Jenkins v. Bernatene
| Decision Date | 28 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:12-CV-00928-MJS (PC) |
| Parties | LESAUNDRA JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. KELLY BERNATENE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM
CLERK TO CLOSE FILE
DISMISSAL IS SUBJECT TO 28 U.S.C. §
Plaintiff LeSaundra Jenkins is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Valley State Prison for Women in Chowchilla, California, ("VSP") proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed on June 7, 2012 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Consent, ECF No. 5.)
On July 13, 2012, Plaintiffs's Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim with leave to amend. On August 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (First Am. Compl., ECF No. 9) which is now before the Court for screening.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous, malicious," or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rightsconferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Plaintiff claims the trial judge in her underlying criminal matter1 made an error in the sentencing documentation and that Defendants acknowledged the error but refused to refer it to the trial court for correction, violating her Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 (First Am. Compl. at 3-5.)
She was sentenced on November 8, 2000 to life in prison with the possibility of parole on count one which, at least on the face of it charged Cal. Penal Code § 209(b)(1) "kidnaping", with sentencing on count two Cal. Penal Code § 211 "burglary" stayed by the trial court. (Id. at 49-50, 59.)
Plaintiff claims that her original felony complaint/information charged count one as "burglary" and count two as "kidnaping"; that the trial court improperly allowed the complaint/information to be amended by the district attorney to reverse these counts; that the life sentence imposed on count one is erroneous because count one should properly have charged "burglary" carrying a maximum 5 year term; resulting in sentencing error and a continuing illegal detention (as she has been incarcerated for more than 5 years). (Id. at 3-5, 146-55.)
Upon discovering the sentencing error, she requested and was granted a Computation Review (Haygood) hearing on July 25, 2011, which constituted her secondlevel prison appeal.3 (Id. 3-4.)
Plaintiff alleges the Haygood hearing officer, non-party B. Hinson, VSP Case Records Manager, found error and granted the second level appeal based thereon, but failed to refer the error to state court for correction.
She contends her subsequent third level (Director's) appeal was improperly denied. (Id. at 3-5.)
She names as Defendants (1) Kelly Bernatene, CDC Correctional Case Records Analyst, (2) M. Fortes, CDC Correctional Case Records Manager, (3) M. Cates, CDC Secretary, (4) K. Pool, CDC Appeal Examiner, (5) D. Foston, CDC Chief of Appeals, (6) Pamela Webster, CDC Correctional Case Records Analyst, (7) Sandra Woodyard, CDC Correctional Case Records Administrator. (Id. at 2-3.)
She seeks monetary compensation, and that "due process be performed". (Id. at 5.)
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that thepleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 667-68.
Detention beyond the termination of a sentence could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it is the result of "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's liberty interest, see Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1354, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976); otherwise, such detention can be held to be unconstitutional only if it violates due process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to errors in her sentencing documents causing her to be and remain incarcerated beyond her lawful release date.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979). "No static 'test' can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark theprogress of a maturing society.'" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
"In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim for incarceration without penological justification . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements to establish § 1983 liability against a prison official: (1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight; and (3) a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention. Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252, citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d. Cir. 1989).
The facts before the Court do not suggest that Defendants, placed on notice of an alleged computational error in Plaintiff's life sentence, then refused to investigate or took only ineffectual action in the matter. See Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1355. The Haygood hearing officer's decision did not find error as to the trial court's imposition of Plaintiff's life sentence. Nor does it appear that such an alleged error, which goes to validity of the sentence imposed rather than start and release dates thereunder, could constitute Haygood "computational" error. In Haygood, corrections staff refused to investigate and afford a hearing on alleged error in computing Mr. Haygood's release date under California's continuous term policy. In contrast, Plaintiff Jenkins challenges the validity of her life sentence, not computation of start and release dates thereunder.
To the extent the Haygood hearing officer did find a discrepancy in Plaintiff's sentencing credits and minimum eligible parole date, such was reviewed and corrected by CDC staff. Nothing before the Court suggests deliberate indifference thereto.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting any predicate computational error and Defendants' deliberate indifference thereto.
Plaintiff having been advised in the previous screening order of the deficiencies in her predicate sentencing error claim and having been given an opportunity to correct them, has failed to do so. There is no point in granting yet another opportunity to correct the same deficiencies.
Plaintiff alleges error in her sentencing documents, acknowledged by the Haygood hearing officer yet not referred to the trial court for correction, violating her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1...
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