Jessie L., In re

• Decision Date: 27 April 1982
• Docket Number: Cr. 37738
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re JESSIE L. and Edward J., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSIE L. and Edward J., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 396

182 Cal.Rptr. 396

131 Cal.App.3d 202

In re JESSIE L. and Edward J., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSIE L. and Edward J., Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 37738.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

April 27, 1982.

Douglas B. Finlayson, Westminster, and Jolene Larimore, Sepulvedo, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for defendants and appellants.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Marc E. Turchin

and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

In petitions filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellants Jessie L. and Edward J. were charged in six counts with murder, attempted robbery, assault with a deadly weapon and robbery. After denial of their various pretrial motions, there was a plea bargain in which it was stipulated that the cause be submitted on the police reports, that appellants would be found to have committed second degree murder although the evidence would support a finding of first degree murder, and that the remaining counts would be dismissed. Upon the finding of murder and the dismissal of other counts in accordance with the understanding, appellants were committed to the Youth Authority. They appeal.

Since the issues on appeal relate primarily to the pretrial motions, only a brief summary of the circumstances of the crimes is necessary. On the evening of January 29, 1980, appellants and their two juvenile companions, Barry M. and David C., smoked PCP, acquired a sawed-off rifle and looked around their Long Beach neighborhood for someone to rob. They encountered Fredrick Cruz Saldana who was emptying his trash. David C. pointed the rifle at him and demanded money. When Mr. Saldana replied loudly that he did not have any, several of his relatives came out, and David C. fired the rifle at Daniel Saldana Corona, striking him in the ankle. The young men then went to Seventh and Almond near the Alpha Beta market and hid in the bushes looking for another victim. As two boys, William Steele and Patrick Laverly, left the market, Barry M. stepped out of the bushes and pointed the rifle at them, demanding their money. When William Steele responded that they had no money, Barry M. fired the gun into Steele's chest, killing him. The robbers fled together. They were all arrested on February 1, 1980, and made incriminating statements to the police.

Appellants raise numerous contentions. They both contend they were arrested without probable cause and also that the murder weapon was unlawfully seized. Edward urges additionally that the prosecution failed to comply with a discovery order, that he was unlawfully arrested at his home without a warrant, that his statement to the police was involuntary, that the procedure of submitting on the police reports was improper, that the evidence is insufficient to show he aided and abetted the attempted robberies, that the felony-murder rule should be abolished, and that the court abused its discretion in committing him to the Youth Authority. We affirm, finding no merit to these contentions.

PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST BASED IN PART ON INFORMATION FROM DAVID C.

Under the authority of a juvenile court arrest warrant for grand theft auto, the police arrested David C. at his home shortly after 5 a. m. on February 1, 1980. David was taken immediately to the police station where he was interviewed by Officer Miller for about an hour beginning at 5:25 a. m. He made statements implicating himself, appellants and Barry M. in the crimes. He informed the officer of the residences where appellants lived. The officers went there and arrested appellants. Appellants contend (1) that the information from David C. should have been excluded because David was unlawfully detained at the police station; (2) that the information from David C. should have been excluded on grounds of a failure by the prosecution to comply fully with a defense discovery order; and (3) that even if not excluded the information from David C. was insufficient to provide probable cause for appellants' arrest. The result, appellants contend, is that their arrests were illegal and that their own subsequent statements to police should be suppressed as products of such illegality.

