Jester v. State

Decision Date19 November 1997
Docket NumberNo. A97A2450,A97A2450
Citation494 S.E.2d 284,229 Ga.App. 490
Parties, 97 FCDR 4354 JESTER v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Shaw, Maddox, Graham, Monk & Boling, Thomas H. Manning, Rome, for appellant.

Tambra P. Colston, District Attorney, Fred R. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

John Robert Jester appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine, arguing that (1) the trial court erroneously admitted his prior criminal record into evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence seized during a warrantless search; and (3) the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial. Jester was indicted for possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on the charge of possession of cocaine but not guilty on the charge of intent to sell.

On July 11, 1996, officers of the Rome Metro Task Force received a tip from a confidential informant that Ben Pinson, a known drug dealer, had crack cocaine in his possession. Arriving at the location given to them, the officers saw Pinson, Jester, and two other men standing in front of the house of Joyce Ferguson, Jester's mother. As the officers pulled up, Jester, Pinson, and the others ran around to the back of the house, whereupon Jester, Pinson, and one other man ran inside. Running around the opposite side of the house, Officer Rodney Clemones pursued the men to the rear thereof and walked up to the back door. After Jester entered the rear door, Clemones heard Ferguson yelling at the men to leave her home. Since the main door was open, Clemones was able to see inside the house through a closed screen door. At that point, Clemones saw Jester throw an object into the freezer. According to Clemones, he then asked Ferguson for permission to enter the house and search the freezer, and she consented verbally. Upon searching the freezer, Clemones found a small medicine bottle containing crack cocaine, and Jester was taken into custody. Following the search of her freezer, Ferguson signed a consent form on which a notation was made that she had previously given verbal consent. During his trial, Jester maintained that the cocaine belonged to Pinson, who threw the medicine bottle into the sink when he entered the house. Jester testified that he then took the medicine bottle and tried to hide it in the freezer because he was afraid that his mother would get into trouble.

1. Jester first contends that the trial court erred by admitting his prior criminal record into evidence in violation of OCGA § 24-9-20(b), which indicates that "no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue." At trial, Jester was asked, "Were you working with Ben Pinson selling drugs?" Jester responded, "No, sir. I do not sell drugs. I wasn't even working--I wasn't working with Ben Pinson." Following this testimony, the State asked that Jester's 1993 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute be admitted because "[Jester had] just point-blank said he does not sell drugs, and that is contradicted by his--by this conviction." The trial court admitted the prior conviction evidence on the basis that Jester's answer, when compounded with his defense that he was just trying to protect his mother, brought his character into question.

The State concedes that Jester's statement was not enough to put his character into evidence. See Sanders v. State, 199 Ga.App. 671, 672-673(3), 405 S.E.2d 727 (1991) (statement by defendant that he did not do drugs insufficient to put character in evidence). However, "[t]here are numerous instances where the state may properly offer evidence that the defendant has committed prior crimes for a purpose other than to show the defendant is a person of bad character. The fact that such evidence may reflect adversely on the defendant does not place his character 'in issue' within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-20(b)." (Citations omitted.) Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 759(1)(c), 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988). "Under Bland v. State, 198 Ga.App. 671, 672, 402 S.E.2d 782 (1991), [Jester's] statement that he did not [sell drugs] could be construed as a denial that he had ever been involved in any cocaine-related offenses so as to render admissible for purposes of impeachment (by disproving the facts testified to by defendant) evidence that he had previously been convicted of possession of cocaine [with intent to sell]." (Punctuation omitted.) Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga.App. 143, 145(2), 449 S.E.2d 660 (1994). Therefore, evidence of Jester's prior conviction was appropriately admitted in order to impeach specific testimony. Although the trial court admitted the evidence on grounds other than impeachment, "[w]e have consistently held that a correct decision of a trial court will not be reversed, regardless of the reasons given therefor." (Punctuation omitted.) Ely v. State, 192 Ga.App. 203, 205(4), 384 S.E.2d 268 (1989).

2. Jester also contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the bottle of cocaine retrieved from his mother's freezer as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. "When we review a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, the evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court; the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility are adopted unless they are clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them." (Punctuation omitted.) Sutton v. State, 223 Ga.App. 721, 722(1), 478 S.E.2d 910 (1996). We find that denial of Jester's motion to suppress was proper.

Specifically, Jester argues that the arresting officers improperly entered upon the curtilage of Ferguson's home, that the officers entered the home without a warrant and without the existence of exigent circumstances, and that Ferguson did not consent to the search of her freezer until after it took place. The information provided by the known confidential informant which the task...

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9 cases
  • State v. Kelly
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 4, 2003
    ...escape"; rather "it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response"); see also, e.g., Jester v. State, 229 Ga.App. 490, 494 S.E.2d 284, 286-87 (1997) (officers had reasonable articulable basis to stop suspect and so were justified in chasing fleeing suspect onto In......
  • Short v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 5, 1998
    ...of the evidence. Lester v. State, 226 Ga.App. 373, 376(2), 487 S.E.2d 25 (1997)." (Punctuation omitted.) Jester v. State, 229 Ga.App. 490, 493(3), 494 S.E.2d 284 (1997). So viewing the evidence, it reveals that Kamari Thomas testified that he, John Kirkland, Mike Kirkland, and Short discuss......
  • Leary v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 22, 2002
    ...(1999). 8. Id. 9. See id. 10. See Payne v. State, 248 Ga.App. 158, 160(2), 545 S.E.2d 336 (2001); Porter, supra; Jester v. State, 229 Ga.App. 490, 491(1), 494 S.E.2d 284 (1997); see also Lucas v. State, 234 Ga.App. 534, 538(3), 507 S.E.2d 253 (1998) (State allowed to introduce prior DUI con......
  • King v. State, A08A0732.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 2008
    ...steps leading to the rear deck and back door. Chasing criminal suspects into backyards is certainly a permissible police activity. See Jester v. State.10 Accordingly, the officers were validly at the back steps leading to the back door at the time it became obvious they needed to talk to th......
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