Jenkins v. Jeffrey

• Citation: 29 P. 186,3 Wyo. 669
• Parties: JENKINS et al. v. JEFFREY
• Decision Date: 03 March 1892
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

29 P. 186

3 Wyo. 669

JENKINS et al. v. JEFFREY

Supreme Court of Wyoming

March 3, 1892

Error to district court, Laramie county.

Action by John K. Jeffrey against Helen Jenkins and John Jenkins for possession of land. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

P. Gad Bryan and John Charles Thompson, for plaintiffs in error.

E. W Mann, for defendant in error.

GROESBECK C. J. CONAWAY and MERRELL, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GROESBECK, C. J.

August 16, 1890, John K. Jeffrey, the defendant in error, brought an action under the style and designation of "forcible detainer" before W. F. LEE, one of the justices of the peace for Laramie county. Summons was issued against the defendants therein, Helen Jenkins, and John Jenkins, who was joined as husband of the said Helen, and the claim of the plaintiff was stated in the summons "that the defendants unlawfully detain from the possession of the plaintiff lot number 3, in block number 357, in the city of Cheyenne." The notice to vacate premises, given by plaintiff to the said Helen, was filed. August 20, 1890, the summons was returned, and the parties appeared before said justice of the peace. The plaintiff, Jeffrey, filed his complaint, which is in the following language: "The plaintiff in this action complains of the defendants herein, and alleges that said defendant Helen Jenkins is the wife of the defendant John Jenkins, who is joined with her for the purposes of this action. For a cause of action the plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of the following described real estate, to-wit: All of lot number three, (3,) in block number three hundred and fifty-seven, (357,) in the city of Cheyenne, in the county of Laramie and state of Wyoming. That the possession of said premises is, and for a long time has been, unlawfully and wrongfully withheld from this plaintiff by said Helen Jenkins; and that more than three days before the commencement of this suit this plaintiff caused to be served upon said defendant Helen Jenkins a written notice to surrender the possession of the said premises, but that said Helen Jenkins failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to surrender possession thereof to this plaintiff. Wherefore said plaintiff demands judgment against said defendants for the possession of said premises, and the costs of this action." The defendants answered, (probably orally, as no written answer is here,) denying "that the plaintiff is the owner of the property described in the complaint, or that he is entitled to the possession thereof, and alleges that the defendant Helen Jenkins is the owner of said property, and now has, and for a long time past has had, the rightful possession thereof, and demands judgment from the plaintiff for costs." The defendants then asked "that the case shall be certified and returned to the district court of the county." After taking the matter under advisement until the following day, the said justice of the peace, upon the appearance of the parties, "ruled that this case be certified to the district court." The plaintiff, Jeffrey, took an exception to this ruling. The cause was so certified, and a transcript of the record and all the original papers in the case were transmitted by said justice of the peace to the district court of Laramie county. The parties appeared in said district court October 9, 1890, and, the plaintiff, Jeffrey, having filed a motion to "remand the cause back to the justice of the peace before whom it was originally brought," the court, after hearing the argument of the counsel, overruled said motion, and the plaintiff, Jeffrey, excepted. The cause was then set for trial for October 11th. October 10th the defendants moved to dismiss the cause on the following grounds: (1) The court has no jurisdiction to try the same; (2) this is an action for forcible entry and detainer, and this court has not original jurisdiction in such causes; (3) this case has not been brought to this court by appeal or on error, and the court, not having original jurisdiction, cannot try the case; and (4) the title to real property cannot be tried in this action. On the trial day this motion was also overruled by the trial court, to which ruling the defendants excepted; and, the cause having been submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, trial by jury having been expressly waived, the court, having heard all the evidence and the arguments of counsel, found for the plaintiff generally that his complaint was true; that he was the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the premises described in his complaint; and that the defendants unlawfully detained the same. The following judgment was at once entered on said findings: "Wherefore it is considered, ordered, and adjudged by the court that the said defendants, Helen Jenkins and John Jenkins, shall make restitution to the said plaintiff, John K. Jeffrey, of the premises in his complaint described, and shall restore him to the full and immediate possession thereof." Judgment for costs was also entered, and an order made for a writ of restitution. We have stated these various proceedings at length, in order that our views may be fully understood. The defendants below were given time to prepare and present their bill of exceptions for allowance, but none is here, and we have only the jurisdictional question to pass upon; that is, whether or not the district court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the cause.

There can be no question that the justice of the peace had no right to try the cause. The complaint before him, and which we have embodied in full in this opinion, was insufficient in the action of forcible detainer, under the provisions of the Justices' Code. Sections 3578, 3579, of the Revised Statutes provide that, before the justice shall proceed, the plaintiff shall file a complaint, in which he shall describe the property, the possession of which is claimed, and the facts upon which he relies in order to recover the premises which must be sustained by proof, or the action must be dismissed; and this complaint must be filed whether the defendant appears or not. The defendant is required to admit or deny these facts in his answer. In this complaint there is a bare allegation of ownership, and that the defendants unlawfully and wrongfully withheld the possession. There is no allegation of the facts upon which plaintiff relied to recover possession of the premises, and there was no issue formed upon which the justice of the peace could lawfully hear, try, and determine the controversy. He should have dismissed the cause summarily, unless the complaint had been amended so as to show the facts required in the statute, and under the pleadings, which disclosed an action in the nature of ejectment, he had no right to certify it to the district court. The only issue presented was that of title and the unlawful possession of the defendants, and this he could not try, as the allegations were those required in an action of ejectment. The action of forcible entry and detainer or of forcible detainer is no bar to an action of ejectment, (Rev. St. Wyo. § 3589,) but it cannot be a substitute for the action of ejectment, or, as it is termed under the Code of Civil Procedure, an action for the recovery of real property. The action of forcible entry and detainer or of forcible detainer is a summary method of determining the right or fact of possession. Where a defendant forcibly and unlawfully makes entry into lands and tenements, and detains the same, or when he unlawfully or by force holds the same, when his entry has been peaceable, the action, under the statute, will lie. It also lies, under the statute, against tenants holding over their terms, or after failure to pay rent for three days after due; in sales of realty on executions, orders, or other judicial process, when the judgment debtor was in possession at the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree by virtue of which such sale was made; in sales by executors, administrators, and guardians; and on partition, where any of the parties to the petition were in possession at the commencement of the suit, after such sales so made on execution or otherwise shall have been examined by the proper court, and adjudged legal by it; and in cases where the defendant is a settler or occupier of lands and tenements without color of title, and to which complainant has the right of possession. Sections 3574, 3575, Rev. St. Wyo. In none of these enumerated cases in section 3575 can the title be disputed or called in question, as, in the first instance, the tenant could not deny the title of his landlord, and in the others, referring to judicial sales, the solemn judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction could not be impeached or collaterally attacked, while, if the defendant is in possession without color of title, there is no title to be adjudicated. In the general inquiry provided for in section 3574 there must be a forcible or unlawful holding or unlawful and forcible entry, such as would seem to preclude clearly any controversy over the title. The cases are almost unanimous in holding that, title not being in issue, no evidence to disprove the complainant's title is admissible. Evidence of title is sometimes admissible in forcible entry and detainer and detainer suits to show the purpose for which the entry was made, and the character and extent of the possession, though evidence of an adverse title cannot be given to prove the extent of the defendant's possession. 8 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 166, and cases there cited. See, also, Goerges v. Hufschmidt, 44 Mo. 179; Pearson v. Herr, 53 Ill. 144; Spurck v. Forsyth, 40 Ill. 438; McCartney v. McMullen, 38 Ill. 237; Smith v....