Jenkins v. Jensen

• Decision Date: 05 December 1901
• Docket Number: 1320
• Citation: 66 P. 773,24 Utah 108
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN A. JENKINS, JR., Appellant, v. MARY E. JENSEN and THOMAS QUAYLE, Respondents

66 P. 773

24 Utah 108

JOHN A. JENKINS, JR., Appellant, v. MARY E. JENSEN and THOMAS QUAYLE, Respondents

No. 1320

Supreme Court of Utah

December 5, 1901

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County.--Hon. W. C Hall, Judge.

Action to quiet title to a certain piece of real estate. Defendants denied plaintiff's allegations of title and set up as a defense the statute of limitations, estoppel, family compromise and settlement, and want of consideration. From a decree in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff appealed.

AFFIRMED.

Messrs Pierce, Critchlow & Barrette for appellant.

The first agreement was a family settlement. Courts of equity uphold such settlements with a strong hand. 12 Ency. (2 Ed.) 875; In re Ralston Estate, 172 Pa. St. 104, 33 A. 273; Adams v. Adams, 70 Iowa 253, 30 N.W. 798; Cruger v. Douglas, 4 Ed. Ch. 433, 533.

No subsequent agreement or unauthorized action of the guardian can deprive the minor of his property. The legal and beneficial title to the real and personal property remains in the ward, which the guardian can in nowise bind by any promise or contract of his own. Woerner on Guardianship, sec. 53. Hence it is not within the authority of a guardian to avoid a beneficial contract or to waive any benefits to which his ward is entitled. Woerner on Guardianship, sec. 53.

A guardian can not bind his ward by admission of facts not proved or by suffering judgment by default (Woerner on Guardianship, sec. 53, p. 174), nor bind the infant by a consent decree. Bearinger v. Pelton, 78 Mich. 114.

Independent of statute, a guardian has no power, without special authorization thereto by a court of competent jurisdiction, to sell his ward's real estate. Woerner on Guardianship, sec. 54.

The guardian could not even assent to a partition (Session Laws 1880, p. 77), nor compromise. Any compromise without the consent of the court is voidable. Woerner on Guardianship, sec. 56, p. 184. See, also, generally Richardson v. Richardson, 49 Mo. 29; Antonidas v. Walling, 4 N.J. Eq. 42, 31 Am. Dec. 248.

The plaintiff is not barred by the statute of limitations. We believe the court ought to decide that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against the minor's estate until he was entitled to possession on becoming of age. Furthermore, an infant is not barred from asserting his right when he becomes of age, on account of the failure of his guardian to bring suit during the minority of the infant. Monroe v. Simmons, 86 Ga. 344, s. c., 12 S.E. 643; 13 Ency. (1 Ed.), 740; Moore v. Wallis, 18 Ala. 458; Christian v. Westbrook, 75 Ga. 852; Grimsby v. Hudnell, 76 Ga. 378; Bacon v. Gray, 23 Miss. 140; Frost v. Ry., 64 N.H. 220; Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172; 2 Wood on Limitations, sec. 238.

Messrs. Bennett, Howat, Sutherland & Van Cott and George L. Nye, Esq., for respondents.

The plaintiff's alleged cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations of the State of Utah before the institution of this suit. The law is well settled that the statute of limitations runs as between a stranger on the one side and the cestui que trust on the other, but does not ordinarily run as between the trustee on one side and the beneficiary on the other. McLeran v. Benton et al., 73 Cal. 329; Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U.S. 564.

It is well settled that if an administrator or trustee lets the statute of limitations run so that a minor is barred of his rights, the latter has an action against the administrator and his sureties. 100 U.S. 566-7; McLaren v. Benton, 73 Cal. 343.

The plaintiff is barred by reason of the compromise that was made as evidenced in the agreement and deed of 1881, by which Thomas Jenkins and Ann Jenkins gave up all claim to lots two and three and the administrator and guardian gave up all claim to lots one and sixteen.

Compromises are favored by the law and by the courts, and are upheld whenever they are fair and reasonable. 13 L.R.A. 601, and note. And in particular, family compromises are favored and upheld with a strong hand--upheld in cases where they would not be as between strangers. 1 Story Eq. Jur., sec. 132.

The plaintiff confirms the compromise agreement of 1881 by retaining possession of lots two and three and asserting title thereto; besides he can not repudiate a contract made for his benefit without restoring the property in his possession obtained by the compromise. Buchanan v. Hubbard, 21 N.E. 538; Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 Ill. 356.

The plaintiff in this case is estopped to claim lots one and sixteen. Whitney v. Fox, 166 U.S. 637. When parties to a contract are estopped, their privies are also estopped. 19 Ency. Law (1 Ed.), 156; 2 Herman on Estop., secs. 800-1; Smith v. Lusk, 24 So. 256-8.

