Jenkins v. Artuz
| Decision Date | 01 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 01-2355.,Docket No. 01-2328. |
| Parties | Eric JENKINS, Petitioner-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Christopher ARTUZ, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Donna Aldea, Assistant District Attorney (Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Queens County, John M. Castello, Assistant District Attorney, Lisa Ann Drury, Assistant District Attorney, of counsel), Kew Gardens, NY, for Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Frederick H. Cohn (Laura K. Gasiorowski, of counsel), New York, NY, for Petitioner-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Before: SACK, B.D. PARKER, JR. and B. FLETCHER,* Circuit Judges.
Respondent Christopher Artuz, Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility, Dutchess County, New York, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nina Gershon, Judge) granting petitioner Eric Jenkins's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In granting Jenkins's petition, the district court engaged in de novo review because it concluded that the Appellate Division, Second Department, of the New York Supreme Court had not, on direct appeal, "adjudicated [the federal constitutional claim] on the merits" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Subsequent to Judge Gershon's decision, however, we clarified the meaning of "adjudicated on the merits." See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303 (2d Cir.2001). We hold that under Sellan, Jenkins's claim was adjudicated on the merits, and the more deferential standard of review set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) therefore applies to the state court's decision. We hold nonetheless that the writ should issue because the Appellate Division's denial of Jenkins's federal due process claim relating to the use of false testimony against him was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
At about 8:45 p.m. on April 11, 1992, Michael Reese was killed by gunshot wounds inflicted on him while he stood at or near a bus-stop shelter on Guy R. Brewer Boulevard in the Borough of Queens, New York. On May 12, 1992, police arrested Jenkins and charged him with the killing.
In a March 1, 1993 pretrial hearing, Jenkins moved to suppress in-court identification testimony from two potential witnesses, Garvey Napoleon and Rollie Carter. New York Supreme Court Justice John J. Leahy rejected Jenkins's motions without explanation.
Jenkins proceeded to trial before Supreme Court Justice Joseph Rosenzweig on May 5, 1993. On May 11, Queens County Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Solomon Landa, who was prosecuting Jenkins's case, entered into an oral plea agreement with a prosecution witness, David Morgan, who was to testify later that day. Morgan had been arrested twice for selling crack cocaine in a matter unrelated to the Jenkins case1 and had been charged with possession thereof with intent to sell. Under the agreement, Morgan accepted six months' imprisonment and five years' probation. Later that day, in court, Jenkins's counsel objected that he had not been warned of Morgan's plea bargain. Justice Rosenzweig declared a mistrial the following day based on ADA Landa's "prosecutorial misconduct" in "hold[ing] back exculpatory information [that is, Morgan's plea] as long as possible" from defense counsel.
ADA Therese Lendino replaced Landa as the prosecutor in the case. On September 22, 1993, Jenkins's second trial began before Supreme Court Justice William G. Giaccio. Lendino acknowledged to the court at the trial's outset that the State and Morgan had entered a plea agreement, as a condition of which he had agreed to cooperate and testify truthfully and fully, and that she "expect[ed] it w[ould] come out on direct [examination]."
The State presented eight witnesses, six of whom provided no evidence directly linking Jenkins to Reese's murder. Four police officers — Evola, Ritter, Casella, and Gibbons — testified about the crime scene and the gathering of evidence. Medical examiner Dr. Josette Montas testified as to the cause of death. And Reese's mother testified as to her identification of the body.
Garvey Napoleon also testified for the prosecution. He gave a purported eyewitness account of the murder, saying that at the time of the killing he was talking to his girlfriend using a pay phone on Guy R. Brewer Boulevard across from where Reese stood at the bus stop. Napoleon testified that he saw Jenkins, accompanied by two others, approach Reese and shoot him.
Napoleon's testimony contained a number of inconsistencies. For example, Napoleon gave two different names for his girlfriend — Devanya and Jennifer. He also alternated between saying he had and had not been speaking to her at the moment when Morgan was shot. He also failed at first to report seeing Jenkins's gun. Finally, at the first trial, he claimed to have walked across Guy R. Brewer Boulevard toward Reese's body after the shooting, but denied doing so at the second trial.
David Morgan then testified for the prosecution. He said that the day before the murder he had witnessed a fight between Jenkins's nephew, Cecil Saddler, Jr., and the murder victim, Reese. Morgan testified that Jenkins later approached Morgan and asked about Reese, and that Jenkins stated that he was "sick of people bothering his nephew." Morgan also testified that he learned of the murder soon after it occurred, found the victim's mother, and brought her to the murder scene.
In the course of direct examination, ADA Lendino asked Morgan no questions about his plea agreement with the State as she had previously suggested she would. During the defense counsel's cross-examination, however, Morgan falsely denied its existence:
. . .
Q: Before you testified in the proceedings on May 11th, 1993, you were promised and got an offer from the Assistant District Attorney Mr. Landa that if you pled guilty to those charges you would get six months in jail and probation?
Before Morgan could answer, ADA Lendino objected that the question had been "[a]sked and answered." The court overruled the objection, and defense counsel continued:
On redirect examination, ADA Lendino did not seek to correct her witness's at-best-ambiguous testimony about the existence of a plea agreement. Instead, she reenforced the impression that no agreement existed:
The prosecution then rested.
Alnita Saddler and her former husband Cecil Saddler testified for the defense. They said that they were with Jenkins in Alnita's apartment on the night that Reese was killed, celebrating their son Cecil Saddler, Jr.'s birthday. They admitted, however, that Jenkins and their son left for Alabama a week after Jenkins was questioned by police about Reese's murder. Defense counsel also called a telephone company employee who testified that the pay phone at the crime scene where Napoleon asserted he had received a call from his girlfriend could not receive calls. Finally, defense counsel called two police detectives, O'Donnell and Gibbons, to attempt to show contradictions in Napoleon's and Morgan's testimony.
Later, in the course of her summation, ADA Lendino reminded the jury of Morgan's testimony on the absence of a deal between them. She stated that Morgan ADA Lendino posed a series of rhetorical questions about Morgan's motives: Jenkins's counsel failed either to object or to raise Morgan's plea agreement in his summation. Instead, defense counsel impugned Morgan's credibility by describing him as a "drug dealer."
The jury convicted Jenkins of Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Decree. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25, 265.03. He...
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