Jewett v. Carter

• Decision Date: 03 March 1882
• Citation: 132 Mass. 335
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Clarence F. Jewett & another v. Charles L. Carter

132 Mass. 335

Clarence F. Jewett & another v. Charles L. Carter

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

March 3, 1882

Argued November 4, 1880

Essex. Contract for the price of a book called "History of Essex County." The answer set up that the defendant's agreement to accept and pay for the book was obtained by certain false representations. Trial in the Superior Court, before Aldrich, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows:

Before the publication of the history, and in contemplation thereof the plaintiffs employed one Ryanson as their agent to obtain subscriptions for the work. This agent of the plaintiffs called on the defendant and exhibited to him an agreement and statement of the plaintiffs prefixed to it, and stating the objects of the work and what it would contain.

In addition to said general statement of what the contemplated history was to contain, the defendant, against the plaintiffs' objection, was allowed to introduce oral evidence, tending to prove that said agent, before the defendant signed said agreement and for the purpose of inducing him to sign the same, made the representations set forth in the defendant's answer; that those representations were false and known by the plaintiffs to be so; and that the defendant was induced thereby to subscribe for the book.

The plaintiffs requested the judge to rule "that the words 'History of Essex County,' having a well-defined precise and unambiguous meaning, parol evidence to show in what sense the words were understood by the parties is not admissible." But the judge admitted the evidence objected to, for the purpose of showing what the plaintiffs' proposed History of Essex County was to be.

The plaintiffs also requested the judge to rule as follows "1. In order to relieve the defendant from the obligation of accepting and paying for the book on the ground of fraudulent statements made to him by the plaintiffs' agent, it must appear that the statements were not only false in fact, but were known by the agent to be false, and it was not enough that the agent had reasonable cause to believe that the statements made by him were untrue. 2. If the statements made by the plaintiffs' agent were false in fact, and were known by the plaintiffs to be false, yet, if the agent did not know them to be false, there is no ground to justify the defendant's refusal to accept the book, in the absence of authority to the agent from the plaintiffs to make such false statements."

The judge declined to rule as requested, but instructed the jury that the plaintiffs would be responsible only for the acts and representations of their agent made and performed within the scope of his agency, explaining in this connection, so far as was necessary for the purposes of this case, the law of principal and agent; and further instructed the jury, that if the plaintiffs' agent, acting within the scope of his agency, and for the purpose of inducing the defendant to subscribe for the book, made, as true and as of his own knowledge, the...