Jesse Bartlett's Heirs v. Cocke

• Decision Date: 01 January 1855
• Citation: 15 Tex. 471
• Parties: JESSE BARTLETT'S HEIRS v. JAMES H. COCKE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

15 Tex. 471

JESSE BARTLETT'S HEIRS

v.JAMES H. COCKE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1855.

It was not essential, under the civil code of Louisiana, in force here prior to 1840, nor under the act of congress of that year (Hart. Dig. art. 1026), that the extension of the time for the administration of a succession should have been made before the expiration of the year. The proposition that at the end of the year the estate vested immediately in the heirs, on the supposition that the estate was fully administered, and the administrator discharged by operation of law, is not sound.

Where an administrator's sale has been regularly made and the purchase money paid (confirmation not being required by the laws then in force), a deed from the administrator to the purchaser is not essential to the defense of the latter, or those claiming under him, in a suit by the heirs for the recovery of the land. [8 Tex. 36;20 Tex. 372.]

If necessary for the right of the purchaser, it would seem that an administrator, although his office may have expired, may execute a formal conveyance for lands sold and the purchase money paid during his administration.

See this case in confirmation of the case of Poor v. Boyce, 12 Tex. 440, on the point that under former laws for the extension of administrations, third persons were not required to look further than to see that a person once duly invested with the powers of administrator, continued to act with the sanction of the probate court.

It seems that it is not essential for an administrator's deed to recite the previous proceedings.

See this case as to equity, where heirs seek to recover land on the ground of defects in an administrator's sale.

Quære, whether the statute of limitations would not run against an administrator from the time of the sale by him, and against all the heirs represented by the administrator, to cure defects in the proceedings anterior to the sale?

Appeal from Washington. It did not appear that a new bond was either ordered or filed at the extension of February 25, 1839. In the deed from Oliver Jones to McFaddin, the date of the petition for an order of sale was described as the 22d of October, 1840, but the petition was copied at length, and purported to conclude with the date in figures, as follows: “Washington, October 22, 1842.” The deed recited that the sale was made in pursuance of said order, on the 3d of December, 1840.

Lewis & Barber, for appellants.

I. The time of Jones and Bartlett, as administrators of Jesse Bartlett's estate, was not extended by the order of February 25, 1839, neither is it sought in the petition; no new bond was given; new bond was required prior to February 2, 1844. (Hart. Dig. art. 1069; Civil Code of La. art. 1199.)

On the 13th day of September, 1839, the succession of Jesse Bartlett was not vacant. (Fisk v. Norvel, 9 Tex. 13;Boyle v. Forbes, Id. 35;Flores v. Howth, 5 Id. 329.)

The property belonged to the heirs of Bartlett. (Fisk v. Norvel.) All debts against the estate were presumed to have been paid. (Fisk v. Norvel.) The probate court had no jurisdiction or authority to reopen it. (Boyle v. Forbes; Fisk v. Norvel.)

But granting that the succession had not been closed prior to September 13, 1839, and that the order of that date was an appointment of Oliver Jones as sole administrator of the vacant succession, still the subsequent proceedings relative to said appointment, the failure of the court to issue letters to him as such sole administrator, show that it was not regarded either by Oliver Jones or the probate court as a new appointment.

That order could not operate as an extension of time even if the estate had been open at that date. The petition did not pray for it; the order does not “““affirmatively” extend it.

If the converse be true, for what period was the time extended? It could not be extended for more than twelve months by the same order.

The limit of twelve months would have expired on the 30th day of September, 1840. But the first and only regular and legal extension of time given by the probate judge, after the first opening of the succession, was granted by order of the 22d day of October, 1840, which was an extension of eight months from ““the granting” said order, which time expired on the 22d day of June, 1841. This was also the last order for extension of time.

Oliver Jones could not have been administrator of the estate of Bartlett, deceased, on the 22d day of October, 1840; the property by operation of law was vested in the heirs, and the probate court had no authority to make the order of that date or at any subsequent time. The calling Jones administrator in the orders of the probate court was not of itself an extension of time. It was not necessary before bringing this action to tender the purchase money. The doctrine of caveat emptor applies.

II. Was Oliver Jones administrator of the estate of Bartlett at the time of executing the deed to McFaddin? Even if he was administrator on the 22d of October, 1840, his administration closed on the 22d of June, 1841. (See Sect. 5th, February, 1840, Hart. Dig. arts. 1026 and 1042.) A deed executed by Oliver Jones as administrator, and on the 25th day of September, 1844 (three years and three months after his administration was closed), could confer no title upon the grantee -- not even if the order of sale and sale had been legal. He could not then have been held responsible upon his bond for his acts.

III. The deed from Oliver Jones to McFaddin is void for uncertainty. From the recitals in the deed it appears that the sale was made on the 3d day of December, 1840, under an order dated the 22d day of October, 1842; while the deed itself bears date the 25th day of September, 1844.

J. Willie, also for appellant.

Giddings & Giddings, for appellee.

HEMPHILL, CH. J.

This was a suit by the heirs of Jesse Bartlett, deceased, to recover from James H. Cocke a tract of land originally belonging to the estate of the deceased, and claimed by defendants through mesne conveyances from an administrator's sale. The main question in the cause is whether Oliver Jones, who acted as administrator at the sale of the land, was in fact administrator, his term of office having previously expired, as is contended by the appellants. To understand the position of the administrator at that date, it will be necessary to recur to the principal proceedings had in the probate court in relation to the estate. Jesse Bartlett died in January, 1838, and on the 26th of the month Oliver Jones and Joseph Bartlett (one of the plaintiffs in this suit) were appointed administrators. On the 25th of February, 1839, the administrators conceiving that by virtue of their offices as administrators of Bartlett, they were compelled to administer the successions of one Smith and of one Frind, prayed an extension of time principally upon account of the last; but a general order was passed, allowing them six months to make a final settlement, which of course included the estate of Bartlett.

On the 10th July the administrators exhibited their account showing a large amount of debts against the estate unpaid, and praying for a more perfect inventory. The account was received and an inventory ordered, at the July term, it is presumed, there being no date. Subsequently to this, Joseph Bartlett resigned and was discharged, and Oliver Jones was to render his bond as administrator, in a sum far beyond twice the value of the estate. The date of the resignation of Bartlett, and the extension of time to Jones, or in fact his reappointment, are not stated. The presumption is that these acts were done at the August term, the bond of Jones, in compliance with the order, being dated on the 13th of September, 1839. On the 30th of September, Jones, under his new appointment, took his oath of office. On the 31st of December, 1839, the administrator by petition represented the necessity of selling the personal and a portion of the real property to pay the debts of the estate, and prayed a decree to that effect, which was granted and a sale ordered. No action was had under this order, and a petition for sale was again filed on the 22d of October, 1840, referring in this petition to the home place, a portion of which was proposed for sale, and there was a prayer for further time for the settlement of the succession. A sale was ordered, and eight months further time for the settlement of the estate was allowed.

In conformity with this order, the property in question, together with other portions of the estate, was sold on the first and second days of December, 1840, and Nathan A. McFaddin is set down as the purchaser.

In April, 1843, the administrator, at the petition of one of the heirs, joined by her husband, was cited to...