Jenkins v. Penn Bridge Co

• Decision Date: 22 March 1906
• Citation: 73 s. c. 526,53 S.E. 991
• Parties: JENKINS. v. PENN BRIDGE CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

53 S.E. 991

73 s. c. 526

JENKINS.

v.PENN BRIDGE CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 22, 1906.

Corporations—Service of Process.

Service on a timekeeper of a foreign corporation doing certain construction work in the state is a good service on the corporation, under Code Civ. Proc. § 155, providing that service can be made on a foreign corporation only where it has property in the state, or the cause of action arose therein, or service can be had personally upon the president, cashier, treasurer, attorney, or secretary, or any agent thereof. (By divided court.)

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Charleston County; R. W. Memminger, Judge.

Action by Edward K. Jenkins against the Penn Bridge Company. Motion to set aside service of summons denied, and defendant appeals. Affirmed by divided court.

James F. Duncan and Nath. B. Barnwell, for appellant.

Legare & Holman, for respondent.

WOODS, J. The plaintiff, Edward N. Jenkins, seeks in this action to recover of the defendant, Penn Bridge Company, a corporation chartered under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, the sum of $1,051.12 damages for breach of contract. The defendant appearing specially for that purpose, moved before Hon. R. W. Memminger, circuit judge, to set aside the service of the summons, "on the ground that the defendant is a foreign corporation, and the person upon whom personal service of the summons was made is not, and was not at the time of said service, the president, cashier, treasurer, attorney, or secretary of said company or an agent thereof." The appeal is from an order refusing the motion.

In the affidavit of service made by C. St. C. Kirk, it is stated the summons was served "by delivering to J. W. Rowley, agent of defendant, at the Navy Yard, said county, and leaving with him copies of the same at Charleston Navy Yard." In support of the motion, S. P. White, the president of the company, submitted an affidavit in which he says: "That one J. W. Rowley, upon whom service was had in the above-entitled suit, is in no sense an agent for the said defendant company; that he is an employs of said company, paid by the day, and subject to discharge at a day's notice; that he is a laborer and timekeeper for said defendantcompany, with no authority whatever to contract for said company, or bind it in any manner whatsoever; that the only agent of said company having control over the work in progress as aforesaid, and with authority to bind the company in any manner in connection with the said work, is one J. T. McMahon, the general construction agent of said company, who has sole charge of the work aforesaid." The affidavit of Rowley himself as to his relation to the corporation is to the same effect. No proof of Rowley's agency was offered by the plaintiff.

In section 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is provided as to the service of the summons that "such service can be made in respect to a foreign corporation only when it has property within the state, or the cause of action arose therein, or where such service shall be made in this state personally upon the president, cashier, treasurer, attorney, or secretary, or any agent thereof." The object of service of the summons is not only to give notice to the defendant of the pendency of a suit against him, but to bring him under the jurisdiction of the court. If, therefore, Rowley was not an agent, service upon whom would not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. The circuit judge was in error in the view which he seems to have taken that the object of the service had been accomplished when the defendant received through the service notice of the suit, and by special appearance moved to set the service aside. Hester v. Rasin Fert. Co., 33 S. C. 609, 12 S. E. 563; Wren v. Johnson. 62 S. C. 533, 40 S. E. 937. The circuit judge held as a matter of fact, however, that Rowley was the agent of the defendant corporation, and it seems this finding would not be subject to review by this court unless entirely unsupported by the evidence. Hester v. Rasin Fert. Co., supra. The only evidence on the subject was to the effect that Rowley was a laborer and timekeeper, paid by the day and subject to discharge at a day's notice, without authority to contract or bind the company in any manner whatever, and the question of law is whether a person who sustains this relation to his employer can be regarded an agent.

An agent is generally defined as a person who acts on behalf of another person who is his principal. While in practical affairs the relation assumes so many phases, it is often quite difficult to apply the definition, it is certainly necessary to constitute agency that there should be some kind of representation of the principal by virtue of authority conferred by him. Authority to contract is sufficient to constitute agency under this statute. Gross v. Nichols (Iowa) 33 N. W. 653; Berlin Bridge Co. v. Norton (N. J. Sup.) 17 Atl. 1079; Packet Co. v. Pikey (Ind.) 40 N. E. 527. The claim of agency based on any other authority short of power to contract \t is said by high authority has rarely been maintained, and certainly It should be allowed with great caution. Moore v. Freeman's Nat Bank, 92 N. C. 590 "Employe" is manifestly a much broader term than "agent" and it Is therefore not sufficient under this statute to show that the service was made on an employe without showing that such employe was also an agent. Of all classes of employes a day laborer has the most transient and readily severed connection with the person whom he serves, and no warrant will be found either in legal precedent or the common understanding of practical men for regarding him an agent or representative. The matter is thus forcefully stated in Mul-hearn v. Press Pub. Co. (N. J. Sup.) 20 Atl. 760: "The line between those who represent and those who do not represent a foreign corporation for the purposes of this act cannot be defined by a formula. But it was never intended that every servant who happened to do some act in this state for a...