Jenkins v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 08 December 2016
• Citation: 145 A.D.3d 1231,44 N.Y.S.3d 223,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08276
• Parties: R. Craig JENKINS, Appellant, v. E. Kent JENKINS, as Trustee of the Martha Jenkins Family Trust, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

145 A.D.3d 1231

44 N.Y.S.3d 223

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08276

R. Craig JENKINS, Appellant,

v.E. Kent JENKINS, as Trustee of the Martha Jenkins Family Trust, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 8, 2016.

Martin, Shudt, Wallace, DiLorenzo & Johnson, Troy (Robert L. Adams of counsel), for appellant.

Cooper Erving & Savage LLP, Albany (Susan C. Picotte of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., GARRY, EGAN JR., ROSE and MULVEY, JJ.

EGAN JR., J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered April 9, 2015 in Rensselaer County, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

In May 1997, Martha Jenkins (hereinafter decedent) created the Martha Jenkins Family Trust, designated plaintiff and defendant—two of her four children—as cotrustees and conveyed her personal residence located in the Town of Brunswick, Rensselaer County to the trust. Plaintiff previously had moved in with decedent to assist with her care and, in March 2007, commenced a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 81 seeking to have decedent adjudicated to be an incapacitated person and to be appointed as the guardian of her person and her property. Defendant and his remaining siblings opposed the requested relief. Thereafter, in or about June 2007, the parties and their siblings entered into a stipulation of settlement, pursuant to the terms of which plaintiff was appointed as decedent's personal guardian, and defendant was appointed as the guardian of her property. Insofar as is relevant here, the stipulation provided that, once decedent no longer occupied the premises, the property would be sold at fair market value, but that plaintiff would have "the right of first refusal to purchase said residence at said value"—subject to certain enumerated terms and conditions. If plaintiff failed to exercise that right in accordance with the terms of the stipulation, he would be required to vacate the premises within 90 days of the issuance of the appraisal report for the property.

Following decedent's death in October 2012, plaintiff's attempt to purchase the home in conformity with the terms of the foregoing stipulation was unsuccessful. When plaintiff failed to vacate the premises as required, defendant commenced a summary holdover proceeding against plaintiff in Brunswick Town Court. In May 2013, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement in open court that, among other things, afforded plaintiff a second opportunity to purchase the premises—again subject to certain specific conditions.¹ In conjunction therewith, Town Court executed a judgment awarding defendant possession of the premises and a warrant of eviction directing plaintiff's removal therefrom, both of which defendant agreed to hold in abeyance pending plaintiff's purchase of the property. In anticipation thereof, the parties discussed possession of and access to the property going forward and agreed that, "other than [as] expressly provided for in the rest of the stipulation[ ], [plaintiff would] have exclusive use and possession of the real estate involved." The parties further agreed, however, that plaintiff would allow an appraiser, defendant and his remaining siblings access to the premises for the purpose of inventorying and appraising decedent's personal property and, ultimately, identifying which personal effects each of decedent's children wished to acquire.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he thereafter denied his family members access to the property,² in response to which defendant commenced a turnover proceeding in Rensselaer County Surrogate's Court seeking, among other things, a decree granting him and the remaining beneficiaries access to the premises. After plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled inquest, Surrogate's Court ordered, among other things, that plaintiff deliver all of decedent's personal property to defendant, whom Surrogate's Court also designated as decedent's preliminary executor.

In June 2014, plaintiff commenced this action seeking to compel defendant to convey title to the subject premises, as well as specific performance of the 2013 open court stipulation of settlement and money damages. Defendant apparently continued to pursue an amicable resolution of the underlying disputes—one that would afford plaintiff yet another opportunity to purchase the subject premises—but, when those efforts were unsuccessful, defendant filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (2), (3), (4) and (7), as well as upon res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds (relying upon the prior proceedings in Town Court).³ Supreme Court, relying upon the terms of the parties' 2013 open court stipulation of settlement, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1). This appeal by plaintiff ensued.⁴

We affirm. Although plaintiff relies upon the "liberal construction" standard afforded to a complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), Supreme Court did not grant defendant's motion to dismiss upon CPLR 3211(a)(7) grounds and, in any event, "[t]his liberal standard ... will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible" (Hyman v. Schwartz, 127 A.D.3d 1281, 1283, 6 N.Y.S.3d 732 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Maldonado v. DiBre, 140 A.D.3d 1501, 1505, 35 N.Y.S.3d 731 [2016], lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 908, 2016 WL 6827088 [Nov. 21, 2016] ). To that end, dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(1) —the sole ground upon which Supreme Court granted defendant the requested relief here—"is appropriate where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff's ... allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" (Benetech, Inc. v. Omni Fin. Group, Inc., 116 A.D.3d 1190, 1192, 984 N.Y.S.2d 186 [2014] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 909, 2014 WL 4235230 [2014] ; see Maldonado v. DiBre, 140 A.D.3d at 1505, 35 N.Y.S.3d 731 ; Ganje v. Yusuf, 133 A.D.3d 954, 956, 19 N.Y.S.3d 355 [2015] ; Trask v. Tremper Prop. Assn., Inc., 122 A.D.3d 1206, 1207, 997 N.Y.S.2d 805 [2014] ). In this regard, "it is clear that judicial records, as well as ... any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case" (Fontanetta v. John Doe 1, 73 A.D.3d 78, 84–85, 898 N.Y.S.2d 569 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Ganje v. Yusuf, 133 A.D.3d at 956–957, 19 N.Y.S.3d 355 ).

The crux of plaintiff's argument upon appeal is that he satisfied the only portion of the parties' 2013 open court stipulation of settlement directly pertaining to the preconditions that he had to fulfill in order to purchase the subject premises and, therefore, defendant has no defense to his subsequent failure to convey the property. The flaw in plaintiff's argument on this point lies in his piecemeal reading of the parties' agreement. Stipulations of settlement are subject to the same well-settled principles that govern the interpretation of a contract (see H.K.S. Hunt Club v. Town of Claverack, 222 A.D.2d 769, 769, 634 N.Y.S.2d 816 [1995], lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 804, 653 N.Y.S.2d 543, 676 N.E.2d 72 [1996] ; Matter of Frye v. Brown, 189 A.D.2d 1031, 1033, 592 N.Y.S.2d 527 [1993] )—namely, to construe the agreement in accordance with the parties' intent, which may "be gleaned not only from the literal language of the agreement, but also from whatever reasonably may be implied therefrom" (Matter of Frye v. Brown, 189 A.D.2d at 1033, 592 N.Y.S.2d 527 ; accord Matter of Shatraw, 66 A.D.3d 1293, 1294, 887 N.Y.S.2d 722 [2009] ; see Vega v. Papaleo, 119 A.D.3d 1139, 1139, 990...