Jenkins v. Bergeron
Decision Date | 19 December 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12–10793–NMG. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Parties | Shaun JENKINS, Petitioner, v. Karen BERGERON, Respondent. |
Stewart T. Graham, Jr., Graham & Graham, Hampden, MA, for Petitioner.
Thomas E. Bocian, Office of the Attorney General Martha Coakley, Boston, MA, for Respondent.
This habeas petition arises out of the conviction of petitioner Shaun Jenkins (“Jenkins” or “petitioner”) in 2005 for first-degree murder in Massachusetts Superior Court.
In April, 2003, Jenkins was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Stephen Jenkins (“Stephen”). He was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in April, 2005 and sentenced to life in state prison. The Superior Court denied his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (“SJC”) affirmed the conviction and the order denying the motion for a new trial in February, 2011 upon finding, inter alia, that the claims asserted in the instant petition lacked merit. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 941 N.E.2d 56 (2011).
In September, 2012, Jenkins filed the instant petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his state court conviction on the grounds that 1) he did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to testify, 2) his trial counsel was ineffective and 3) the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of due process.
For the following reasons, the petition for habeas corpus will be denied.
A federal court sitting in habeas corpus is not obliged to re-examine state-court determinations of state-law issues but rather “is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Factual findings made by state courts on direct review are therefore entitled to a presumption of correctness and interpretations of state law are binding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ; Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602, 163 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005).
When the basis for a petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus was adjudicated on the merits in state court, the petition will be granted only if the state court adjudication:
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision represents an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule ... but unreasonably applies it to the facts” of the particular case. Id. at 407–08, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In both instances, the applicable legal principle must be clearly established in a holding by the Supreme Court and cannot appear in dicta or be based upon the holdings of lower federal courts. Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
When the basis for a petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus was not adjudicated on the merits in state court, however, the petitioner's claim will be reviewed de novo. Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2003).
A criminal defendant's right to testify is “a fundamental constitutional right.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). Such a right can only be waived intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly. Jenkins, 458 Mass. at 803, 941 N.E.2d 56 ; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). It is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not waive his right knowingly and intelligently. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019.
Jenkins contends that he never waived his fundamental right to testify because his trial counsel made a unilateral decision on his behalf. He asserts that the SJC addressed only whether he was informed of his right to testify but not whether he waived that right and therefore this Court should review his claim de novo . Jenkins emphasizes that knowledge of his right to testify is inconsequent if his counsel refused to allow him to testify.
The Commonwealth responds that the SJC already adjudicated the claim of whether trial counsel made a unilateral decision not to allow the petitioner to testify because Jenkins presented that argument in his briefing before the SJC. It contends that the Court should therefore apply deferential review under Section 2254(d) and cites in support Harrington v. Richter, which held:
There is no merit to the assertion that compliance with § 2254(d) should be excused when state courts issue summary rulings....When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.
562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784–85, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
Jenkins, 458 Mass. at 803, 941 N.E.2d 56. In light of the SJC's determination regarding petitioner's waiver of his right to testify, the Court declines to review petitioner's waiver argument de novo.
Acknowledging the deference afforded under 2254(d) review, the Court concludes that the SJC's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. There is no standard clearly established by the United States Supreme Court addressing the circumstances under which a criminal defendant waives the right to testify in his own behalf. Thompson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir.2006) ( ).
Moreover, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “a criminal defendant must claim his privilege or right to testify by attempting to take the stand or it is waived.” Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 30 (1st Cir.1987) ; see also U.S. v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir.2000) ( ).
Here, the record does not suggest that petitioner's counsel prevented him from testifying in violation of his Sixth Amendment right or that petitioner attempted to take the stand. As summarized by the SJC, the factual record indicates that 1) the petitioner admitted that he discussed the decision to testify with his attorney, 2) the trial judge conducted a colloquy with the petitioner during trial, at which point the judge informed Jenkins that he had every right to testify and every right not to testify, 3) the petitioner acknowledged that he understood each of the points that the judge had discussed with him during the colloquy, 4) the petitioner responded that he had no questions regarding his right to testify and 5) “there was no indication of any dispute or disagreement between the defendant and his counsel as to trial tactics or of any kind.” Jenkins, 458 Mass. at 803–04 & n. 10, 941 N.E.2d 56.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the determination by the SJC regarding petitioner's waiver to testify is not contrary to federal law.
Jenkins claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to 1) his counsel's advice regarding whether to testify at trial and 2) his counsel's failure to impeach adequately the Commonwealth's key witness, petitioner's cousin Craig Jenkins (“Craig”).
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-pronged test for whether the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated. 466 U.S. 668, 686–687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that his counsel's representation 1) “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and 2) that “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
This is a difficult test to satisfy.
[J]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential [and] counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
Id. at 689–90, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir.2006) ( )(internal citation omitted).
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