Armstrong v. State
Decision Date | 21 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 45S03-0010-PC-564.,45S03-0010-PC-564. |
Citation | 747 N.E.2d 1119 |
Parties | Steven ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Chris Hitz-Bradley, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet L. Parsanko, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer
Steven Armstrong's murder conviction was affirmed in 1996 by the Court of Appeals in a memorandum decision. When he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 1999, the post-conviction court applied the doctrine of laches to bar consideration of his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision. We granted transfer, and we now consider Armstrong's appeal anew and hold that laches does not bar consideration of his petition for post-conviction relief.
The equitable doctrine of laches operates to bar consideration of the merits of a claim or right of one who has neglected for an unreasonable time, under circumstances permitting due diligence, to do what in law should have been done. Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 712 (Ind. 1984). For laches to apply, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and that the State is prejudiced by the delay. Williams v. State, 716 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind.1999). For post-conviction laches purposes, prejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful re-prosecution. Stewart v. State, 548 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ind.App. 1990).
Because the State had the burden of proving laches as an affirmative defense, Armstrong is not appealing from a negative judgment, and the applicable standard of review requires that we affirm unless we find that the judgment was clearly erroneous. Ind.Trial Rule 52(A); Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind.1995). This is a review for sufficiency of evidence. Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, 635 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind.1994). Without reweighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of witnesses but rather looking only to the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, we will affirm if there is probative evidence to support the post-conviction court's judgment. Williams, 716 N.E.2d at 901; Lacy v. State, 491 N.E.2d 520, 521 (Ind.1986).
Armstrong does not challenge the finding that the three-year delay between the conclusion of his direct appeal and the filing of his petition for post-conviction relief was unreasonable. He contends, however, that the post-conviction evidence was insufficient to prove resulting prejudice to the State. The State's laches claim is based upon its contention that it has suffered prejudice from the delay "because the State's eyewitness to the murder, Anthony Moton, is now outside of the jurisdiction," Br. of Appellee at 5-6, and that "[w]ithout the live testimony of Moton, the State's ability to successfully present a case against Armstrong is materially diminished." Id. at 8. The State also argues that other witnesses, William Riley and Claretha Smith, would not likely now provide testimony favorable to the State.
The judgment of the post-conviction court was based on the following findings:
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