Jersey City v. Martin

• Decision Date: 26 June 1941
• Docket Number: No. 32.,32.
• Citation: 20 A.2d 697
• Parties: JERSEY CITY et al. v. MARTIN, State Tax Commissioner.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

20 A.2d 697

JERSEY CITY et al.

v. MARTIN, State Tax Commissioner.

No. 32.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June 26, 1941.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Certiorari proceeding by the City of Jersey City and others against J. H. Thayer Martin, State Tax Commissioner, involving apportionment of excises levied and collected for the years 1938 and 1939. From adverse judgments, 125 N.J.L. 103, 13 A.2d 227, the defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Herbert J. Hannoch, of Newark, for appellants Town of Westfield and others.

John F. Evans, of Paterson, for appellant City of Paterson.

William Newcorn, of Plainfield, for appellant City of Plainfield.

William F. Gorman, of Nutley, for appellant Town of Nutley.

Frederick C. Kentz, of Summit, for appellant City of Summit.

Louis Josephson, of Trenton, for appellant City of Trenton.

Herbert J. Hannoch and Morris Weinstein, both of Newark, of counsel for appellants.

Edward P. Stout, of Jersey City, for respondents.

HEHER, Justice.

Following the determination of this court in Hoboken v. Martin, 123 N.J.L. 442, 9 A.2d 332, cc. 2 and 3 of the Laws of 1940, N.J.S.A. 54:31-15.1 to 54:31-15.13 note, 54:31-29 to 54:31-14 note, were adopted; and the primary subject of inquiry is the validity of the provisions for the apportionment of the excises levied and collected for the years 1938 and 1939 under cc. 7 and 8 of the Laws of 1938. Pamph.L.1940, pp. 13, 17; Pamph.L.1938, pp. 17, 26.

These enactments embody a legislative finding that "the valuation data and methods employed and the valuations determined and certified by the State Tax Commissioner in his attempted apportionment" of such revenues "for each of said years will result in a fair and equitable apportionment" thereof "among the municipalities entitled thereto under the provisions" of the cited act of 1938; and it is provided that the "valuations of the taxpayers' property located in, on or over any public street, highway, road or other public place in the several municipalities as determined and certified by the State Tax Commissioner, acting pursuant to sections five and fourteen" of ch. 7 of the Laws of 1938, supra, for the years 1938 and 1939, "are hereby established and adopted as the units of measure and bases for a fair and equitable apportionment" of such revenues "to such municipalities for each of said years, respectively", and that such revenues "are hereby apportioned among the several municipalities in the proportion that the valuation, hereby established and adopted for said year, of such taxpayer's property located in, on or over any public street, highway, road or other public place in each municipality bears to the total valuations, hereby established and adopted for said year, of all such property of such taxpayer in this State."

The Supreme Court ruled that these statutes, as respects the distribution of the taxes, "reveal nothing approaching a legislatively fixed or pronounced standard for the measurement of value"; and that they "do not conform with the reasoning in Hoboken v. Martin, supra, or with the requirements of our constitution with respect to legislative enactments."

First: It is the general insistence of respondents that the acts "encroach upon the judicial and executive departments of the government," in contravention of sec. I of Art. III of the State Constitution, N.J.S.A.

Specifically, it is said that the statutes "attempted to establish and adopt, by legislative 'fiat' valuations which this court" (in Hoboken v. Martin, supra) "said had been fixed and determined by the State Tax Commissioner under an unlawfully delegated authority;" and that the attempt was abortive as in violation of these "general rules of law": (1) Where litigation has proceeded to a judgment on the merits, "it is beyond the power of legislation to alter or control;" (2) the Legislature is not invested with power "to annul, to set aside, or to reverse a judgment rendered by either a state or federal court;" and (3) "Where the courts have enjoined the collection of, or decreed modifications in the assessment of, taxes, no subsequent statute can nullify such action." The authorities cited in support of these propositions are United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477, 102 A.L.R. 914; John A. Gebelein, Inc., v. Milbourne, D.C., 12 F.Supp. 105; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law § 128; 11 Am.Jur., p. 800, sec. 135. And there is invoked also the legal axiom that "curative acts cannot cure a want of authority to act at all"—citing People v. Wemple, State Comptroller, 117 N.Y. 77, 22 N.E. 761; 59 C.J. p. 1179.

