Jergens v. Marias Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV 20-15-GF-BMM |
| Parties | JEANETTE JERGENS, Plaintiff, v. MARIAS MEDICAL CENTER, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
Plaintiff Jeanette Jergens ("Jergens") filed a Complaint against the Marias Medical Center, the Board of County Commissioners of Toole County, and Cindy Lamb on February 26, 2020. Doc. 1. Jergens alleges that Defendants violated the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Doc. 1 at 6. Jergens filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 19. Defendant Lamb individually filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 32. Defendants collectively filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 37. The Court held a hearing on May 24, 2021. Doc. 58.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
This case constitutes the latest chapter in a lengthy saga of litigation arising from an employment dispute between Jergens and Defendants. Jergens worked off and on for Defendant Marias Medical Center for 26 years, starting as a certified surgical technologist in 1983. Id. at 2-3. Defendant Marias Medical Center terminated Jergens's employment on August 28, 2015. Doc. 9 at 2.
On July 10, 2015, Defendant Marias Medical Center placed Jergens on paid administrative leave while it investigated allegations that Jergens had engaged in workplace misconduct. Id. Jergens claims that she began experiencing anxiety shortly after having been placed on leave. Doc. 21 at 4. Jergens began self-medicating with melatonin, ZzzQuil, and over-the-counter pain relief. Id. Jergens sought treatment from Dr. Hardy. Id. Dr. Hardy prescribed Jergens anxiety medication and sent a three-sentence letter ("Dr. Hardy's Letter") to Defendant Marias Medical Center. Id. Dr. Hardy's letter stated generally that Jergens had started medication for anxiety and then noted that the medication needs at least 2 weeks before it is "advisable that [Jergens] participate in any emotionally stressful situations." Doc. 48-3 at 2.
Defendant Cindy Lamb ("Defendant Lamb") worked for Defendant Marias Medical Center as the Director of Human Resources. Doc. 1 at 7. Defendant Lamb received Dr. Hardy's letter and forwarded it to Michele Puiggari ("Puiggari"), the employment expert whom Defendant Marias Medical Center had hired to investigate the workplace misconduct allegations against Jergens. Id. at 9. Puiggari issued the Final Investigative Report ("FIR") after finishing her investigation. Doc. 48-2. TheFIR listed Dr. Hardy's letter under "relevant documents." Id. at 9. Defendant Marias Medical Center terminated Jergens on August 28, 2015. Doc. 9 at 2.
After Defendant Marias Medical Center terminated her employment, Jergens filed suit (Jergens I) in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Toole County, Montana on August 17, 2016. Doc. 23 at 6-13. Jergens alleged violation of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. During discovery, Jergens requested on October 24, 2016, all documents related to her employment and termination. Doc. 22 at 2. Defendant Lamb, among others, prepared Defendants' discovery responses. Defendants responded on November 28, 2016. Jergens concedes that the discovery responses stated that the FIR (and its reference to Dr. Hardy's Letter) had been disclosed. Doc. 20 at 7. The Defendants had failed, however, to include a copy of the FIR. Jergens apparently failed to notice this omission for several months.
All parties realized the omission of the FIR during Jergens's deposition on February 28, 2017. Id. A year later, on February 18, 2018, the Montana Human Rights Board issued Jergens the Right to Sue on claims of discrimination and privacy violations. Id. at 8. Jergens based these claims on the FIR and Dr. Hardy's letter. Jergens filed a second suit (Jergens II) in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Toole County, Montana on April 28, 2018, in which she raised claims of discriminationand privacy violations. The jury in Jergens I awarded Jergens $80,762 on May 16, 2018. Doc. 28 at 27.
During discovery in Jergens II, Defendants disclosed on July 29, 2019, several emails between Puiggari, the employment law expert, and Defendant Lamb. Doc. 20 at 8. In these emails, Puiggari and Defendant Lamb discussed briefly Defendant Jergens's case and the possibility of FMLA leave. Docs. 51-1, 51-2. On November 12, 2019, Jergens sought to amend Jergens II to include claims for violation of the FMLA, the due process clause, and the equal protections clause. Doc. 39-3. On February 25, 2020, Jergens withdrew her motion to amend Jergens II. On the same day, the district court in Jergens II granted summary judgment and dismissed the case. Doc. 31. Jergens filed this suit (Jergens III) in federal court on February 26, 2020, alleging the same violations under the FMLA, due process clause, and the equal protections clause. Doc. 1.
DEFENDANT LAMB'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 32).
Defendant Lamb asked the Court to determine that she is entitled to qualified immunity against the claims that Jergens alleges against her. Doc. 33. Jergens's claims against Defendant Lamb revolve around the failure to include the FIR and Dr. Hardy's letter in Defendants' discovery responses in Jergens I. Specifically, Jergens alleges that Defendant Lamb "purposefully withheld documentation in discovery that supported an inference of illegal discrimination against [Jergens], aswell as evidence of interference with [Jergens's] FMLA rights." Doc. 1 at 7. Jergens alleges that withholding these documents barred her from presenting at trial all the claims that she otherwise would have brought. Id.
Qualified immunity shields a government official from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was "clearly established" at the time of the official's conduct. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). The Court may grant qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not "clearly established" without resolving the often more difficult question whether the purported right exists at all. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). To be "clearly established," a right must be sufficiently clear "that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what [he or she] is doing violates that right." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). "In other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Neither the parties nor the Court have been able to identify a case premised on an individual's constitutional right to prompt discovery in civil litigation. This absence of case law likely results from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures which serve as the preferred channel by which parties challenge discovery practices in civil litigation. See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (); Campidoglio LLC v. Wells Fargo& Co., 870 F.3d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 2017). Federal district courts possess great discretion in resolving discovery disputes and in protecting parties from misconduct in the discovery process. Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) authorizes a district court to impose monetary sanctions under certain circumstances and to compel parties to respond to discovery requests.
Jergens has not provided any evidence that a right to prompt discovery in civil litigation is "clearly established" under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Defendant Lamb remains entitled to qualified immunity. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. The Court need not address here whether Jergens possesses that right at all. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Defendant Lamb's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 32) is granted. Defendant Lamb is dismissed. The Court will consider the remaining Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 32, 37) as they relate to Defendant Marias Medical Center and Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Toole County.
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 32 & 37).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) Jergens's FMLA claim fails as a matter of law; (2) Jergens's constitutional claim fails as a matter of law; and (3) the doctrine of res judicata bars both Jergens's FMLA claim and her constitutional claim. Doc. 38. Jergens argues,conversely, that she is entitled to summary judgment because both her FMLA claim and her constitutional claim succeed as a matter of law. Doc. 20.
ANALYSIS.
(1) Plaintiff's FMLA Claim.
"The FMLA provides job security to employees who must be absent from work because of their own illness, to care for family members who are ill, or to care for new babies." Olson v. United States by & through Dep't of Energy, 980 F.3d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.222(c)). Congress made it unlawful for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise or the attempt to exercise, any right provided" by the FMLA. Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)).
Employers maintain a duty under certain circumstances to notify an employee of his or her potential eligibility to take FMLA leave. Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2003); 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)-(e). The failure to provide this notice, however, does not result in a standalone cause of action; rather, "an employee must prove, as a threshold matter, that the employer violated § 2615 by interfering with, restraining, or denying his or her exercise of FMLA rights." Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002).
The FMLA includes several limitations on an employee's claim that an employer violated the FMLA. First, the FMLA "provides no relief unless theemployee has been prejudiced by the violation." Id. Second, an employee alleging claims under the...
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