St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Clarke

• Decision Date: 07 February 1944
• Docket Number: 38448,38449,38450
• Parties: St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation, and Allen C. Orrick, Successor Trustees Under Deed Dated June 12, 1885, of Thomas T. Gantt and David Ranken, Trustees, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Charles H. Clarke et al., Defendants-Respondents, Thomas R. Madden, Administrator of the Estate of Hazlett Kyle Campbell, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

178 S.W.2d 359

352 Mo. 518

St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation, and Allen C. Orrick, Successor Trustees Under Deed Dated June 12, 1885, of Thomas T. Gantt and David Ranken, Trustees, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Charles H. Clarke et al., Defendants-Respondents, Thomas R. Madden, Administrator of the Estate of Hazlett Kyle Campbell, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant

Nos. 38448, 38449, 38450

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 7, 1944

Rehearing Denied March 6, 1944.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Eugene J Sartorius, Judge.

Affirmed and appeals dismissed.

Igoe Carroll, Keefe & Coburn and Roberts P. Elam for appellant.

(1) The intention of the grantors in the deed of settlement of 1877 is the pole star in the construction of that instrument, and when the entire language of that instrument is considered in the light of the circumstances surrounding its execution and the objects to be subserved by its execution, it was clearly the general intent that the wife and three sons of Robert Campbell -- Virginia, Hugh, Hazlett and James -- should share equally in the Robert Campbell trust property after Robert's death, and should each receive an "equal fourth part" thereof upon the division and allotment of the property in 1885. The only exception was in the event -- which did not occur -- that one or more of said sons should die intestate and unmarried prior to the division and allotment in 1885. Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 424, 165 S.W. 1035. (2) At the time of his death Hazlett K. Campbell had a vested fee simple absolute in one-fourth of the property in the possession of plaintiffs-respondents (being one-twelfth of the entire Robert Campbell trust property). (3) The deed of settlement of 1877 having granted generally to Virginia an equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property, coupled with an absolute power of disposal of her share, the grant carried a fee simple. Green v Sutton, 50 Mo. 186; Chapman v. Chapman, 336 Mo 98, 77 S.W.2d 87. (4) The fact that the word "heirs" or other words of inheritance were not used in the creation of her interest does not imply any intention to limit her interest, because such words are not necessary to the creation of a fee simple. R.S. 1939, sec. 3496 (formerly R.S. 1879, sec. 3939, and G.S. 1865, p. 442, sec. 2b); Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13; Ball v. Woolfolk, 175 Mo. 278, 75 S.W. 410. (5) Virginia's fee simple interest in an equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property was, at the time of the execution of the deed of settlement of 1877, a vested remainder upon condition subsequent, limited to take effect in default of the exercise by Robert of the powers of appointment reserved to him by the deed of settlement of 1877, and liable to be divested only by the exercise by Robert of such powers -- which never occurred. Hamner v. Edmonds, 327 Mo. 281, 36 S.W.2d 929; Von Behrn v. Stoeppelman, 286 Mo. 73, 226 S.W. 875; Dunbar v. Sims, 283 Mo. 356, 222 S.W. 838; Sanford v. Blake, 45 N.J.Eq. 247, 17 A. 812; Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J.Eq. 406, 9 A.2d 311; Tiedeman on Real Property (4th Ed.), sec. 301, pp. 454-456. (6) The power committed by the deed of settlement to Hugh, respecting Hazlett's equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property, was not a general and unrestricted power of appointment, but was a limited and special power, for the purpose of enabling Hugh to direct the conveyance of Hazlett's equal fourth share of the Robert Campbell trust property, in trust or otherwise, so as to protect the corpus from waste and mismanagement by Hazlett, and so as to subject it to the management, administration and control of others for his use and benefit, and for the support and maintenance of his family -- i.e., his wife and children -- if he had one. 1 Tiffany on Real Property (2d Ed.), sec. 320, p. 1061; Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 186; 49 C.J., p. 1260, sec. 34; Citizens Bank of Lancaster v. Fogelsong, 326 Mo. 581, 31 S.W.2d 779; 25 C.J., p. 664, sec. 1, pp. 664-665, sec. 2; Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670. (7) The power committed by the deed of settlement of 1877 to Hugh, respecting Hazlett's equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property, was not a power to appoint interests in Hazlett's said part of such property to persons other than Hazlett and his "family" -- i.e., his wife and children, if he had any. Hugh's attempt to appoint a remainder over in this property to Hazlett's "heirs at law" after his death -- as expressed in the trust deed of 1885 -- was in excess of the power committed to Hugh by the deed of settlement of 1877, and