Jennings v. Demmon
| Decision Date | 26 February 1907 |
| Citation | 194 Mass. 108,80 N.E. 471 |
| Parties | JENNINGS v. DEMMON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
W. C. Cogswell, for appellant.
Bancroft G. Davis, Henry S. MacPherson, and Everett E. Damon, for appellee.
This appeal brings before us the questions of fact as well as of law raised upon the trial in the superior court, and it becomes our duty to examine with care the evidence and determine the case according to our own judgment. But in reaching this determination, due weight is to be given to the decision of the trial court and it is not to be set aside unless it appears to be clearly erroneous. Properly and necessarily, great consideration must be given to the conclusions of fact reached by the court who hears the evidence, where it is in large part oral, for he has opportunities to judge of the degree of credibility to be given to the testimony of the witnesses which no appellate tribunal possesses. In the present case, the trial court made no memorandum of findings of fact or rulings of law, but simply ordered a decree to be entered dismissing the bill. The single question to be determined, therefore, is whether upon all the evidence, this finding was plainly wrong.
If the evidence proves the allegations in the bill, it is plain that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree in his favor, for a conveytance although absolute in form, may be shown by oral proof to have been made in trust or by way of security. There is nothing in the statute of frauds which prevents this result. Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130, 12 Am. Rep 671. It has not been contended in argument that the plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
The plaintiff has cogently argued that the evidence shows the execution and delivery of a written agreement, now lost between Marcus and the defendant, providing that the conveyance to the latter was in trust for the benefit of Marcus, or in way of equitable mortgage. There are many circumstances which support this contention, but they do not point so conclusively to this view as to demonstrate that the opposite conclusion cannot also be supported by certain aspects of the evidence. If no such agreement was made, as was claimed by the defendant, and the only contract between Marcus and the defendant was the one of June 13, 1887, and if this was terminated at its expiration by the absolute conveyance from Marcus to Demmon,...
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