Jernigan v. Jernigan, 92-CA-0349
| Decision Date | 07 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-CA-0349,92-CA-0349 |
| Citation | 625 So.2d 782 |
| Parties | Ary Kay JERNIGAN, v. Romie JERNIGAN. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
C. Emanuel Smith, Tupelo, for appellant.
Michael D. Jonas, Aberdeen, for appellee.
Before PRATHER, P.J., and SULLIVAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.
Ary Kay ("Kay") Jernigan and Romie Jernigan were divorced in 1985 after approximately seventeen years of marriage. Kay Jernigan was awarded the sole use and exclusive possession of the home owned by the parties, and two acres of land adjoining the home, until the parties' youngest child reached eighteen years of age. Subsequent to the divorce, Kay and Romie resumed cohabitation until June, 1991.
Kay continued to live in the house until it was destroyed by fire in August, 1991. The house and contents were insured. The property, however, was titled solely in Romie's name. Full payment of the insurance proceeds was made to Romie for both the house and its contents.
Kay appeals the Chancellor's findings that she was entitled to past due child support and to one-half of the insurance proceeds attributable to the loss of the household goods, but not to any of the insurance proceeds from the destruction of the dwelling. Kay also appeals the finding that she does not have any legal or equitable interest in the house and two acres that had previously served as the parties' marital domicile. Kay sought an amendment to the judgment, but the Chancellor denied the motion.
Kay appeals assigning as error:
WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO DECREE AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN FAVOR OF A SPOUSE WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE JOINT ACCUMULATION OF REAL PROPERTY TITLED SOLELY IN THE NAME OF THE OTHER SPOUSE?
The Jernigans were married January 21, 1968. The Jernigans have two children, Rueben, born in 1966, and Levert, born in 1968. Kay and Romie separated in December, 1984. At that time, Kay sought a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The Chancery Court of Monroe County, Mississippi issued a Final Decree of Divorce on May 22, 1985. In that decree, Kay was granted a divorce; awarded custody of the two children; child support in the amount of $150.00 a month for the youngest child, Levert; $50.00 a month in alimony; sole use and exclusive possession of the home owned by the parties, as well as the two adjoining acres; and sole use and exclusive possession of all household furnishings and appliances. The chancellor noted that Romie had not answered the complaint, and did not appear in court.
Romie filed a Motion to Set Aside Final Decree of Divorce on May 28, 1985, alleging that Kay had assured him that she would not go through with the divorce. The chancellor issued an Amended Decree of Divorce. The amended decree relieved Romie of the obligation to pay Kay alimony; the rest of the decree is the same as the first decree.
The Jernigans resumed cohabitation sometime in the latter part of 1985, and continued to live together until June, 1991. Kay continued to live in the house; Romie moved into a trailer that they owned. On August 11, 1991, the parties' house burned down. The house had been titled solely in Romie's name. The insurance proceeds for the house, and the personal property destroyed by the fire, were paid to Romie. The proceeds totalled $43,000.00, and were paid in three different checks. 1 Kay did not receive any of the proceeds, even though one of the checks was made payable to both Kay and Romie Jernigan.
In October, 1991, Kay filed a Complaint for Contempt, Modification and Injunctive Relief, alleging that Romie was in arrears on payment of child support. At the same time, Kay also filed a Motion for Modification of Final Judgment and Injunctive Relief, alleging that the loss of the house in the fire was a substantial material change in Kay's circumstances, thereby warranting a modification of the final judgment. Also, Kay sought to enjoin Romie from wasting the insurance proceeds.
A hearing was held on November 22, 1991. During the hearing, Romie stated that his wife did not work prior to marriage, but began shortly after they were married. The land upon which the marital home was built was deeded by warranty deed to Romie by his father, aunts and uncles. The property was conveyed five months after the Jernigans were married. Romie borrowed money from the bank to build the house. He testified that his father signed the note, and believed that Kay signed it as well. The mortgage on the house was paid in full. Romie alleged that he made all the mortgage payments and that Kay did not contribute anything. Romie claims that he paid all the taxes, insurance, maintenance, as well as the mortgage payments on the house.
The Jernigans had a joint checking account in the sense that they both contributed funds; however, the account was in Romie's name alone. Kay stated at the hearing that when they married, Romie already had a checking account, and as he was "the man of the house," she never pushed the issue. Kay maintained that she and Romie contributed evenly to the "joint" account, and that they paid the bills together, including the time they cohabitated after their divorce.
Kay stated that both before and after the divorce she drew money out of her savings account to have additions built on the house, and to have portions of the existing house remodeled. Kay said that she paid for the materials, and Romie did the work. Kay said that Romie moved out in June, 1991, into a mobile home that they owned. The house burned down in August, 1991. She filed the claim with the insurance company, and Romie received the proceeds. Kay stated that she lost everything in the fire, and that she now lived with her mother. She said she had received no money from Romie.
The Chancellor found that Romie was indebted to Kay for the past due child support payments in the amount of $1,650.00. 2 Furthermore, Kay was entitled to one-half of the insurance proceeds for the contents of the house. However, the chancellor found that Romie was the sole and exclusive fee owner of the lot and the house that was destroyed by fire, thereby entitling Romie to all of the insurance proceeds. Kay moved to amend the final decree, which was denied by the chancellor on April 8, 1992.
Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited. Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226 (Miss.1993). "Findings of a Chancellor will not be disturbed or set aside by this Court on appeal unless we are of the opinion the decision made by the trial court was manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial, credible evidence, [citations omitted], or unless an erroneous legal standard was applied." Snow Lake Shores Property Owners Corp. v. Smith, 610 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss.1992).
Kay Jernigan contends that the fact that her name does not appear on the deed to the property does not negate her interest in the property, especially given that the house and property were acquired during the course of the marriage. She also argues that both the original and amended divorce decrees refer to the house and property as "the home owned by the parties." Kay further contends that the Chancellor awarded her "the sole use and exclusive possession of the home owned by the parties ... until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of eighteen." The Chancellor did not state what was to happen to the property upon that event occurring.
Romie contends that Kay only asked for "permanent use and exclusive possession" of the property; she did not ask to divest Romie of any part of his interest in the home. Romie also argues that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the Chancellor's refusal to divest him of any interest in the property.
In the original divorce action, Kay did ask for the "permanent use and exclusive possession of" the marital home and thirty acres of land. The final decree awarded her "sole use and exclusive possession of the home owned by the parties ..., as well two (2) acres of land adjoining said home until the parties' youngest child reaches the age...
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