Jenkins v. Hoboken Board of Education, Civ. No. 93-2525 (DRD) (D. N.J. 12/1/1999), Civ. No. 93-2525 (DRD)

• Decision Date: 01 December 1999
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 93-2525 (DRD)
• Parties: THEODORE J. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. HOBOKEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, EDWIN DUROY, Superintendent, and ANGEL ALICEA, PERRY BELFIORE, ANDREW CARONICO, JAMES FARINA, JONATHON GORDON, OTTO HOTTENDORF, MICHAEL LENZ, GERALDINE PANTALIANO, JILL LESLIE STEIN, Members, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

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THEODORE J. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. HOBOKEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, EDWIN DUROY, Superintendent, and ANGEL ALICEA, PERRY BELFIORE, ANDREW CARONICO, JAMES FARINA, JONATHON GORDON, OTTO HOTTENDORF, MICHAEL LENZ, GERALDINE PANTALIANO, JILL LESLIE STEIN, Members, Defendants.

Civ. No. 93-2525 (DRD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

December 1, 1999.

Paul Schachter, Esq., REINHARDT & SCHACHTER, P.C., Newark, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Valerie Dion, Esq., MURRAY, MURRAY, & CORRIGAN, Little Silver, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants.

Hoboken Board of Education and Individual Board Members, Paulette L. Pitt, Esq., HAYDEN & SILBER, Weehawken, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant Edwin Duroy.

OPINION

DICKINSON R. DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge.

This employment discrimination action has been brought by plaintiff Theodore Jenkins against the Hoboken Board of Education, its Superintendent of Schools, and the individual Board members. Plaintiff' complaint alleges six causes of action against these defendants, as follows:

1) violation of plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981");

2) violation of plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983");

3) violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD");

4) deprivation of property in violation of the New Jersey State Constitution;

5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and;

6) violation of the public policy of the state of New Jersey.

Four motions are currently pending before the Court. The first is a motion brought by defendants Hoboken Board of Education ("Board") and the individual Board members ("Members") seeking a waiver of the page-limit rule for the brief in support of their motion for summary judgment. While these defendants could easily have met the page limit by deleting some of the more frivolous arguments from their brief, this motion is unopposed and will be granted.¹

The second motion is brought by plaintiff, seeking partial summary judgment as to his tenure claim. The third is a motion for summary judgment brought by the Board and the Members, the fourth a motion for summary judgment brought by defendant Edwin Duroy ("Duroy"). The resolution of these three motions will be discussed below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Theodore Jenkins is an educator with a doctoral degree in education from Rutgers University. He was appointed as the Director of Curriculum for the defendant Hoboken Board of Education ("the Board") in January 1988. He obtained tenure in January of 1991 and remained in his position as Director of Curriculum until June 30, 1991, when the position was abolished by the Board.

Shortly before the Director of Curriculum position was abolished, the Board created a new administrative position entitled Curriculum Supervisor of Science and Social Studies ("the Supervisor Position"). The Board filled this position with a candidate named Lawrence Yacullo ("Yacullo"), formerly the head of the science department at Hoboken High School.

Approximately one year after plaintiff's position was eliminated, the Board created a second new administrative position, titled the Director of School Improvement ("the Director Position"). This position was filled by James Lerman.

Plaintiff alleges that the responsibilities of the Supervisor and Director Positions included responsibilities previously performed by the Director of Curriculum, and that the Board's failure to place him in these positions, as well as the decision to abolish the Director of Curriculum Position, constituted discrimination on the basis of race and age and a violation of his tenure rights under New Jersey law.² He avers that neither Yacullo nor Lerman had the same level of qualifications and experience as plaintiff, and that they were selected primarily because they were younger, white male candidates who would appeal to the influx of young white professionals moving into Hoboken.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment will be granted if the record establishes that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Rule 56(c) imposes a burden on the moving party simply to point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the burden then shifts to the opposition to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The evidence need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

At the summary judgment stage, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247. In determining whether there exists a material issue of disputed fact, however, the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986).

In addition to being genuine, the disputed facts must be material, as determined by the substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Debate over extraneous issues will not suffice; "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff asserts that under New Jersey law his status as a tenured employee with the Board entitled him to the Supervisor Position, and moves for an order to that effect.³

Defendants first respond that the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine this issue because exclusive jurisdiction over tenure matters has been granted to the New Jersey Commissioner of Education. Second, they contend that summary judgment is unavailable because issues of fact remain as to whether plaintiff served as a supervisor in his former position and whether he had the necessary science and social studies background to qualify him for the Supervisor Position.

While New Jersey law provides that the Commissioner of Education has primary jurisdiction to hear and determine all controversies arising under the school laws, Bower v. Board of Educ. of East Orange, 149 N.J. 416, 420 (1997); N.J.S.A. § 18A:6-9 (West 1989), plaintiff's tenure claim is so intermeshed with his discrimination claims under federal law that this Court has jurisdiction to hear it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.⁴ None of the grounds to decline supplemental jurisdiction provided in § 1367(c) are present here, nor are any of the concerns addressed by the various abstention doctrines. See Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 1997); Trent v. Dial Med., 33 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Colorado River abstention); O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Younger abstention); General Glass Indus. v. Monsour Med. Found., 973 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing Burford abstention); Biegenwald v. Fauver, 882 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing Pullman abstention). Resolution of the tenure issue is especially appropriate here because the New Jersey Administrative Law Judge has entered an order staying the Commissioner of Education proceedings regarding plaintiff's tenure pending resolution of plaintiff's federal case. See Exhibit "A" annexed to the Board and Members' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion.

It does appear, however, that significant factual issues remain which make summary resolution of plaintiff's tenure claims inappropriate.⁵ Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment will consequently be denied.

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Board and Members have moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Defendant Duroy has joined in that motion, adopting its arguments, and has submitted an additional brief in support of his own motion for summary judgment.

The primary thrust of defendants' briefs is that plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his claims. The briefs also raise several issues of law regarding certain counts of the complaint. These issues will be addressed first.

A. Preemption

In Point VIII of their brief, the Board and Members assert that Count VI of the complaint, alleging that defendants violated the public policy of the State of New Jersey, is subject to dismissal because it is based on the same facts as plaintiff's discrimination claims under NJLAD and § 1981. They observe that under New Jersey law, a common law cause of action cannot be maintained if based on the same allegations as a statutory cause of action. See Catalane v. Gillian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J.Super. 477, 491-92 (App. Div. 1994); see also Butler v. Sherman, Silverstein & Kohl, 755 F.Supp. 1259, 1265 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that "the [New Jersey] Supreme Court does not intend to allow a supplementary common law cause of action where the NJLAD provides a remedy for the wrong").

Plaintiff notes that adverse employment decisions can give rise to a cause of action for violation of public policy, citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980), and remarks that the New Jersey Supreme Court has never expressly held that NJLAD preempts Pierce claims. While both of these observations are true, the Butler court specifically found Pierce claims to be preempted, a holding endorsed by the New...