It is maintained that these statutes are in essence "curative," but constitute "an attempted legislative recall of a judicial decision," and therefore a trespass upon the "judicial department of the government." The contention is also made that they "encroach upon the executive department," since it is not "constitutionally within the power of the Legislature to determine the value of property, whether for the purpose of taxation or the apportionment of taxes, unless the actual value of necessity is fairly equivalent to that fixed by law—such as money on deposit in bank, or securities where the nominal or face value is substantially identical with the actual value." The insistence is that Art. IV, sec. VII, par. 12 of the State Constitution "implies the requirement of an administrative officer to make assessments, and applies equally to exemption from and apportionment of taxes, as well as to the imposition and levy of taxes." In sum, it is argued that the Legislature "could have directed the State Tax Commissioner to establish and certify valuations de novo, provided a legislative standard or guide were furnished," but that it "had no constitutional power to dispense with the need of establishing valuations de novo, nor any power to itself establish the valuations."

These contentions are wholly untenable. As declared in Hoboken v. Martin, supra [123 N.J.L. 442, 9 A.2d 334], the Legislature "may apportion and distribute" these tax revenues "as it may see fit and determine." And, while it may entrust the effectuation of its declared policy to an administrative agency, if the authority of the latter be confined by established standards of action, and thereby it performs its essential legislative function, it is elementary that the legislative power may in a given case be exerted directly, unless for practical reasons the intervention of a fact-finding instrumentality is essential to the consummation of the legislative object with due observance of constitutional precepts. Jersey City v. Martin, 126 N.J.L. 353, 19 A.2d 40. It may, if it chooses, adopt valuations or other factual findings made by a subordinate agency, and this without regard to whether such administrative action was in pursuance of a lawful grant of authority. Certainly, it was within the province of the legislative authority to adopt the valuations and formula established by the Tax Commissioner as designed to effect the distribution of these revenues in consonance with what it conceived to be considerations of fairness and equity. The fact that the commissioner acted without a valid grant of power does not put the results of his labors beyond adoption by the Legislature, whose power in the premises is not limited by the Constitution. Respondents proceed on the erroneous hypothesis that the Legislature cannot do what it may delegate another to do in its behalf, even though direct action may be had without transcending constitutional limitations. There is no inhibition upon the Legislature in the disposal of these moneys except that they be devoted to public uses and purposes. And the restraint imposed by Art. IV, sec. VII, par. 12, of the State Constitution, does not extend to the exercise of this power. The challenged legislative action is not classable as the assessment of "property" for taxes, but rather the distribution of collected excise charges. Vide Jersey City v. Martin, supra. The law-making body is the sole judge of the fairness and wisdom of the distribution it directs. State Board of Assessors v. Central R. R. Co., 48 N.J.L. 146, at pages 277, 287, 334, 4 A. 578.

Second: The next point made by respondents is that the statutes "referred to 'valuation, data and methods employed' by the State Tax Commissioner;" that "this 'data'" and the "valuations determined and certified" are "wholly unidentified in the acts;" that "the term 'methods employed' is not only loose, but, so far as the statute is concerned, it is utterly impossible to know what is meant;" that "there is nothing to show when the valuations were determined or certified, or to whom," and they "cannot be ascertained by anyone, without recourse to the State Tax Commissioner himself;" that it is not sufficient, as appellants maintain, that the commissioner's valuations are "ascertainable" as "matters of record" in his "office and in court," since they cannot "be identified from the acts themselves;" and so "there is a total disregard" of Art. IV, sec. VII, par. 4, of the State Constitution, "to say nothing of the fundamental requirement for certainty in legislation."

This contention is likewise groundless.

The cited constitutional provision...