Jensen v. Department of Ecology

Decision Date28 June 1984
Docket NumberNo. 49509-2,49509-2
Citation102 Wn.2d 109,685 P.2d 1068
PartiesEugene C. JENSEN, Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, et al, Respondents.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Ken Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Wick Dufford, Charles B. Roe, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for the State.

Gene Anderson, U.S. Atty., Charles Pinnell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Seattle, F. Henry Habicht, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dirk D. Snell, U.S. Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Blake A. Watson, Land & Natural Resources Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Bureau of Reclamation; William Dunlop, United States Dept. of Interior, Boise, Idaho, of counsel.

John Baird, Richard A. Lemargi, Ephrata, Wash., Allen D WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

Brecke, Kennewick, Wash., for Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation District, et al.

Appellant Jensen's application for a permit to withdraw public groundwaters was denied by the Department of Ecology (DOE) on March 20, 1981. He appealed to the Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB) which, following a formal hearing, affirmed the DOE decision. He then appealed to the Superior Court for King County which affirmed the PCHB. RCW 43.21B.190 provides for direct review by this court. We affirm.

The issues raised are (1) whether there was error in the DOE's denial of the permit based on the determination that no public groundwater was available for appropriation, and (2) whether procedural errors occurred in the DOE's processing and denial of the application which warrant remand or reversal.

In 1968, appellant purchased property in the Quincy basin, an area in Eastern Washington. Since 1952, large portions of that area have been irrigated with waters made available by the Grand Coulee Dam as part of the Columbia Basin Project. As a result of percolation of imported irrigation water, the naturally occurring groundwater table has been substantially augmented. Appellant's property did not receive project irrigation water, but is located in an area where the groundwater table has been increased. On February 28, 1974, he filed an application with the DOE for a permit to withdraw public groundwater. 1 At that time, the DOE had tentatively determined that all public groundwater had been fully appropriated. He was told that his application would be held for priority purposes only. There Among the existing rights considered by the DOE are those of the Bureau. The Bureau's ownership of artifically stored water was recognized by the DOE pursuant to RCW 90.44.130. In 1973, the DOE established the Quincy groundwater subarea in compliance with its duty to administer and control groundwater withdrawals as will safely sustain water yields. RCW 90.44.130. Within a prescribed period following the designation of a groundwater subarea, claimants to ownership of artificially stored groundwater must file a declaration of ownership. Within the period in 1973, the Bureau filed such a declaration, claiming all water which had percolated into underground storage as a result of project irrigation. On January 8, 1975, the DOE recognized the Bureau's claim by Docket No. 74-772.

                were 186 other applicants who preceded him in priority.   In 1975, appellant filed an application to withdraw artificially stored groundwater.   The permit, issued soon afterwards, requires applicants to enter into an agreement with the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) to pay for withdrawn water.   While Jensen noted on his application that he did not recognize the Bureau's claim of ownership of the water, he did enter into the required agreement.   Appellant then requested the DOE to process his 1974 application for public groundwater.   The DOE denied his application on April 3, 1980, basing the denial on its determination that all public groundwater had been fully appropriated, and that further withdrawal would impair existing rights
                
I.

CLAIMED ERRORS OF LAW

Applications for permits to withdraw groundwater are governed by RCW 90.03.250 through 90.03.340, which regulate surface water appropriation. RCW 90.44.060. Under those provisions, DOE must reject the application and refuse to issue a permit if there is no unappropriated water available, if withdrawal will conflict with existing Appellant disputes as an error of law the PCHB finding of fact that groundwater beneath his land "is composed of both naturally occurring (public) groundwater and imported (artificial) water which have been commingled". PCHB 80-96, Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, at 4. He argues that the artificial groundwater should be included in the DOE's quantification of public groundwater, because it is, in law, public groundwater. The theories he offers are these: (1) the Bureau did not timely claim their ownership; (2) the Bureau abandoned the water; (3) commingling with public water causes artificially stored water to become public water; and (4) the Bureau's claimed water is limited to a horizontal depth above the area from which his well draws. When errors of law are alleged the reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body; however, the court will accord substantial weight to the agency's view of the law. Sellers, at 325, 646 P.2d 113.

                rights, or if withdrawal will detrimentally affect public interest.   RCW 90.03.290.   Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).   The DOE's decision is an exercise of discretion.   Peterson v. Department of Ecology, 92 Wash.2d 306, 314, 596 P.2d 285 (1979).   We will not set aside a discretionary decision absent a clear showing of abuse.   Schuh v. Department of Ecology, 100 Wash.2d 180, 667 P.2d 64 [685 P.2d 1071] (1983).   Review of administrative decisions is based on the record of the administrative tribunal, and its factual determinations will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.   Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982)
                

Appellant argues that his rights to the artificially stored groundwater he is withdrawing vested before the Bureau's rights, because his 1974 application preceded the DOE's 1975 recognition of the Bureau's ownership. Appellant is mistaken in several regards. First, with certain exceptions not applicable here, a permit is required for withdrawal of public groundwater. Peterson v. Department of Ecology, supra. Appellant's right to withdraw public Appellant argues, however, that the Bureau's water was either abandoned, or else that it lost its identity by virtue of its commingling with naturally occurring groundwater. In either case, appellant concludes, the water has become public groundwater available for appropriation.

                groundwater never arose because he was never granted a permit.   Had a permit been granted, his right of withdrawal would relate back to the date of his application.   RCW 90.03.340.   A permit not having been granted, his sole right was to his place in line.  Schuh v. Department of Ecology, supra.   Second, although a declaration of ownership and an application to withdraw are not really analogous, we note that the Bureau's 1973 declaration preceded appellant's 1974 application.   Third, the DOE's acceptance of the Bureau's declaration was a recognition of the Bureau's preexisting rights in conformance with RCW 90.44.130.   Contrary to appellant's assertions, the Bureau was not under an obligation to claim its ownership until such time as the DOE designated the groundwater subarea.   RCW 90.44.130.   Unless abandoned or forfeited, artificially stored groundwater is not public water.   See RCW 90.44.040
                

In 1923, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with arguments similar to Jensen's, specifically whether the United States had a right to recapture and utilize seepage from irrigation waters in the Shoshone Project in Wyoming. Quoting United States v. Haga, 276 F. 41 (D.Idaho 1921), the Court said,

"One who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruitful purposes, is entitled to its exclusive control so long as he is able and willing to apply it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to what is commonly known as wastage from surface run-off and deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical irrigation. Considerations of both public policy and natural justice strongly support such a rule. Nor is it essential to his control that the appropriator maintain continuous actual possession of such water. So long as he does not abandon it or forfeit it by failure to use, he may assert Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 506, 44 S.Ct. 182, 185, 68 L.Ed. 407 (1924).

                his rights.   It is not necessary that he confine it upon his own land or convey it in an artificial conduit.   It is requisite, of course, that he be able to identify it;  but, subject to that limitation, he may conduct it [685 P.2d 1072] through natural channels and may even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with other waters.   In short, the rights of an appropriator in these respects are not affected by the fact that the water has once been used."
                

The test for determining whether water has been abandoned was enunciated in Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 P. 641 (1909). There the court said:

[A]bandonment like appropriation is a question of intent, and to be determined with reference to the conduct of the parties. The intent to abandon and an actual relinquishment must concur, for courts will not lightly decree an abandonment of a property so valuable as that of water in an irrigated region.

(Citation Omitted.) Miller, at 435, 103 P. 641. Appellant offered no evidence that the Bureau intended or in fact relinquished control of its water. In contrast, the PCHB found that the Bureau intended from the inception of the Columbia Basin Project to recapture waters from the northern portions of the project for use in the southern portions. PCHB 80-96,...

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