Jernigan v. King

• Decision Date: 03 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2112,2112
• Citation: 440 S.E.2d 379,312 S.C. 331
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Rodney C. JERNIGAN, Jr., as Guardian Ad Litem for Perry Pressley, Appellant, v. J. Stovall KING, M.D., Kenneth S. Kammer, M.D., and McLeod Regional Medical Center, Defendants, of whom Kenneth S. Kammer, M.D., is Respondent. . Heard

Page 379

440 S.E.2d 379

312 S.C. 330

Rodney C. JERNIGAN, Jr., as Guardian Ad Litem for Perry

Pressley, Appellant, v. J. Stovall KING, M.D., Kenneth S. Kammer, M.D., and McLeod

Regional Medical Center, Defendants,

of whom Kenneth S. Kammer, M.D., is Respondent.

No. 2112.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 3, 1993.

Decided Dec. 28, 1993.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1994.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 11, 1994

Desa A. Ballard and L. Joel Chastain, of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, Barnwell; and Thomas D. Rogers, of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, Charleston, for appellant.

Ernest J. Nauful, Jr., and Andrew F. Lindemann, both of Nauful & Ellis, Columbia, for respondent.

BRUCE LITTLEJOHN, Acting Associate Judge.

Rodney C. Jernigan, as Guardian ad Litem for Perry Pressley, sued physicians J. Stovall King and Kenneth S. Kammer, as well as McLeod Regional Medical Center (MRMC), for medical malpractice for injuries Perry received while being treated by King and Kammer. Kammer moved for summary judgment on the basis that he owed no duty to Perry. The trial court granted the motion and Jernigan appeals. We affirm.

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, SCRCP; Baugus v. Wessinger, 303 S.C. 412, 401 S.E.2d 169 (1991). All ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence must be construed most strongly against the movant. Id. Viewed in this manner the record reveals the following facts.

King was the sole shareholder in Carolina Neurological Services, P.A. and had active staff privileges at MRMC. Kammer was King's employee.

On August 2, 1982, Perry complained of a severe headache and he was taken to his physician, Marion Fowler. Perry lost consciousness and was transported to the emergency room at MRMC. The attending physician, King, admitted Perry to MRMC at about 8:55 p.m. On August 3, 1982, at about 8:00 a.m., Kammer, while on call for King, responded to an emergency code from Perry's room and discovered Perry in arrest. Kammer resuscitated Perry, ordered Perry transferred to the intensive care unit, placed him on a respirator, ordered blood gas studies, ordered intravenous fluids to be administered, ordered checks on vital signs, and ordered an immediate CT scan. At about 8:25 or 8:30 a.m., King resumed responsibility for Perry's care.

Neither Kammer nor King reviewed the results of the CT scan. Those results indicated "intracranial hemorrhage, as well as intracranial pressure sufficient to cause brain compression as evidenced by a shift of intracranial contents to the right."

On August 6, 1982, Kammer saw Perry again while on call for King. Kammer ordered another CT scan and, upon receiving the results, performed immediate surgery to relieve the pressure. Jernigan claims the delay in treating Perry from August 3 through August 6 most probably resulted in permanent brain damage to Perry.

Jernigan brought this action on Perry's behalf against King, Kammer and MRMC. After some discovery Kammer moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and Jernigan appeals.

At oral argument, Jernigan's counsel stated that Jernigan was not claiming that by beginning treatment on Perry on August 3, 1982, Kammer was liable for Perry's care throughout Perry's illness. Rather, Jernigan's position was that once Kammer began a particular course of treatment during the emergency period when he was covering for King, he had an obligation to exercise due care in completing that particular treatment. Counsel stated that Kammer had an obligation to evaluate the CT scan or "to make sure someone else does--he has a responsibility to make sure that it is followed up." Counsel also stated that Kammer "ordered a CT scan and did absolutely nothing to make sure that anybody even bothered to look at it." Finally, counsel stated "the fact that [Kammer] undertook emergency services and ordered a CT scan and put this ball in motion by definition create[d] a duty to make sure someone catches the ball on the other side."

We assume, without deciding, Jernigan is correct that once Kammer ordered a CT scan on August 3, he was under a duty to see to it that the scan was performed and to see the results, or to see to it that someone else evaluated the results. We hold the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Kammer in this case.

Medical malpractice is the failure of a physician to exercise that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions and in like surrounding circumstances. Welch v. Whitaker, 282 S.C. 251, 317 S.E.2d 758 (Ct.App.1984). In a medical malpractice action the plaintiff must establish by expert testimony both the required standard of care and the defendant's failure to conform to the standard, unless the subject matter lies within the ambit of common knowledge and experience, so that no special learning is needed to evaluate the defendant's...