Jennings v. State
Decision Date | 11 July 2016 |
Docket Number | S–15–0283 |
Citation | 2016 WY 69,375 P.3d 788 |
Parties | Cameron Clayton Jennings, Appellant (Defendant), v. The State of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Vaughn H. Neubauer, Neubauer, Pelkey and Goldfinger, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Director, Bradford H. Coates, Student Director, and David B. Maris, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program, University of Wyoming, College of Law. Argument by Mr. Maris.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
[¶1] Cameron Jennings challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a controlled substance found in his vehicle after a traffic stop. He claims that the traffic stop was unjustified and a violation of his constitutional rights. We will affirm.
[¶2] Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jennings' motion to suppress evidence?
[¶3] On the morning of November 5, 2014, the general manager of a motel in Casper, Wyoming, heard a woman outside her room who was “crying and seemed to be hysterical.”1 The woman turned back toward her room, where a man opened the door and yelled at her. After the woman went back into the room, the manager “heard screaming and yelling,” heard some “loud thuds,” and saw “the curtains swishing back and forth in the room.” The manager thought the woman “was in danger,” so she called the police. She related what she had seen and heard to the police dispatcher. While the manager was still on the telephone with the dispatcher, she saw “the vehicle that was registered to that room, which was a school bus,” leave the parking lot. A man wearing a black hoodie and the woman seen crying earlier were inside the bus. The manager gave this information to the dispatcher as well.
[¶4] The dispatcher called for two units to respond to a “family fight” at the motel. Detective Dunnuck of the Casper police department was in the vicinity, and responded to the call. As he drove toward the motel, the detective listened to the “radio traffic” and watched the written “call comments” on the computer screen in his patrol car. He learned that an employee of the motel reported a “male and female arguing within the room,” the woman coming out of the room, “crying,” then going “back in the room” where they were again “yelling at each other.” He knew that the motel manager reported hearing “loud thuds from [the] room ... yelling ... and then they're leaving in [a] yellow Chevy bus with Colorado plates.” He learned where the bus was and got a description of the female. He spotted the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.
[¶5] Detective Dunnuck approached the vehicle on its passenger side and, as soon as the window was opened, the officer smelled “a strong odor of raw marijuana.” After a second officer arrived at the scene, they asked Mr. Jennings to get out of the vehicle. Mr. Jennings refused and resisted but he was eventually removed from the vehicle. The officers handcuffed Mr. Jennings and placed him into a patrol car. After removing the passenger from the bus, the officers conducted a search and found “copious amounts of marijuana” inside. Mr. Jennings was arrested and charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and obstruction of a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of official duties.
It further concluded that, “additionally, based upon the totality of the circumstances in the case at hand the stop of [Mr. Jennings'] vehicle was also justified pursuant to Officer [Dunnuck's] community caretaker function since the search and/or seizure was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances.”
[¶7] After the district court's adverse ruling on his motion to suppress evidence, Mr. Jennings entered a conditional guilty plea to all three charges. He reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion. The district court accepted the pleas and confirmed their conditional nature. The district court later sentenced Mr. Jennings to three to six years of imprisonment on the conspiracy charge, three to six years on the possession charge, and one year on the interference charge, all sentences to run concurrently. It then suspended the imprisonment terms in lieu of three years of supervised probation on each of the first two charges and one year supervised probation on the third charge, with all probation periods to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
[¶8] In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination and defer to the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Owens v. State , 2012 WY 14, ¶ 8, 269 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Wyo.2012). However, the underlying “issue of law—whether a search was unreasonable and in violation of constitutional rights—is reviewed de novo .” Lovato v. State , 2010 WY 38, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 55, 57 (Wyo.2010) (quoting Yoeuth v. State , 2009 WY 61, ¶ 16, 206 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Wyo.2009) ).
Venegas v. State , 2012 WY 136, ¶ 9, 287 P.3d 746, 749 (Wyo.2012). Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop—that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).
[¶10] The question, then, is whether the information available to Detective Dunnuck at the time he made the traffic stop could give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As set forth above, Detective Dunnuck was called to respond to a “family fight” at the motel. He learned that an employee of the motel reported a female crying outside her room. As she returned to the room, a man met her at the door. The motel manager reported more yelling from inside the room, and then loud thuds. Soon thereafter, the couple left the motel in a yellow bus with Colorado plates.
[¶11] When asked why he decided to stop the yellow bus, Detective Dunnuck explained:
On cross examination, Detective Dunnuck reiterated that he stopped the bus because “[t]hey were in a family fight, I had reason to believe that she was in danger, there was a criminal action going on.”
[¶12] The detective's testimony demonstrates that he had specific and articulable facts upon which he made his decision to stop the bus. He explained how those facts gave rise to his suspicion of criminal domestic battery or kidnapping. The detective had more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, and at least some minimal level of objective justification for stopping Mr. Jennings. See Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585. Given the totality of the...
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