Jennings v. Jennings; Same v. Jennings' ex'R

Decision Date04 May 1945
Citation299 Ky. 779
PartiesJennings et al. v. Jennings et al. Same v. Jennings' Ex'r et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court.

Leslie W. Morris and Marion Rider for appellants Edward Jennings and others.

Kinsolving & Reasor, W.W. Jesse, Robert Matthews, William Hays and J. Ballard Clark for appellees C.L. Jennings and others.

Before J. Wirt Turner, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY STANLEY, COMMISSIONER.

Reversing.

This controversy over the construction of the will of the late George W. Jennings springs from different views as to what he meant by the words "funds" and "heirs" in the second paragraph of the third clause. His will is as follows:

"I declare this to be my last and only will, made in order to make disposition of my estate.

"1st. I decree that all my just debts be paid.

"2nd. That the Waddy Christian Church to receive $500. Georgia Summers to receive $1,000, Anna Swan to receive $1,000. Aline Fortwengler to receive $1,000. Verna Robertson to receive $200. Herbert Clark to receive $100. Marshall Clark to receive $50. Edward Jennings to receive $50. Sarah Clark to receive $500. Dora Clark to receive $500. Roy Frye to receive $100.

"3rd. I appoint William H. Nash as administrator to serve under bond fixed by the court and to receive the customary fee for all settlements.

"Any funds left after the above bequest have been satisfied I decree that it be equally divided among the above heirs and not on a percentage basis. However, if the estate fails to pay out I decree that the shortage be settled on a percentage basis.

"4th. All household goods evenly divided between Georgia Summers, Anna Swan and Aline Fortwengler."

Considerable evidence was submitted to disclose the conditions surrounding the testator and the circumstances under which the will was prepared and executed; also evidence of his statements with respect to the disposition of his estate. The chancellor ruled the evidence tending to show his intention could not be considered, and construed the word "funds" to embrace all of the testator's personal estate but not his realty, and the word "heirs" as including only three of the devisees named in the second clause of the will who were his heirs at law. An appeal is prosecuted by all of the testator's heirs at law, who claim the entire estate as undevised except money on hand and a sufficiency of the proceeds of tangible personal property to make up the amount specifically devised. The three heirs named in the second clause also appeal, and insist that the will disposed of all the estate and that they are entitled to the residuary, both personal and real. The other devisees contend that the residuary was devised to all the persons named, the word "heirs" meaning "legatees."

Able argument is made by the heirs that there is a latent ambiguity and this Court should extend the rule of admissibility of extraneous evidence relating to the construction of wills and hold that declarations of the testator with respect to his property and the persons he intended to have it, including his instructions to the draftsman of his will, are competent. We have long regarded as competent extrinsic evidence to describe the conditions surrounding the testator that the court as an interpreter might place itself in his position in order the better to appreciate his situation and to discern his intent as expressed by his language. Wheeler's Heirs v. Dunlap, 52 Ky. 291, 13 B. Mon. 291; Williams v. Williams, 182 Ky. 738, 207 S.W. 468; Thomas' Ex'r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629, 61 S.W. 2d 282; Cummings v. Nunn, 290 Ky. 609, 162 S.W. 2d 213. We have also held acceptable evidence to identify the devisees or particular property where the language is obscure, or there is a latent ambiguity, such as where a description might apply to more than one person or one item of property. Eichhorn v. Morat, 175 Ky. 80, 193 S.W. 1013; Cummings v. Nunn, supra. But in this case there is no latent ambiguity and no confusion as to identity of any devisee or particular property. What the testator meant by "funds" and "above heirs" presents patent but not latent ambiguities. Our jurisprudence has long refused to consider evidence of statements of a testator as an aid to ascertaining an intention not expressed, or one contrary to that which the language used reveals. Wheeler's Heirs v. Dunlap, 52 Ky. 291, 13 B. Mon. 291; Cochran v. Lee's Adm'r, 84 S.W. 337, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 64; Marquette v. Marquette's Ex'rs, 190 Ky. 182, 227 S.W. 157; Muth v. Goins, 199 Ky. 321, 250 S.W. 995. It can not be received for the purpose of enlarging or diminishing the estate or interest devised or to vary the legal effect of the language used in this respect. Long v. Duvall, 45 Ky. 219, 6 B. Mon. 219; McCauley v. Buckner, 87 Ky. 191, 8 S.W. 196; Martin v. Palmer, 193 Ky. 25, 234 S.W. 742. Testimony of the one who drew the will as to the testator's meaning of ambiguous words or of his intention can not be heard. Poore v. Poore...

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