MINER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. BASKIN and BARTCH, JJ., concur.

OPINION

MINER, C. J.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

This action was brought by John A. Jenkins, Jr., the plaintiff and appellant, to quiet title to lot 16, block 22, 10-acre plat A. Big Field survey, in Salt Lake City. The defendants denied plaintiff's allegations of title, and set up as a defense the statute of limitations, estoppel, family compromise and settlement, and want of consideration. The trial court found the issues in favor of the defendants, and made its decree accordingly. The plaintiff appealed from the decree.

It appears from the evidence and findings, in substance, that on July 16, 1875, one Thomas Jenkins purchased and continued to occupy lots 1, 2, 3, and 16, block 22, 10-acre plat A, known as the "40-acre tract." He was at this time the owner and in possession of 125 acres in section 14. For more than thirty years said Jenkins had been a member of the Mormon Church, and believed in the right of having a plurality of wives. He then had a legal wife named Ann Jenkins, to whom he was married in 1851, and by whom he had eight children. John A. Jenkins, the father of the plaintiff, was his eldest son by his lawful wife. He also had a plural wife, named Mary R. Jenkins, to whom he was married in 1855, and by whom he had eleven children. On March 2, 1876, Thomas Jenkins, desiring to provide a support and maintenance for Ann and Mary R. Jenkins and their families in case of his death, conveyed the 40-acre tract, embracing lot 16 in question, to Mary R. Jenkins, and the 129-acre tract to Ann Jenkins. At the time of these conveyances it was verbally agreed by the parties that Thomas Jenkins was to manage and occupy said land during his lifetime, and the grantees were to take possession at his death. On April 5, 1877, Ann and Mary R. Jenkins agreed to exchange the respective tracts of land, with the consent of Thomas Jenkins, each conveying to the other the land so conveyed to her; and thereupon Ann conveyed the 129-acre tract to Mary R., and Mary R. was about to convey the 40-acre tract to Ann, when, at the request of Ann, and with the consent of Thomas Jenkins the deed to Ann was changed and made to John A. Jenkins, the eldest son of Ann and Thomas Jenkins, now deceased, who knew all the facts, and who took the deed for the 40-acre tract subject to the former agreement of the parties, without paying any consideration therefor, and agreeing that Thomas Jenkins was to hold, manage, and occupy the 40-acre tract during his lifetime, and at his death the said John A. Jenkins was to take possession thereof, and, without other consideration, was to keep and support his mother during her life, and also his sisters Alice and Anna during their minority, and until they should severally marry, and also support Mary Bundy, an aged lady dependent upon Thomas Jenkins for support. John A. Jenkins lived at home with his father, and in 1878 he married Minnie R. Jenkins, and on September 25, 1879, he died intestate, without issue; but thereafter, on December 8, 1879, the said Minnie R. Jenkins bore a son begotten by John A. Jenkins, named John A. Jenkins, Jr., who is plaintiff in this action. He became twenty-one years of age on the eighth day of December, 1900. John A. Jenkins, deceased, never took possession of the 40-acre tract, and never supported said Alice, Anna, or Mary E. Bundy, as agreed, or in any manner. Thomas Jenkins and his successors in interest and grantees have always held possession of lots 1 and 16 of the 40-acre tract from the time Thomas acquired it to the time of the trial. Said John A. Jenkins, deceased, left surviving him his wife and the plaintiff, as his only heirs. John S. Barnes was duly appointed administrator of the estate of John A. Jenkins on the third day of November, 1879, thereafter duly qualified, and from thence hitherto has acted as such administrator. On September 27, 1880, Barnes, as administrator, by his attorney, Mr. Kaign, filed a complaint (No. 4592) against Thomas Jenkins and his tenant, and therein represented, among other things, that John A. Jenkins, deceased, was seized in fee of said 40-acre tract, and that defendant was withholding possession of the same from him to his damage in the sum of $ 500, and also claimed that the rents, issues, and profits of said land were $ 600 per annum, and prayed for judgment. Thomas Jenkins answered, and set up the facts heretofore stated, and asked that the deed to John A. Jenkins be cancelled, and the title decreed to be in Ann Jenkins and her heirs, subject to the right of Thomas Jenkins to occupy the said tract during his life. Soon thereafter the administrator, by his attorney, filed a second complaint against Thomas Jenkins (No. 4544), claiming that the defendant had appropriated certain personal property belonging to the estate, valued at $ 1,600.

On October 6, 1880, Thomas Jenkins filed an action (No. 4557) in the district court against Barnes, the administrator, wherein he sought to recover upon a note given him by John A....