Jenkins v. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 January 1903
• Citation: 71 S.W. 688,171 Mo. 375
• Parties: JENKINS v. COVENANT MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

71 S.W. 688

171 Mo. 375

JENKINS v. COVENANT MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

January 9, 1903.

INSURANCE—LIFE POLICY—APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT—REPRESENTATION — WARRANTY — MATERIALITY — STATUTES — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SPECIAL ACT—CHANGE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.

1. Rev. St. 1889, § 5849 (Rev. St. 1899, § 7890), enacts that no misrepresentation made in obtaining a life policy shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency on which the policy is to become due. Held, that the statute applies to representations which are warranties.

2. The statute applies to a warranty contained in an application for reinstatement.

3. Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibits the passage of any special law regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts. Rev. St. 1889, § 5849 (Rev. St. 1899, § 7890), provides that no misrepresentations made in obtaining a life policy shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless they shall have actually contributed to the contingency on which the policy is to become due. Held that, while such statute applies only to policies issued by old-line companies doing business on a stipulated premium plan, it is not violative of the constitutional provision, since the legislature has a constitutional right to discriminate between the liabilities of old-line companies and those doing business on the assessment plan.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; E. P. Gates, Judge.

Action by Mary Jenkins against the Covenant Mutual Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Lathrop, Morrow, Fox & Moore and Thos. H. Reynolds, for appellant. Flournoy & Flournoy and Paxton & Rose, for respondent.

BURGESS, J.

This is an action upon a policy of life insurance for $1,000 issued by the defendant company to John H. Jenkins, payable to his wife, Mary Jenkins, the plaintiff, and dated on the 24th day of April, 1890. The premiums were due semiannually, but he made default in the payment of the one that became due October 24, 1896, and the policy lapsed by reason thereof. On December 12, 1896, the assured applied for reinstatement of his policy, and upon a certificate signed by him in which he stated, "I hereby warrant, as the basis of such reinstatement, that I have not been sick since the issuance of said policy; that there has not been since that time any material change in my health." The policy was reinstated. There was some conflict in the evidence as to whether or not he had any serious ailment prior to the date of his application for reinstatement, and especially with respect to the time the symptoms of the disease (lung trouble) which finally led to his death appeared,—in the fall preceding his reinstatement or afterwards. It was, however, shown by plaintiff that in January, 1897, he contracted rheumatism, and that about a month before his death he contracted cold, which caused inflammation of the lungs, from which he died July 8, 1897.

The court, over the objection and exception of defendant, instructed the jury in behalf of plaintiff as follows: "(1) You are instructed: That it is admitted in this case that the policy sued on was issued to John H. Jenkins by defendant on April 24, 1890, and that he paid all the premiums due on said policy up to October 24, 1896, but failed to pay that premium when it became due; that on December 12, 1896, said John H. Jenkins made the certificate of health introduced in evidence, and upon which his policy was reinstated, and that he on said December 12, 1896, paid said premium of October 24, 1896, and all other premiums on said policy as they became due, up to the date of his death, which it is admitted occurred on July 8, 1897. But defendant's defense in this action is upon the ground that said John H. Jenkins in such certificate of health made false representations and warranties as to the then or previous condition of his health, about matters which actually contributed to his death. That the burden of showing that said John H. Jenkins made false representations and warranties in said certificate of health is upon the defendant, and you cannot find for the defendant unless you believe from a preponderance of the evidence (that is, the greater weight of credible testimony in the case) that said John H. Jenkins made false representations and warranties in said certificate of health, about matters which actually contributed to his death. (2) You are instructed that although you may believe from the evidence in this case that John H. Jenkins was unwell at and previous to the time he made the application upon which the policy sued on was reinstated, and in such application he misrepresented the then and previous condition of his health, yet that will not be sufficient to warrant you in finding in favor of the defendant unless you further believe from the evidence that the sickness, if any, with which the said John H. Jenkins was then or had previously been suffering, actually contributed to his death. (3) If you find for the plaintiff, you will assess her damages at the sum of $1,000, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the 30th day of September, 1897, less the $13.60 already paid."

The court gave the following instructions asked by defendant: "(4) The court instructs the jury that the failure of John H. Jenkins to pay the premium on the policy sued on that fell due October 24, 1896, terminated the contract of insurance at that time. (5) The court instructs the jury that the fact that the defendant is a corporation is wholly immaterial, and its rights are the same as an individual's, and you should consider the case the same as if it were between two individuals."

The court refused to give the following instructions as asked by defendant: "(1) The court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence that the policy of insurance sued on was reinstated by defendant company, relying upon the truth of the representations in the health certificate read in evidence; that such representations were not true; and that said John H. Jenkins had been sick after the issuance of said policy, and prior to the making of said certificate, or that there had been any material change in his health after the issuance of said policy, and prior to the making of said certificate,—then your verdict must be for defendant. (2) The court instructs the jury that the failure of John H. Jenkins to pay the premium at the time specified in the policy terminated the contract of insurance sued on, October 24, 1896; that if said policy was reinstated by defendant upon the faith of the representations made by said John H. Jenkins, and such representations were false, then said policy of insurance was void, and plaintiff cannot recover in this suit. (3) The court instructs the jury that the defendant had a right to rely upon the truth of the representations in the certificate of health read in evidence, and, if such representations were not true, then the policy of insurance sued on was void, and your verdict must be for defendant. (4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant company would not have reinstated the policy sued on, had it known the real state of facts in regard to the health...