Jent v. State, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-785
Decision Date | 13 March 2019 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-785 |
Citation | 120 N.E.3d 290 |
Parties | Michael R. JENT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appellant, Pro Se: Michael R. Jent, Pendleton, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana Monika Prekopa Talbot, Supervising Deputy Attorney, General Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Michael Jent ("Jent"), pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that Jent has failed to show that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Whether the post-conviction court erred by summarily denying Jent's petition for post-conviction relief.
[3] In November of 2002, the State charged Jent with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, Class A misdemeanor interfering with the reporting of a crime, Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The trial court held an initial hearing, during which it advised Jent of his constitutional rights, which he waived. At the hearing, Jent also pled guilty to all four misdemeanors and was sentenced to 365 days of unsupervised probation.
[4] Fifteen years later, in November of 2017, Jent filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). Jent alleged that his guilty plea was not knowingly made, that there was an insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea, and that he was denied the assistance of guilty plea counsel. Jent further alleged that on the date of his hearing, he "went to court while he was still intoxicated." (App. 10). In its answer, the State argued that Jent's issues were waived by his guilty plea. The State also argued that his allegations did not create a genuine issue of material fact because they did not allege specific facts which, if proved, would suffice to establish any grounds for post-conviction relief. The State further asserted that Jent's claims were "barred by laches in that he has unreasonably delayed in seeking post-conviction relief." (App. 19).
[5] On March 1, 2018, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief, stating: (App. 7). Later, the court reporter filed an affidavit, stating that she had been requested to prepare Jent's guilty plea hearing transcript. She explained that the transcript was not available because Indiana destroys misdemeanor records after ten years. Jent now appeals.
[6] Jent appeals from the post-conviction court's order summarily denying post-conviction relief. Our standard of review in post-conviction proceedings is well-settled.
We observe that post-conviction proceedings do not grant a petitioner a "super-appeal" but are limited to those issues available under the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). A petitioner who appeals the denial of PCR faces a rigorous standard of review, as the reviewing court may consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the judgment of the post-conviction court. The appellate court must accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact and may reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. If a PCR petitioner was denied relief, he or she must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion than that reached by the post-conviction court.
Shepherd v. State , 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.
[7] Jent maintains that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that "the State failed to present evidence to support their claim of laches, or unreasonable delay and that the delay caused prejudice[.]" (Jent's Br. 14). We disagree.
[8] Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained our standard of review in a laches case as follows:
Armstrong v. State , 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[9] Our review of the record and the inferences favorable to the judgment reveals that Jent unreasonably delayed in filing his petition for post-conviction relief. Jent pled guilty in 2002 and petitioned for post-conviction relief in 2017. Although lapse of time does not in and of itself constitute laches, a long delay in filing for post-conviction relief may be sufficient to infer that the delay was unreasonable. Kindred v. State , 514 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh'g denied, trans....
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