both Hugh's action and the trust deed of 1885 are, and always have been, void to that extent. Hopkinson v. Swain, 284 Ill. 11, 119 N.E. 985; In re Johnson's Estate, 276 Pa. 291, 120 A. 128; In re Appeal of Pepper, 120 Pa. 235, 13 A. 929; Coffin v. Attorney General, 231 Mass. 579, 121 N.E. 397; Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head. 1, 73 Am. Dec. 186; In re Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 565, 99 A. 79; Horowitz v. Norris, 49 Pa. 213; 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests, sec. 274. (8) The invalidity of that part of Hugh's action, and that part of the trust deed of 1885, by which there was an attempted appointment of a remainder over after Hazlett's death, did not affect the validity of that part of Hugh's action, and that part of the trust deed of 1885, by which there was set up a trust for Hazlett's lifetime, for his use and benefit and for the support and maintenance of his family, if he should have one. Authorities cited under Point (7), supra; 2 Sugden on Powers (3rd Am. Ed.), pp. 76-78; Kale's "Estates, Future Interests, etc.," (2d Ed.), sec. 642. (9) After the execution of the trust deed of 1885, Hazlett's vested fee simple interest in an equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property was subject only to the trust for his lifetime, for his use and benefit and for the support and maintenance of his family, if he should have one, and his interest in the property was not diminished or qualified at any time except to the extent required for that trust during his lifetime. Guy v. Mayes, 235 Mo. 390, 138 S.W. 510; Cornet v. Cornet, 248 Mo. 184, 154 S.W. 121; Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 341, 44 S.W.2d 644. (10) The interest which plaintiffs-respondents, and their predecessors, acquired in Hazlett's equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property, and under the trust deed of 1885, was nothing more than an estate per auter vie -- i.e., for the life of Hazlett -- with such powers of disposal respecting the corpus of the property as were necessary to the purposes of the trust for the use and benefit of Hazlett and for the support and maintenance of his family, if he should have one. Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601. (11) Upon Hazlett's death, the trust for his use and benefit, and his trustees' legal estate, in his equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property terminated, leaving Hazlett's vested fee simple interest in that property, which had been subject to the trust during his lifetime, as a part of his estate and to devolve under the laws of descent and distribution. Authorities cited, supra. (12) In any event, at the time of his death, Hazlett K. Campbell had a vested fee simple in one-third of the remaining three-fourths (one-fourth of the property in the possession of plaintiffs-respondents and one-twelfth of the entire Robert Campbell trust property). If Hazlett, at the time of the division and allotment of the Robert Campbell trust property in 1885, did not acquire a vested fee-simple interest in an equal fourth part of such property, but acquired only a life estate therein, then the remaining interest therein constituted a reversion in fee in the grantors, Robert and Virginia, subject to absolute conveyance and transfer to Hazlett upon a contingency which never occurred, viz., his recovery from his insanity so as to be capable of managing his own affairs. Collins v. Whitman, 283 Mo. 383, 222 S.W. 840; Bigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353, 39 S.W. 525; Coots v. Yewell, 95 Ky. 367, 25 S.W. 597; Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 131 So. 400; Collins v. Sanitary District, 270 Ill. 118, 110 N.E. 318. (13) Upon the deaths of the settlors, Robert and Virginia, this reversionary fee-simple interest in this equal fourth part of the Robert Campbell trust property descended to their surviving sons and only heirs at law, Hugh, Hazlett and James, in equal shares, but subject to the trust during Hazlett's lifetime. Authorities cited under Point (12), supra. (14) Appellant Madden, as administrator of Hazlett's estate, is entitled to all of the personal property which became a part of Hazlett's estate. Appellant Madden is, and has been since August 8, 1938, the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of Hazlett's estate, under and by virtue of his appointment as such on said date by the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri. His appointment by that court is not subject to collateral attack in this or any other proceeding. Sec. 34, Art. VI, Missouri Constitution; R.S. 1939, secs. 2436, 2437; State ex rel. McWilliams v. Armstrong, 320 Mo. 1122, 9 S.W.2d 600. (15) Appellant has the right and duty, as such administrator, to collect and take into his possession all of the personal property of his decedent. The title to such personal property passed to and vested in him as administrator, and the decedent's heirs have no title thereto until the administration of decedent's estate is completed. R.S. 1939, secs. 38 and 57; Jones v. Peterson, 335 Mo. 242, 72 S.W.2d 76; Wass v. Hammontree, 77 S.W.2d 1006; Toler v. Judd, 262 Mo. 344, 171 S.W. 339; Green v. Tittman, 124 Mo. 372, 27 S.W. 391; Todd v. James, 157 Mo.App. 416, 138 S.W. 929; Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 73...