Jenkins v. State, 2016–KA–01527–COA
| Decision Date | 13 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2016–KA–01527–COA,2016–KA–01527–COA |
| Parties | Rodise JENKINS a/k/a Rodise Jenkins, III, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: SCOTT STUART
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ.
GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Rodise Jenkins was convicted of murder by deliberate design in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–3–19(1)(a) (Supp. 2017). He was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On appeal, he argues that the jury was improperly instructed and that evidence of the victim's criminal history was improperly excluded. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. Hazel Turner lived in Biloxi, Mississippi, with her boyfriend, Jenkins. Turner's son, Anthony Wheaton, also lived in Biloxi. On October 11, 2014, at 2 a.m., Nyra Jenkins, Jenkins's ex-wife, called Jenkins's telephone, and Turner answered. Nyra proceeded to harass Turner over the phone as she had done in the past. Once Jenkins arrived home from work about 5 a.m., he and Turner spoke about Nyra and the possibility of filing for a restraining order against her. Jenkins then called Nyra and spoke with her about the calls.
¶ 3. Turner and Jenkins were upset over the Nyra situation and the harassing phone calls. While Jenkins slept, Turner made three calls to different family members to talk, one of whom was Wheaton. Shortly after 2 p.m. that same day, Turner and Jenkins were seated in the kitchen talking when Wheaton walked into the house. Together in the kitchen, they continued the conversation about Nyra and the possible restraining order. The conversation grew more intense as Jenkins became agitated and no longer wished to discuss it with Wheaton. The two stood up and faced each other. Turner sensed something was wrong and jumped in between Jenkins and Wheaton to de-escalate the situation.
¶ 4. While Wheaton and Turner moved toward the front porch, Jenkins left through the back door of the house and headed toward his truck. Once at his truck, Jenkins realized he had forgotten his wallet and keys inside. He grabbed his gun from the truck and walked around to the front of the house where Wheaton and Turner were standing. Jenkins shot at Wheaton three times, and hit him twice. Wheaton and Turner then ran into the house, and Jenkins followed. Jenkins walked up to Wheaton and shot him two more times from close range. Wheaton died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds
.
¶ 5. Turner then called 911 while Jenkins fled the scene. He was quickly apprehended and arrested without resistance.
ANALYSIS
¶ 6. Jenkins argues he was entitled to have the jury instructed on manslaughter. Jenkins submitted proposed jury instruction D–16, which would have instructed the jury "that the killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without the authority of law, and not [in] necessary self[-]defense, shall be manslaughter." He also submitted proposed instructions D–15 to define "heat of passion" and D–17 to instruct the jury to proceed to consideration of manslaughter if the jury found Jenkins not guilty of murder. All three instructions were refused by the trial court on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to support the assertion that Jenkins killed Wheaton in a state of violent and uncontrolled rage.
¶ 7. It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court. Davis v. State , 18 So.3d 842, 847 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2009) (citing Higgins v. State , 725 So.2d 220, 223 (¶ 15) (Miss. 1998) ). Further, jury instructions must be considered together:
[i]n determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. There is no error if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law.
Newell v. State , 49 So.3d 66, 73–74 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Rubenstein v. State , 941 So. 2d 735, 784–85 (¶ 224) (Miss. 2006) ). Additionally, we have explained that "[a] defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given [that] present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction that incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence." Hearn v. State , 3 So.3d 722, 738 (¶ 45) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Chandler v. State , 946 So.2d 355, 360 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2006) ).
¶ 8. A lesser-included-offense instruction should be denied only when the court finds that "no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser[-]included offense," and, conversely, "not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge." Harper v. State , 478 So.2d 1017, 1021 (Miss. 1985). In other words, "a lesser-included[-]offense instruction is authorized if a rational or reasonable jury could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense in the indictment, but guilty of the lesser-included offense." White v. State , 842 So.2d 565, 575 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2003). Therefore, "[o]nly in cases where the evidence could only justify a verdict of murder, should a requested manslaughter instruction be refused." Ruffin v. State , 444 So.2d 839, 840 (Miss. 1984).
¶ 9. In his brief, Jenkins repeatedly relies on Turner's trial testimony to show how she observed Jenkins to be feeling. Turner—not Jenkins—testified that Jenkins seemed angry, agitated, frustrated, mad, and even "beyond rage." In fact, Jenkins repeatedly denied that he was angry at all, much less "beyond rage." Jenkins testified that he was afraid, terrified, in fear for his life, and frightened, and that he acted to defend himself. This testimony was inconsistent with the requirements for manslaughter.
¶ 10. Jury instruction D–15 defined "heat of passion" as "a state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given, but the passion must be the result of immediate and reasonable provocation arising from words or acts of the victim." Wheaton confronted Jenkins at the home Jenkins shared with Turner. That fact is not in dispute. After the confrontation in the kitchen, Jenkins fled the house and went to his truck. He then realized he had forgotten his wallet and keys, but instead of returning through the back door he had just exited in order to retrieve them, he grabbed a loaded gun and headed to the front of the house in Wheaton's direction.
¶ 11. Jenkins then shot Wheaton. This act was not an immediate response to anything Wheaton did. Jenkins testified that he was reacting out of fear to an action by Wheaton. However, after the first three shots were fired at Wheaton, Jenkins did not gather his keys and leave; instead, he followed Wheaton back into the house. Jenkins saw Wheaton on the floor and shot him again, this time from close range, in the head.
¶ 12. A significant amount of time passed between Jenkins' and Wheaton's interaction in the kitchen and when Jenkins shot Wheaton. "[A] heat-of-passion jury instruction is not warranted where a cooling-off period exists between the provocation and the killing." Sanders v. State , 103 So.3d 775, 779 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Although "[a] defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given [that] present his theory of the case ...," the court may refuse the instruction if it "is without foundation in the evidence." Hearn, 3 So.3d at 738 (¶ 45). Because of the lack of an evidentiary foundation and the fact that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, the trial judge did not err when he refused the proposed jury instructions on manslaughter. Harper , 478 So.2d at 1021.
¶ 13. After the trial judge gave jury instruction S–9, Jenkins made a general objection to the use of the instruction without any further explanation. There remains a question as to whether the point was effectively preserved for appeal:
[T]he rule of this Court [is] that no assignment of error based on the giving of an instruction to the jury will be considered on appeal unless specific objection was made to the instruction in the trial court stating the particular ground or grounds for such objection. However, in extreme cases, this Court may raise an objection to a jury instruction in order to prevent manifest injustice.
Watson v. State , 483 So.2d 1326, 1329 (Miss. 1986). "A corollary of this is that a general objection to a jury instruction does not suffice to preserve the issue for appeal." Id. (citing Holifield v. State , 431 So.2d 929, 930 (Miss. 1983) ). Therefore, since Jenkins failed to adequately preserve this issue for appeal, it can only be analyzed under the plain-error doctrine to determine if there was an error resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
¶ 14. To prevail under the plain-error doctrine, an appellant must show that an error occurred that resulted in a "manifest miscarriage of justice." Flora v. State , 925 So.2d 797, 811 (¶ 42) (Miss. 2006). Jenkins failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal with a specific objection. However, notwithstanding the waiver, we still cannot conclude based upon our review of the record that there was an error that caused manifest injustice.
¶ 15. Jenkins alleges jury instruction S–9 contained an incorrect statement of the law and subsequently diluted Jenkins's evidence that he acted in self-defense. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial