Jensen v. Traders & General Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 23 October 1959 |
Citation | 52 Cal.2d 786,345 P.2d 1 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | Raymond H. JENSEN et al., Appellants, v. TRADERS & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent. S. F. 20212. |
Sheridan, Hoffman & Mendel, Nichols, Williams, Morgan & Digardi and Edward M. Digardi, Oakland, for appellants.
Partridge, O'Connell, Partridge & Fall, Partridge, O'Connell & Partridge, and Wallace O'Connell, San Francisco, for respondents.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Harold B. Haas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, San Francisco, Betts, Ely & Loomis, Early, Maslach, Foran & Williams, Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Snow & Holle, Veatch, Thomas & Carlson, Spray, Gould & Bowers, Frank Woodhead, Henry F. Walker, Los Angeles, Perry H. Taft, San Francisco, Watters & Donovan, James B. Donovan, Patrick J. Hughes, John N. Reid, New York City, and Weinstock, Anderson, Maloney & Chase, San Francisco, amici curiae for respondent.
From a judgment in favor of defendant after trial before a jury in an action to recover upon an accident insurance policy, plaintiffs appeal.
Facts: On April 19, 1951, John DiMatteo signed a conditional sales contract for the purchase of a used car for his minor son, plaintiff Vincent DiMatteo. The contract contained a request that the sellor obtain insurance in a company acceptable to it and include the premiums therefor in the balance due under the contract.
Defendant, upon the request of the seller, issued its policy of public liability and property damage insurance, naming plaintiff Vincent DiMatteo and his father as insureds. The DiMatteos received the policy by mail and read it to check the coverage, but did not read the fine print. All premiums were paid from May 1951 through November 1951.
The policy contained, among others, this provision:
On August 10, 1951, two separate notices of cancellation of the policy were placed in the mail, one addressed to plaintiff Vincent DiMatteo and the other to his father. Neither of these letters was ever returned to defendant's office. Both DiMatteos testified that no cancellation notices were ever received by them and that they had no knowledge of any cancellation until November 1951.
On November 15, 1951, Vincent had an automobile accident, in which plaintiffs Jensens and Morrow were injured. A few days later, Vincent and his father learned that the policy had been canceled.
Plaintiffs Jensens and Morrow filed an action against Vincent and served him with summons and complaint. The DiMatteos retained attorney Bernard Mendel to represent them. He made demand upon defendant by telephone to defend the action and later sent a copy of the complaint and summons to defendant with a further demand to defend, which was refused. A judgment in the sum of $10,000 was entered against Vincent in favor of plaintiffs Jensens and Morrow.
The present action was then filed against defendant predicated upon the insurance policy that it had issued. After trial, a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiffs, but the judgment rendered thereon was reversed on appeal. (Jensen v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Cal.App.2d 162, 296 P.2d 434.) After a second trial before a jury, a judgment in favor of defendant was entered. Plaintiffs appeal, urging that it was error for the trial court to give this instruction to the jury:
Questions: First. Is the standard cancellation clause set forth, supra, which provides that cancellation may be effected by mailing notice, (a) ambiguous and/or (b) contrary to the public policy of the State of California?
No. It is the general rule that the parties to an insurance policy are free, subject to legislative restriction, to arrange the occasions, method, and means of cancellation by private agreement. (Ohran v. National Automobile Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 636, 645, 187 P.2d 66 ( ).)
It is likewise settled that in the construction of a contract, the office of the court is simply to ascertain and declare what, in terms or in substance, is contained therein, and not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted. Code Civ.Proc. § 1858.
This rule is applicable to insurance contracts, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Spence, speaking for this court, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 38 Cal.2d 73, 81(7), 237 P.2d 510, 514, where he stated: (Italics added.)
(a) The cancellation clause in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; it means exactly what it says. It provides that the company may cancel the insurance by mailing at least a five-day notice to the insured at the address he has given the company. It expressly provides that such mailing shall be sufficient proof of notice and that the effective date stated therein shall become the end of the policy period.
It is to be noted that the clause further provides that 'delivery' of such cancellation notice shall be equivalent to mailing, thus making it clear that there are two methods of canceling the policy, one by mailing, and the other by delivering, notice of cancellation to the insured.
The clause is mutually available on the same terms to both parties to the policy. The unrestricted privilege of cancellation by either side exists for the benefit of the insured, whose interest in the covered property or need for protection may cease during the policy period, as well as for the benefit of the insurer.
In Automobile Liability Insurance, by Appleman (1938), in referring to a cancellation provision similar to that involved in the present case, the author said, at page 476: (Cf. Savarese v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 518, 521(5) et seq., 310 P.2d 142.)
It is, of course, conceded that the Legislature, by statute, may prescribe that receipt of the notice is required for effective cancellation of an insurance policy. No such statute has existed, or now exists, in this state.
Referring to a similar cancellation provision in insurance policies, in 64 A.L.R.2d (1959), p. 988 et seq., it is stated:
Again, on page 1000, appears the following: 'Most of the more recent insurance policies contain a standard provision dealing with the cancellation of the policy by the insurance company. This so-called 'standard form' of policy cancellation clause reads as follows: ...
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