Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'X

Decision Date29 November 1940
Citation284 Ky. 614
PartiesJennings v. Vincent's Adm'x. Same v. Bell's Adm'x. Bell v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. Vincent v. Same.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

1. Workmen's Compensation. — After awards for deaths of employees of subcontractor were made by the Workmen's Compensation Board, the estates of deceased employees could not recover at law against the principal contractor, on ground that he was negligent, in view of the fact that the provision of the compensation act giving an employee injured because of the negligence of "some other person" an option to sue "some other person" does not apply as between contractor and employee of subcontractor (Ky. Stats., secs. 4890, 4891).

2. Constitutional Law; Workmen's Compensation. — Where employees of subordinate contractor voluntarily agreed to waive their rights of action for wrongful death in order to obtain benefits under the section of the compensation act dealing with contractors and subcontractors, of recovering compensation from the principal contractor, administrators of the deceased employees could not contend that such section of the compensation act deprived them of a right of action against the principal contractor for the wrongful death of the employees, in contravention of the section of the Constitution providing for an action for negligent injury resulting in death (Ky. Stats., sec. 4891; Constitution, sec. 241).

3. Workmen's Compensation. The section of the compensation act providing that a principal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to an employee suffering "injuries" while in the employ of any of his intermediate or subcontractors and engaged on the subject matter of the contract, to the same extent as the immediate employer, applies not only in case of "injuries" but where death occurs (Ky. Stats., sec. 4891).

4. Master and Servant. — Generally, the owner of property is not liable for injuries resulting from the acts of an independent contractor, unless work to be done by the independent contractor is in itself a nuisance, or necessarily results in a nuisance, or unless the work or the instrumentality for doing it is inherently dangerous.

5. Master and Servant. — A patented plastic which was used to insulate floor of building having little ventilation was not an "inherently dangerous instrumentality," and hence owner was not liable for deaths and injuries of independent contractor's employees when an explosion occurred, though the patented plastic was a highly volatile substance, which a chemist testified would flash at 95 degrees Fahrenheit with a fire point at 100 degrees.

6. Master and Servant. — Where danger is not naturally expected to result in the use of a substance or instrumentality by an independent contractor, it is not an "inherently dangerous instrumentality" and the owner of the premises is not liable for injuries caused by the negligent use thereof by the independent contractor.

7. Master and Servant. — Where the owner of premises exercises due care to employ an architect to prepare plans for a building, which is constructed in accordance therewith by an independent contractor, the owner is not liable for any defects unless they were such that he should have known them.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court

Davis, Boehl, Viser & Marcus and Dodd & Dodd for Jennings.

Nathan Kahn, Richard Priest Dietzman and W.S. Heidenberg for Administrators.

Charles W. Morris and Morris & Garlove for Tobacco Co.

Before Burrel H. Farnsley, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY SIMS, COMMISSIONER.

Reversing in part and affirming in part.

John D. Jennings entered into an agreement with the Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company, hereinafter referred to as the Company, to construct a sweathouse for it in Louisville to be used in ageing tobacco. The American Builders Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as The American, was a subcontractor on this job, having a contract with Jennings to furnish the necessary labor and material for re-enforcing steel for the walls and floor of the building. While the building was being insulated there was an explosion which killed Hova Vincent and Wavie Bell, and injured Robert Orr, all of whom were employees on this job of The American.

The building fronted 87 feet on Nineteenth Street and extended westwardly 104 feet towards Twentieth Street to the rear wall of an old plant which was utilized as the rear wall of this new structure. This sweathouse was a very low building, being only 6 1/2 feet high. It had no windows in the walls or vents in the roof, except on Nineteenth Street there were two open doorways some 30 feet apart and in the rear wall there was a door 6 by 8 feet. The building was to be insulated with Celotex, the walls were coated with melted asphalt and the Celotex was pressed into the asphalt. The floor was insulated by a patented plastic known as R.I.W., a highly volatile substance which a chemist testified would flash at 95 degrees Fahrenheit, with a fire point at 100 degrees. The drums containing the R.I.W. had this warning painted on them: "Do not open nor use near open flame; provide good ventilation during use."