Edward contends that David C. was unlawfully interrogated by Officer Miller because under the juvenile court arrest warrant David should have been taken to Edward next claims that the prosecution did not give timely discovery to the defense concerning the information from David C., and that therefore the testimony supporting probable cause to arrest appellants should have been suppressed.

                juvenile hall instead of to the police station.  The warrant was not placed in evidence;  there was no evidence that the warrant required that David be taken immediately to juvenile hall.  (Cf. Pen.Code, § 814;  Welf. & Inst. Code, § 626.)   The interrogation began within 20 minutes of his arrest and lasted for 1 hour, a minimal delay.  Even assuming, however, that this was an unnecessary delay within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 626, such a delay would not render David's statement inadmissible.  The only question is whether David's statement was voluntarily made, and the delay in taking him to a juvenile probation officer is only one factor to be considered.  (People v. Harris, 28 Cal.3d 935, 953-954, 171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240;  People v. Thompson, 27 Cal.3d 303, 329-330, 165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883;  In re Michael E., 112 Cal.App.3d 74, 79-80, 169 Cal.Rptr. 62.)   Indeed, appellant has no standing to contest the legality of David's interrogation unless he can show that David's statement was actually coerced.  (People v. Varnum, 66 Cal.2d 808, 812-813, 59 Cal.Rptr. 108, 427 P.2d 772.)   Appellant fails to make such showing.  The only evidence at the hearing was that David C. was advised of and waived his constitutional rights and voluntarily made his statement to the police.  The delay was not shown to be a coercive factor rendering the statement involuntary
                

David C. told the police about Barry M. by name but he did not know appellants' names. He knew one of the appellants by nickname (Spooty) and he knew where both appellants lived. He told Officer Miller that Spooty lived with Barry in an identified apartment building on Cerritos, in the last apartment on the left, and that the other suspect lived in the green house next door to that apartment building on the north. He drew a rough sketch of the location for Officer Miller. Officer Miller discussed this information with Officer Castillo, the patrolman whose beat included that neighborhood. Officer Castillo was familiar with the residents at both of those locations. He knew that appellant Jessie L. was nicknamed "Spooty" and lived at the apartment in question, and that appellant Edward J. lived in the house.

However, the police report by Officer Miller of his interview with David C., which was provided initially to the defense on February 22, 1980, did not contain the information that David had identified one suspect as Spooty and had pointed out the residences of both. The report simply indicated that David had implicated Barry M. and two friends, all of whom were male Negroes.

When this question was drawn to his attention by the prosecutor, Officer Miller reviewed his report and realized it was incomplete. He still remembered the interview with David C. and he prepared a supplemental report which was provided to the defense on March 18, 1980, the day before the first day of pretrial hearings. The reason he did not put this information in his original report was that he "just screwed up, that's all." At the time he wrote his original report he erroneously thought such information was not necessary. "[Y]ou could go on for three days dictating stuff...." After dictating his report, he had disposed of his handwritten notes of the interview. As for the map, "It was just a rough sketch. I knew where he was talking about, 9th and Cerritos, and I wanted to be sure that we went to the right houses. He drew it out on a piece of paper where it was." When the arrests were made, Officer Miller threw away the map, figuring it was of no use anymore, and that the addresses would be noted in the arrest reports.

The trial court found that appellants were not prejudiced by the delayed discovery, since the supplemental report was eventually provided the defense, and that a continuance would be adequate to enable appellants to meet the officer's testimony.

Both in denying a motion to dismiss and in ultimately denying all the pretrial motions, the court indicated that the officer did not wilfully suppress evidence, that the court understood how the mistake could have happened, and that the court was satisfied that the defense had not been prejudiced and that the truth came out.

The trial court correctly concluded that the delayed discovery did not justify dismissal or other sanction. Where there has been a failure of discovery the normal remedy is not dismissal or the suppression of evidence, but a continuance to enable the defense to meet the new evidence. (People v. Reyes, 12 Cal.3d 486, 501-502, 116 Cal.Rptr. 217, 526 P.2d 225; People v. McGowan, 105 Cal.App.3d 997, 1002, 166 Cal.Rptr. 725.) Here appellant received the supplemental report, the trial court offered a continuance, and appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Officer Miller about the new evidence. (People v. McGowan, supra.) It is appellant's burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delayed discovery, and he has failed to satisfy that burden. His argument that had he known about the details of David C.'s statement earlier he could have prepared a better defense is highly speculative. (People v. Reyes, supra, at p. 502, 116 Cal.Rptr. 217...