elementary canons of judicial conduct, and brought grave dishonor upon this state's judiciary.

The evidence of respondent's ticket-fixing activities includes the testimony of his former court clerk Cheryl Love, former court employee Rogers Armour, Jr., and fourteen individuals who received citations which were improperly dismissed by respondent. ² Eight of the latter individuals testified that bribes or favors were given to middlemen or to respondent directly in return for respondent's dismissal of the citations. Six individuals testified to dealing directly with respondent as middlemen, passing bribes or favors to respondent in return for the improper dismissal of citations received by others. ³ The chief middleman was Sabah Dickow, a close friend of respondent who became a federal informant. In addition to Dickow's lengthy testimony against respondent, the evidence includes forty-three recorded conversations between respondent and Dickow and several other individuals.

It appears that respondent operated, to some extent, under the illusion that he could protect himself by attempting to avoid, on many occasions, any explicit quid pro quo for fixing a specific ticket. ⁴ The record is replete, however, with evidence that on numerous occasions respondent did indeed solicit and accept specific bribes in return for fixing specific tickets. ⁵ The fact that the ticket-fixing occurred on such a wholesale, systematic, and continuing basis that it was often unclear precisely which bribe applied to which ticket hardly mitigates the case against respondent. Respondent's conduct would, if proven in a criminal trial, constitute a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 750.118; M.S.A. Sec. 28.313, and indicates appalling disregard for Canons 3A(4), 5C(4), and 6C of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The testimony of James Safiedine and insurance agent Thomas Pietila, and related documentary evidence, establishes that respondent, when applying for automobile insurance on December 23, 1985, intentionally misstated his residential address for the purpose of defrauding the Farmers Insurance Company. Respondent falsely gave Safiedine's West Bloomfield address as his own, when in fact respondent lived in Detroit. Respondent applied for policy renewals on the basis of this false address three times, on June 29, 1986, December 29, 1986, and June 29, 1987. The testimony of Farmers policy supervisor Brenda Heninger establishes that respondent's misrepresentations defrauded Farmers of $2,015.45. This conduct may, if proven in a criminal trial, constitute a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 750.218; M.S.A. Sec. 28.415.

The testimony of Saud Barbat and Kevin Council establishes that in the summer of 1986 respondent accepted $200 in return for promising to dismiss several citations received by Council, but that Barbat and Council later learned that the citations had not been dismissed. Council's testimony indicates that the citations never were dismissed, and that respondent confronted Council with them in the spring of 1987. At that time, respondent asked Council, in return for future favors from respondent, to commit perjury by falsely testifying that no improper agreement to fix Council's citations had ever existed. This conduct would, if proven in a criminal trial, constitute a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 750.425; M.S.A. Sec. 28.667.

The testimony of Jerome Crawford and Sabah Dickow further establishes that on August 5, 1986, respondent signed a writ of habeas corpus purporting to authorize the release of an individual, James Alexander Parrish, whom he believed to be a friend of Dickow. Parrish was in fact an undercover agent posing as an arrested felon. When Dickow informed respondent of Parrish's arrest and the charges against him, respondent agreed on the spot to effect his release, and told Dickow it would cost him $200 to $300. Respondent told Dickow he would personally retain an attorney for Parrish, and accepted a blank check drawn on Dickow's business account for that purpose. Respondent retained his close friend Jerome Crawford as Parrish's lawyer and gave Crawford the blank check, which Crawford filled out and cashed for $300. Respondent then signed the writ of habeas corpus prepared by Crawford. This conduct constituted, at the very least, a flagrant breach of Canons 2A and 2C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in that it exhibited both the reality and the appearance that respondent, with extreme impropriety, permitted "his family, social, or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment."

In response to the foregoing evidence, respondent offers little beyond assertions of the allegedly unreliable character of the testimony against him. However, "[o]ur power of review de novo does not prevent us from according proper deference to the master's ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor and comment on their credibility." Loyd, 424 Mich. at 535, 384 N.W.2d 9. The master found the testimony against respondent credible and persuasive, and the commission found no reason to disagree. On the basis of our de novo review of the record, we also find no reason to question the master's conclusions.

Respondent, in his capacity as his own legal counsel, argues his innocence on the basis of the record. We note, however, that in this judicial disciplinary proceeding we may properly take into account, as did the master, the fact that respondent declined to testify in his own behalf at the hearing below. See MCR 9.211(B); see also part II(B)(1).ents of counsel are not, of course, evidence. We therefore may, and indeed must, treat the extensive testimony against respondent as being unrebutted and unrefuted by respondent himself. ⁶ 6] Furthermore, while respondent strongly disputes the criminal allegations against him, he conceded at oral argument before this Court that he has engaged in ex parte...