At the time of the explosion which was on the morning of July 6, 1936, the three walls, together with the common wall of the old building, and the roof had been completed. The door in the back wall was closed and the only openings in the sweathouse were the two doors on Nineteenth Street. This explosion occurred on Monday morning after about 200 gallons of R.I.W. had been applied on the floor and Celotex affixed thereto on the preceding Thursday or Friday. Due to the Fourth of July holiday no work had been done in the building since the previous Friday. An open vat in which the asphalt was being melted was about half way back in the building. As the gasoline burners were not inclosed, there was an open flame under this heating vat. On the morning of the accident, workmen of Jennings' were carrying R.I.W. in open buckets containing from two to three gallons from the drums outside into the building and within a few feet of the open flame under neath the vat. A flame was seen to shoot up from the gasoline burners, it ran rapidly along the ceiling of the building and a terrific explosion occurred. The architect and also Coffman, the Company's engineer, knew there was an open flame under the vat while R.I. W. was being spread in the building.

The dependents of the two men who were killed and Orr filed applications with the Workmen's Compensation Board against The American, and proper awards were made in their favor. The administratrices and Orr all filed suits at law against Jennings and the Company alleging that the explosion and resulting deaths and the injury to Orr were due to the negligence of Jennings and the Company.

Jennings' answers traversed the petitions and affirmatively pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the decedents and Orr. These answers contained a third paragraph incorporating an affirmative plea that Jennings was the principal contractor for the Company; that the two decedents and Orr were employees of the subcontractor on the job, The American; that both contractors and their employees were all operating under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Kentucky Statutes, Section 4880 et seq., and that the explosion occurred on the premises on which Jennings was executing his contract; that applications had been made to the Workmen's Compensation Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) for compensation against The American, and awards had been made against it in favor of the dependents of the two decedents and in favor of Orr; that The American had appealed to the circuit court from these awards by the Board, which awards were affirmed by the circuit court; and that the judgment of the circuit court affirming the awards had not been appealed from nor modified.

The answers of the Company first traversed the allegations of the petition, then pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the decedents and Orr, following which was an affirmative plea in bar of the action that it had no control over the construction of the sweathouse, but that same was being constructed by Jennings, an independent contractor.

The trial judge sustained general demurrers filed by the plaintiffs to the third paragraph in Jennings' answers and the court refused to let Jennings file an amended answer pleading res adjudicata to the effect that the Board had found the accident was caused by the negligence of The American and that Jennings had not been negligence, which finding of the Board was affirmed on an appeal to the circuit court. The three cases were tried together and at the conclusion of all the evidence the trial judge gave a peremptory instruction in favor of the Company and also gave a peremptory instruction in favor of Jennings as against Orr, but submitted to the jury the cases of the two decedents against Jennings. The jury returned verdicts in favor of each decedent in the sum of $10,000. Jennings appeals from the judgments entered on the verdicts against him, and the two administratrices appeal from the judgments entered on the verdicts directed against them in favor of the Company. There was no appeal prosecuted by Orr.

Jennings insists the circuit court erred in sustaining general demurrers to the third paragraph of his answers, contending that after an award for the death of an employee is made by the Board against his employer, who is a subcontractor, such decedent's estate cannot recover at law against a principal contractor. The two administratrices on their appeals argue that the circuit court erred in holding that because Jennings was an independent contractor, the Company is not liable, contending that the work was of such an inherently dangerous nature that the owner could not be relieved by a contract from damages resulting therefrom.

The actions of the administratrices...

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3 cases
  • Ruby Lumber Co. v. K.V. Johnson Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 16 January 1945
    ...part relating to construction of the statute, aside from the facts, was not to the point in question. However, in Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'x, 284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W. 2d 537, 539, we put the stamp of approval on that part of the McEvilly case which said that the general contractor was not "so......
  • Cottengim's Adm'r v. Adams' Adm'x
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 27 February 1953
    ...death resulted from injuries, although the statute limited liability for compensation 'to any employe injured'. Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'x, 284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W.2d 537, 541, and the authorities there In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 223, 166 S.W.2d 68, 70, we construed §......
  • Clemons v. Browning, 85-CA-1039-MR
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 18 July 1986
    ...construction of the scaffold. The trial court, relying upon Simmons v. Clark, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 930 (1968), and Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'x., 284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W.2d 537 (1940), entered summary judgment in favor of Browning, thus precipitating this appeal. We There is no doubt that constructi......

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